The relationship between the ulama and the government in the contemporary Saudi Arabian Kingdom: an interdependent relationship? by Marines, Alejandra Galindo
Durham E-Theses
The relationship between the ulama and the
government in the contemporary Saudi Arabian
Kingdom: an interdependent relationship?
Marines, Alejandra Galindo
How to cite:
Marines, Alejandra Galindo (2001) The relationship between the ulama and the government in the
contemporary Saudi Arabian Kingdom: an interdependent relationship?, Durham theses, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3989/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
The Relationship Between the Ulama and the 
Government in the Contemporary Saudi Arabian 
Kingdom: An Interdependent Relationship? 
Submitted by 
Alejandra Galindo Marines 
The copyright of this thesis rests with 
the author. No quotation from it should 
he published in any form, including 
Electronic and the Internet, without the 
author's prior written consent. All 
information derived from this thesis 
must he acknowledged appropriately. 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Durham 
Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
2001 
1 9 SEP 2 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between the ulama and the government in 
contemporary Saudi Arabia (end of 1970s until 1999). The study contends that the 
relationship between the ulama and the government is based on interdependence. The 
majority of previous analysis on Saudi Arabia underplays the importance of the role of 
the ulama, who indeed no longer have direct access to the government's decision-
making. However this study shows how the role of the ulama is paramount for the 
legitimacy of the regime, an aspect that defines the nature of the interdependence 
between the ulama and the government. Two sets of hypothesis are used to explain how 
this relationship oscillates between conflict and cooperation in relation to the creation 
and maintenance of the legitimacy of the regime. 
An analysis of the historical role of the ulama and examples of their role in current 
times has been brought in, to provide an understanding of the development of the role of 
both the ulama and the government in Saudi Arabia. The creation and maintenance of 
the legitimacy of the political system in Saudi Arabia underscores how and in which 
domains the relationship between the parties produces both conflict and cooperation, as 
well as how Saudi society participates in the maintenance of the legitimacy. The 
ulama'^ role, moderating among the different actors of the society, has been emphasised 
through an examination of the contestation of the regime by different groups and 
individuals since 1979, and the record of cooperation with the government. 
The conclusions of the research show how the ulama are important for the definition of 
the mles and values around which Saudi society revolves. However the role of the 
ulama is being threatened by the challenges emanating from the access to modern 
technology and the implications of the incorporation of Saudi society into the world 
economy. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
A dominant topic in the study of Islam has been the issue of the relationship 
between religion and politics. The most widespread idea is that the mixture of these two 
domains is prevalent in the Islamic/Muslims societies, and that this is associated with 
backwardness given that in the Western world modernisation is anchored on the 
separation of these two dominions. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents an 
example of an existing political system where Islam has played, and still plays, an 
important role. Thus, an appreciation of the relationship between the ulama and the 
government is central to understanding how politics and religion act in tandem to 
regulate and to influence Saudi society. The main feature of the relationship between 
these two actors is their interdependency in establishing both their authority and their 
legitimacy. 
The principal concern of this research is the analysis of the ulama vis-a-vis the 
government. At the core of this relationship are the issues of authority and legitimacy, 
which are constantly being defined, at times swinging from conflict to cooperation in 
their relationship throughout the history of the kingdom. The ulama, as the interpreters 
of the sacred sources, are continuously in competition with the government and also 
with other groups and discourses over the sacred sources. In general terms, the 
definition of the domains of the ulama and the government has not been permanent nor 
has the interpretation of Islam in this sphere, since the latter has involved social 
practices attached to the particularities of the society. 
The resources controlled by the government and the official ulama make them 
the principal influence to determine the interpretation of Islam and the content of the 
principles that govern life in Saudi society. However, different contexts or situations 
have influenced the scope and the terms of the definition of authority and legitimacy. 
This research seeks to emphasise the changing conjunctures from the late seventies to 
the present, where internal and external processes overlap and produce shifts in the 
balance in the relationship between the ulama and the government. 
The point of departure is based on a conception of power, which is not limited to 
power over society, but power with a transformative capacity. This may be imposed not 
only from above, but may also result from social individuals participating in the daily 
creation and recreation of norms. 
As a way to set this study within a wider framework, it is necessary first to 
describe the historical role of the ulama, as an active social group and in relation to state 
authority. An examination of the relationship between the ulama and the government in 
countries such as Morocco, Egypt and Iran will show how this relationship has evolved, 
thereby bringing out the particular features of the Saudi Arabian case. The second part 
of this chapter presents the issues that are considered critical in the case of Saudi 
Arabia, defining the content of the relationship and its actors. It will also explain how 
this study is conceived. 
1.1. The ITlama and their Historical Role 
The current usage of the term "ulama " (singular alim) refers to the persons who 
possess the knowledge (ilm) of science at large. Traditionally this term has been applied 
to those scholars who are knowledgeable of Islamic traditions and Islamic law.' On the 
basis of their knowledge and the qualifications derived from it, the ulama are perceived 
as being protectors of the Islamic heritage and their work has been the maintenance of 
Islam. "They were the agency which could identify with Islamism things of this world, 
constituted them as Islam, name them, form them into a tradition of scholarship and 
' Macdonald, D. B. (1937). "Ulama" in Encyclopaedia of Islam (hereafter £ / ) (in French). (Leiden: E . J 
Brill), pp. 1047-1048. 
learning, and into an ethos" (Al-Azmeh, 1997: 102). Their contribution was paramount 
to the development of the Islamic and Muslim community and the tasks performed by 
them were products of the religious, and socio-political imperatives faced by this 
community.^ Among the functions and tasks that the ulama have been performing are 
mufti, qadi (judge),/agi/i (jurist), khatib (preacher), mudarris (teacher). A brief account 
of each of them follows, emphasising also the relation between the ulama and the 
central authority. 
The origin of the role of mufti can be traced to the first year after the hegira 
(seventh century), after the death of the prophet, when the companions acted as muftis 
answering questions of the people regarding the rites and problems of daily life, 
according to the precepts of the sunna and Qur'an. During the Umayyad period, the 
qadi office was created due to the growing necessities of the new Islamic community. 
The qudat (sing, qadi) became the secretaries of the central government, administering 
and regulating daily life, enforcing Islamic norms and in this way ensuring Qu'ranic 
regulations prevailed (Schacht, 1970: 548). Of this group, some focused on the task of 
codifying and formulating the law. At the beginning the sunna was simply seen in terms 
of ideal practice or precedent, but gradually with the emergence of distinguished 
scholars and the establishment of madrasas, it became the sunna of the scholars until 
finally it became the sunna of the Prophet. The main preoccupation of the religious 
leadership was the definition of the norms and ethics of the society according to the 
precepts of the Qur'an, establishing the duties of individuals toward God and their 
fellow men (Gibb, 1962: 197-200). 
Most of the ulama served as qadi (pi. qudat) whose main domain was the 
knowledge of the shari'a and whose principal function was the exercise of justice 
- For a general review on the biographic literature about the ulama see: Humphreys, Stephen (1991). 
Islamic Histoiy: A Framework of Analysis. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
{aclil). They were representatives of the central authority in towns and cities.^ Other 
functions traditionally attached to the figure of qadi were the guardianship of orphans 
and supervision of testament wills, and they were in charge of marrying women who 
had no guardian. The qadi also had to be familiar with the issues of public order and 
public interest, as well as the supervision of the aw^a/(religious endowments) (Gardet, 
1969: 137). 
At first, the duties developed by the qudat were devoid of economic gain, since 
the qadi had either an independent source of income or another profession by which he 
could earn his living. However, a breach of this practice was seen during the period of 
the Abbasid Caliphate, when the qadi started to receive money from the central 
authority, and when the Caliphate began to provide money for pensions and salaries for 
some mosques (Gibb and Bowen, 1957: 82).^ * The same was true of the muftis. After the 
development of Islamic law their function changed to that of providers of religious and 
legal opinion, although some of them kept their independence. Nonetheless, the muftis' 
contribution to the establishment of the canon of law was significant, since their opinion 
was important for its evolution (Schacht, 1970: 550). 
Another role that arose from the development of the law was that of faqih (pi. 
fuqaha) or expert on the science of law. Originally this role was associated with the 
independent exercise of reasoning and giving opinions based on the Qur'an, sunna and 
daily life, as opposed to ilm which was associated only with the knowledge of the two 
first sources (Goldziher, 1987:101). The consolidation of Islamic law during the 
Abbasid period produced the specialisation of scholars on law and its four roots [the 
Qu'ran, sunna, qiyas (analogies) and ijma (consensus)]. 
• See Juynboll, W (1936). " K A D I " EI. (in French). (Leiden: E . J . Brill), pp. 645-646. 
•* The function of qadi was very importanl for the cahph or central authority, since the geographical 
extension of the Islamic community made his role the link between the authority and the society at large. 
The interference of the political authority in judicial affairs started with the appointment or dismissal of 
the qadi according to the will and the collusion of interest of the caliph in the application of the law. See 
Coulson, N. J . (1996) "Doctrine and Practice of Islamic Law" in Edge, Ian (ed.). Islamic Law and Legal 
Theory. (Aldershol: Dartmouth:), pp. 425-440. 
The ulama's, role as teachers was very important, since religious education was 
an informal type of education based on a close personal relationship between teacher 
and student. The madrasa (traditional school), located in the mosques, was the main 
source of education available. The study of the religious sources allowed knowledge to 
be handed down from generation to generation. 
From the beginning, the ulama were heterogeneous because of the very nature of 
their role as jurists, judges or theologians. On the one hand, this reflected the diverse 
content of knowledge attained until Abbasid period, and on the other this group was not 
closed to any particular social background, since it was thanks to the financial donations 
of prominent families that the students were supported.'^  In general terms, there were 
those ulama associated with the political authorities and those who were independent. 
Sometimes the stance of the religious scholars was one of appeasement towards the 
central authorities, criticising them but not opposing them. This happened during the 
Umayyad period. At other times, they opposed the authority of the caliph as in the 
famous case of Ibn Hanbal and his dispute with the Caliph al-Mu'min during the 
Abbasid period. In this sense, it is important to consider that in the process of creating 
an Islamic culture and creating the norms of public life, the religious scholars 
incorporated the realities of their times. After all, the ulama were the ones who, 
adapting to the situation of their time, legitimised the figure of the Caliph and the 
political authority in general, giving the Caliph the right to intervene in religion as well 
(Schacht, 1970: 550).^ 
^ For general comments about the social roots of the ulama during the Abbassid period see; Sourdel, 
Dominique (1979). Medieval Islam. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), pp. 152-154. 
For a discussion about the theories of caliphate see: Ayubi, Nazih (1991). Political Islam: Religion and 
Politics in the Arab World. (London, New York: Routledge). Gibb Alexander (1962). Studies on the 
Civilization of Islam. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Lambton, Ann (1981). State and Government 
in Medieval Islam. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rosenthal, Erwin (1958). Political Thought in 
Islam: an Introductory Outline. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
1.2. T h e Relationship between the Ulama and the 
Government in Morocco, Egypt and Iran 
In the contemporary world, the role of the ulama has evolved in particular ways, 
but their role as the major providers of the rules that regulate daily life in society has 
remained unchanged. One has to bear in mind that Islam is not a monolithic system, 
rather it is subject to the traditions and development of each society and each country, in 
the same way that the political system is a result of those dynamics. The relationship 
between the ulama and government is therefore different in each country. Three cases 
will be presented as a means of framing the analysis of this research. Although the 
comments on each country do not constitute an exhaustive study, they do seek to 
elucidate briefly the way that the government and the ulama relationship has evolved, 
stressing mainly two variables: the autonomy of the ulama and the role of the ulama in 
legitimising state policies (Dessouki, 1987: 135). 
The countries Morocco, Egypt and Iran, are examples of the different patterns of 
the relationship that exist between the ulama and the government in Muslim societies. 
To some extent Morocco shares with Saudi Arabia, the characteristic of being 
monarchies rooted in religion. Egypt, as a famous historical centre for religious 
learning, represents a point of reference on how the ulama, from being a group that 
mediated between political authorities and society, became subordinated to state 
authority. In contrast, Iran represents the Shi'a version and shows how independent 
religious leaders were able to create a revolution to end the monarchical government 
and to change the political system into a religious orientated one. 
The Moroccan monarchy, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, is intertwined with 
religion. Both countries are products of religious movements, but in the case of 
Morocco, the disputes among different tribal and religious groups, as well as the 
colonial experience, created a rather distinct type of relationship between the ulama and 
the government. The ruling family, by virtue of its own origins, portrays Islamic 
legitimacy. The founder of the country, Al Idrissi I (eighth century), was the grandson 
of A l i , the Prophet's son-in-law. Authority since then has been anchored in a religious 
legitimacy that has been recreated by the leaders of the different dynasties, by claiming 
family links to Al Idrissi and the Prophet's family. A popular manifestation of those 
claims is the notion of religious charisma (baraka), which is the product of the ancestry 
claimed by the rulers of Morocco. Descendants of the Prophet were seen as blessed with 
a divine force to give abundance and prosperity in the material world (Bourqia, 1999: 
246). Another source of religious legitimacy derived from the lineage has been the title 
of Amir al Muslimin (leader of the Muslims) and/or Amir al Mu'minin, (leader of the 
believers) by different dynasties, up to the present.^  In sum, the political authorities 
enjoyed, by their ancestry, the command of religion in the eyes of the population, in 
terms of religious charisma and religious authority. 
Some of the ulama in Morocco can also be considered as possessors of baraka, 
as persons whose religious knowledge would make them close to God. However the 
ulama up to the pre-colonial period did not play a strong role, since the power of the 
Sultan was stronger than theirs. Only those ulama who were considered to be upholders 
of baraka could defy the Sultan's power (Munson, 1993: 54-55). In fact, due to the 
religious credentials that accompanied the figure of the King, the ulama effectively 
share with him the interpretation and knowledge of religion. 
During the period of struggle against the colonial power, the ulama played an 
important role, constituting an organised group that supported independence. But, 
thereafter, there was a continuous reduction in their role, as independence led to an 
expansion of state control. The ulama lost control of their major domain, education, 
when the Western type of education was introduced, reducing their role to that of 
teachers or lecturers in the centres of learning. The main religious centre of learning, A l -
^ See Kably, Mohamed (1999). "Legitimacy of State Power and Socioreligious Variations in Medieval 
Morocco" in Bourqia, Rahma and Susan Gilson Miller (eds.). In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, 
Power and Politics in Morocco. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press), pp. 19-20. 
Qarawiyiin, survived the attempts to integrate it with the University of Mohammed V 
(the main national university), but the ulama lost their supremacy in administering the 
law. The study of law had to include French law, after independence. 
Major changes took place during the government of King Hassan (1961-1999). 
First of all, he took control of religious properties, such as those of awqaf, mosques and 
brotherhoods placing responsibility for the administration of these properties and for 
religious affairs under the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs (Boween, 1985: 4-7). 
This brought about the loss of the ulama's economic independence. The mosques and 
their personnel also passed under the control of the Ministry; the only ones remaining 
independent were those financed by private donations. In terms of education, the ulama 
were constrained by the advances of the government in this area. During the 1960s, the 
creation of the Institute Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniyya removed the ulama's monopoly 
over religious education. Furthermore, in the late 1970s, Islamic studies were 
incorporated into University studies. Since then, a double pattern for the formation of 
religious scholars has emerged. Those who graduate from al Qarawiyiin become the 
ulama in charge of giving the sermons, while those graduated from the Universities and 
the Institute are currently considered to be civil servants, in charge of administering the 
mosques and the related ministries, or teaching in the universities where they graduate 
(Tozy, 1999: 103-109). 
The ulama after independence formed an independent organisation called the 
League of Ulama of the Maghreb in 1956, which aimed to promote and protect Islam. 
However, this league became a forum to protect the interests of the scholars, and its 
contribution to the public domain was formal and occasional (Tozy, 1979: 225). 
Another organisation composed by religious scholars is the one set up by the 
government called the Supreme Council of Ulama and headed by the King in 1981. 
This organisation is the main suppHer of the preachers and Imams for the mosques 
(Tozy, 1999: 113-115). 
It is clear that the ulama after independence lost their autonomy. The King and 
the state took control of the ulama's domains but, as the decades of the 1980s and 1990s 
showed, the appearance of religious opposition signalled the need to have the ulama 
more participant in the public domain, in order to neutralise the Islamist groups. In the 
case of Morocco, the role of the ulama continues to be to legitmise the state. 
The case of Egypt represents a different case from those of Saudi Arabia and 
Morocco, due to the strength of the state in exercising its authority over the ulama's 
dominions. The ulama have endured the different stages of the consolidation of the 
state. The ulama, prior to the advent of the reforms advanced by Muhammad Ali (1805-
1809), exercised a political role as mediators between the government and Egyptian 
society. They were a distinct group not only due to their religious stance, but also as a 
result of their wealth derived from the awqaf and their function as tax collectors 
(Zeghal, 1996: 62-63). 
The reforms introduced by Muhammad Ali marked the beginning of the ulama's 
retreat from the public domain, amid the introduction of secular education. During this 
period, the agricultural awqaf were abolished, and the wealthy ulama who controlled 
them received compensation. Another important change was the abolition of taxes on 
peasants, removing the role of ulama as tax collectors. 
o 
The links between the ulama and other social groups did not prevent their 
retreat from public life. Paradoxically, the alliance between non-wealthy ulama and the 
artisans attempted to stop Muhammad Ali from pursing his policies, while the wealthy 
Malika Zeghal points out the different groups among the ulama, distinguishing basically two: the 
wealthy ulama, who were the elite and had been associated with the political power, and the mujawir 
ulama including students who were living in or around the mosques and supported by the waqf. This 
second group is portrayed in Zeghal's account as more dynamic and flexible in their approach towards 
Islam and the ideas of nationalisation and modernisation, in opposition to the Azhari elite. Zeghal, Malika 
(1996). Gardiens de I'Islam: Les Oulemas d'Al Azhar dans I'Egypte Contemporain. (Paris, Presses de 
Sciences Politiques). pp. 70-76. 
ulama together with the merchants cooperated with Muhammad Al i in enlarging the 
state's control.^ Later, after the declaration of national independence in 1923, the ulama 
once more participated in politics, collaborating with the nationalist party (the Wafd) in 
adopting a nationalist stance, as shown in the defence of al-Azhar against British forces 
and the organization of public demonstrations. Once more, this alliance did not prosper, 
since the ulama were unable to form a viable alternative to secular nationalism, leading 
again to their retreat (Zeghal, 1996: 76). 
Nationalism reached its peak during the Nasser regime, with its programme of 
socialism. During this period, the ulama were deprived of their economic resources and 
areas of influence. The religious endowments passed into the control of the state and 
paved the way for the introduction of more reforms aimed at decreasing the margin of 
manoeuvre of the religious scholars. Indeed, from this period onwards, areas 
traditionally held by the ulama, such as education, administration of justice and public 
health, were taken over by the state (Cantori, 1981: 79). The religious awqaf were 
abolished and the religious charity foundations passed under the control of the Ministry 
of Awqaf. The ulama became state functionaries, losing their economic independence. 
Another loss for the ulama was the abolition of the religious courts. 
The most important policy was the nationalisation of al-Azhar and the loss of its 
independence, since the Sheikh al Azhar now came to be appointed by the president. 
The salaries of the al-Azhar ulama were made to conform with the ranks and salaries of 
other state functionaries. The introduction of modern studies in al-Azhar, beyond the 
scope of religious knowledge, represented, according to Zeghal, an attempt by the state 
to deprive the ulama of their role as transmitters of religious knowledge (Ibid. 99). Also 
' With the introduction of the economic reforms by Muhammad Ali and the state trading monopolies, 
there was an erosion of the interests of the artisans, limiting their scope and introducing European goods. 
The position of the merchants was different, since only a minority of them were affected. The majority of 
the merchants were participating with the state in the administration of the government trading 
monopolies. See Moaddel, Mansoor (1993). "The Egyptian and Iranian Ulama at the Threshold of 
Modern Social Change: What does and What does not Account for the Difference" in Arab Studies 
Quarterly 15, (3): 35-39, 
10 
during that time, family law (the ulama's last domain in judicial issues) was taken over 
by the government. 
Later, during the period of Sadat, and with the spread of Islamic organisations 
and the challenges posed by left oriented groups, the ulama once more endorsed the 
state policies. However, the Sheikh al Azhar opted to separate himself from the state, in 
an attempt to regain Al Azhar's space and to maintain the legitimacy associated with 
this institution.'" If Nasser used Islam to legitimise socialism, Sadat resorted to Islam in 
order to fight Nasserism and to pursue a policy of economic liberalism. During the 
period of Mubarak, the Mufti and the Sheikh al-Azhar maintained different positions, 
the first legitimising the state and the second opting for a more independent role - in 
some cases opposing state policies and even/atowa issued by the Mufti . The emergence 
of critical Islamists has provided an opportunity for the Sheikh al-Azhar to pursue a 
policy of reasserting a role for this institution in the Islamic affairs. The state, due to 
economic and political conditions, has lacked a strong basis of legitimacy, and has, in 
order to increase its Islamic credentials vis-a-vis the Islamic oppositionist groups, given 
more influence to al-Azhar during the last years (Barraclough, 1998: 236-249). The 
ulama, and in particular al-Azhar, have been trying to re-gain their role as mediators 
between the state and society, exercising their influence over the media, education and 
law. 
The Iranian ulama'% ascendance to political power was determined by their 
historical role as an important group inside the society. In contrast to the two previous 
cases, the Iranian religious scholars during the time of the establishment of the Qajar 
dynasty (1779-1925) enjoyed considerable prestige associated with the functions they 
performed, such as being educators and administrators of judicial affairs. In general 
terms, they were a semi-autonomous group, partly because the rulers gave them control 
Ibrahim, Ibrahim (1987). "Religion and Politics under Nasser and Sadat, 1952-1981" in Stowasser, 
Barbara (ed.). The Islamic Impulse. (Kent: Croom Helm, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies), pp. 
121-133. 
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of the awqaf in order to promote Shi'ism against the practices of Sufism or Babism 
(Moaddel, 1993: 28). They had powerful links with the merchant class. Indeed, the 
relations between the bazaar and the mosque were due to the fact that some of the ulama 
were engaged in commercial practices, and that the commercial transactions were 
sanctioned by the ulama themselves. The ulama received donations from the merchants, 
and mosques were built in the bazaar (Faghfoory, 1978: 23). 
The ulama were the only group that could articulate the demands of society and 
could challenge the government. The participation of the ulama in the tobacco 
concession (1891), their opposition to the constitution of 1906-1907 and the reforms 
promoted by Reza Shah in the aftermath of the First World privileges provoked the loss 
of privileges of the merchants through the reforms initiated by Reza Shah and, later, his 
son were the immediate cause that mobilised the ulama, the merchants and society in 
general to topple the Shah's regime in 1979. 
The modernisation programme adopted by Muhammad Reza Shah since the 
1960s included, among other policies, land reform, the professionalisation of the army, 
the introduction of the literacy and health corps, and the industrialisation of the country. 
The impact of these policies undermined the position of the ulama. The introduction of 
the literacy and health corps," for example, was a blow to their traditional role in the 
countryside and, together with their disagreement with the over-reaching monarchical 
power and the strong foreign influence, provoked their participation in the organisation 
of the revolution. 
The establishment of the "government of the jurists" gave the ulama the upper 
hand in the decision-making process, especially during the Khomeini period (1980-
1989). This type of government is sustained on the idea that the main source of the 
" Since the early 1960s the policy of the state was aimed at curtailing the ulama's power, and the 
introduction of these brigades of men to teach and help especially in the rural communities was regarded 
by the ulama as an attempt to take over their roles in the local communities. On the other hand, the state 
also encouraged and supported financially the establishment of other schools, reducing the financial help 
to the traditional religious schools. See: Ibid. pp. 129-143. 
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authority was the ulama, as the guardians of God's law and in the absence of the Imam. 
The best ulama, known for their knowledge of the sacred sources, would guide the 
community. The head of the government is the leader (rahbar), and is the main source 
of authority in the country, something between head of state and chief of justice (Hiro, 
1987: 121). The leader, in Khomeini's time, enjoyed extensive control of the 
formulation of governmental structures, political and economic decisions and judicial 
matters. After the leader, second in authority is the Council of Guardians, composed of 
six ulama appointed by the leader and six experts on Islamic law. The main function of 
the Council of Guardians has been to verify the fulfilment of the shari'a in 
governmental policies, including the approval of the candidates for the elected positions 
in the parliament and the presidency. Just before the death of Khomeini, another 
institution held by the ulama came into existence, the Council of Assessment, whose 
main function was to pass laws independently of the Council of Guardians and the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly. The Assembly of Experts, constituted from the best-
qualified ulama, is responsible for the election of the leader and the amendment of the 
constitution. 
The ulama during this period occupied positions at all levels of the government 
structure. In economic terms, although they are financially dependent on the state, they 
are free from government interference, thanks to the emergence of foundations 
established by the religious scholars as a result of their own clientele. These foundations 
work on social projects and participate in business, thereby providing an alternative to 
state support (Schirazi, 1997: 155). 
Since the death of AyatoUah Khomeini, the balance between politics and 
religion has been held by the latter. In general terms, the power of the ulama remains 
strong, since they are present in the most important institutions and bodies related to the 
government's decision-making process (Ehteshami, 1995: 47). The current president. 
Khatami, a religious scholar with a reformist approach, is gaining support mainly from 
the younger generation and other sectors of Iranian society. In sum, the situation of Iran 
represents a case where the mixture of politics and religion has given society the 
opportunity to intervene in religion by participating in politics (Khian-Thiebaut, 1999: 
14). 
The three cases presented here show how different the relationship between the 
lilama and the government can be. The process of consolidation of a central authority 
has been, in the three cases, the context where the relationship between ulama and the 
government has evolved. The dominions of the ulama, education and justice, have been 
the source of competition between the two types of authority; the autonomy or lack of 
autonomy has been related to the nature of the ulama's links to social groups. In the 
case of Iran, the strong links of the ulama with the commercial class, and the lack of a 
strong state paved the way for the creation of an Islamic government based on the 
authority of the ulama. The different types of national projects, depicted in each country 
and in different periods, have shown how Islam is invoked in order to gain legitimacy. 
The ulama are then in a position to obtain internal legitimacy, as is shown in the cases 
of Nasser and Sadat. However, the official discourse of Islam is not exempt from 
contestation and its continuous evolution makes the relationship between ulama and 
government sensitive to overcoming the challenges emanating from contestation. 
1.3. Defining the Relationship of the Ulama and the 
Government in Saudi Arabia 
From the above examples of the relationship between the government and the 
ulama, the case of Saudi Arabia presents particular features. In contrast with the three 
cases presented, the role of the ulama in the formation of the Kingdom has been 
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paramount for the formation of the Saudi polity. In the Saudi case, religion has been 
associated to the formation of the state in Saudi Arabia. The notion of unity in the case 
of Saudi Arabia is shown by the alliance between the emir Muhammad ibn Saud and 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in 1745, the former representing the political power and 
the latter the religious power. Furthermore, the maintenance of the role of the ulama and 
their relation with central authority has evolved in different ways, as this study will 
show. 
The majority of the studies about the ulama in Saudi Arabia agree about the lack 
of power of the ulama vis-d-vis the government, as a result of the effects of the tension 
between modernisation and traditionalism. Al-Yassini, for example, contends that the 
relationship is symbiotic, where the institutionalisation of the ulama has represented the 
subjugation of ulama to the state. He argues further that the state will continue to use 
religion to strengthen its authority, but if the religious institutions challenge this 
authority, they will be suppressed (Al-Yassini, 1985). Also, Salame considers the ulama 
have never enjoyed autonomy, because the political power (the political leader, the King 
and the state) has always used them as a mere instrument of legitimation. As a result 
Salame thinks that legitimacy is presently based more in institutionalisation than in 
religion per se (Salame, 1987). Bligh agrees that the ulama do not have any power 
nowadays. He identifies the cause as the institutionalisation of religion and justice since 
the reign of King Faysal (Bligh, 1985). Layish also considers that the role of the ulama 
has been decreasing since the beginning of the third Saudi state (Layish, 1984). 
In contrast, Kechichian contends that religious power and authority continues to 
be exercised by the ulama in tandem with the political figures. The ulama, according to 
him, have not been subjugated by the state, but co-operation is the main feature of this 
relationship (persuasion instead of veto) (Kechichian, 1986). Although Piscatori 
considers that the ulama do not have an autonomous power, he observes that the King 
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and the Al Saud family can not take for granted their loyalty, because the ulama are to a 
certain degree the intermediaries between society and government (Piscatori, 1983).'' 
The difference with the previous studies that this research aims to pursue is a 
conception of an interdependent relationship between the ulama and the government. 
The role of the ulama in the research is considered very important for the creation and 
recreation of the legitimacy of the political system. This interdependence is determined 
by the following considerations. The government requires the official ulama to 
legitimate its policies, to keep the moral, social and political values. The latter constitute 
one of the most important elements for the establishment of consensus between society 
and government. Meanwhile, the official ulama depend on the government for their 
maintenance as the only inteipreters and supervisors of the application of Islam, as well 
as for the government's financial support. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the 
government has the authority to govern, while the ulama have the authority to keep the 
correct implementation of Islam. In order to exercise their respective authority each 
needs the other, creating a relationship of independency. 
In spite of the amalgamation between religion and politics that is often portrayed 
as the main feature of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, this study departs from the idea 
that in practice the ulama and the government have separate dominions. The exercise of 
their authority involves the intersection and overlapping of their dominions (Eickelman 
and Piscatori, 1997: 59). This intersection and overlapping causes the relationship to 
oscillate according to the context, between cooperation and conflict. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the ulama and government in Saudi Arabia is conceived of as 
being one of the main pillars for the existence of the political system and the state. 
The study of Openshaw, following the studies mentioned already, reached the same conclusions as 
Piscatori in his analysis of Islam in Saudi Arabia with the emergence of the Islamic opposition in the 
nineties. Openshaw, M. (1994). "Religion and Legitimacy: the Al-Saud, Wahhabism, and Saudi Arabian 
Politics" Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies 1, (2): 76-89. 
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A. Dimensions. 
The dimensions that are followed in this study are the ones related to the concept 
of legitimacy by itself and legitimacy as an ongoing process. In this study the 
articulation of legitimacy is conceived, as it is discussed in the following chapter, as 
being based on a relationship between the government and governed. This relationship 
is created and recreated first of all by the agreement between government and governed 
on the values and norms of the society. Another important aspect is that the rules and 
norms are justified by the shared beliefs of both parties in the relationship, and by the 
existence of consent between those governed to those in authority. 
In order to understand how legitimacy entails a dynamic process where 
legitimacy is reproduced, it is necessary to take into consideration the following 
dimensions: the origins of the values and norms of the society, the recreation and 
maintenance of those values and norms, and the contestation of the political power. 
Regarding the first dimension, although this is a reference to the past of a society and it 
representations and discourses, it remains a constant source of invocation for the actors 
involved in the process of legitimacy, and also for the ones who challenge the 
legitimacy of the regime. The construction of forms of authority and the ways that 
legitimacy is justified and attained in the past form an understanding of the present, 
since the current forms of authority and the process of legitimacy are framed in that 
tradition. 
The second dimension, the recreation and maintenance of norms and values that 
accompanied the process of legitimacy, is regarded here as the way that both the ulama 
and the government exercise their authority and the way that legitimacy is constantly 
attained. In parallel, the way that society performs daily life and complies with the 
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norms and values indicates how society on its own produces and reproduces the 
legitimacy of the system. 
The third dimension is the contestation to the prevalent form of authority and/or 
government. The contestation is anchored in the same framework of history, norms and 
values, but it claims another interpretation of those elements, opposing the form of 
legitimacy and vindicating its own claims. Conforming to and opposing the prevalent 
order are practices carried out simultaneously either by groups or individuals, these 
constitute an important element in identifying the agents that participate in the political 
system, and establishing how legitimacy is reinforced and challenged. 
B. Levels of Analysis. 
The levels proposed for this research are the "siyasa" (governance, political 
domain) and ""shari'a" (religious domain), as domains of both the ulama and the 
government respectively. This approach follows the distinction that is established by 
Vogel, in his study of the law in Saudi Arabia (Vogel, 1993: 409-412). This division, as 
is explained in the following chapter, is born from the doctrines and the practices 
established by the Wahhabies. In practice both dominions are intertwined by the search 
for and maintenance of, the legitimacy of the political system. It is undoubtedly a 
considerably difficult task to separate these two dominions because the activity and the 
fundamentals of these two actors overlap in reality. However, it is indeed the 
overlapping of the two dominions that causes strains and co-operation in the 
relationship between the government and the ulama. 
The first domain, political, is related with the exercise of power both in the 
formulation of internal and foreign policy and its implementation. This domain is 
almost the prerogative of the principal circle of the A l Saud family, the main 
participants in the process of decision-making. The King has the right to nominate his 
cabinet, to appoint the members of the Council of Ministers and Shura Council, and has 
the authority to issue decrees that Islamic law does not consider. However, in the 
principal circle, where the decisions are taken, the King or the princes can find 
opposition or consensus towards certain policies. For this reason, it is important to 
emphasise that the authority, which emanates from the government, is independent of 
any other instance of power, since Saudi Arabia lacks a parliament or another institution 
participating directly in government's decision-making process, apart from the royal 
family. 
The second domain considered is the religious domain. This domain is mainly 
focused on the relationship between individuals and their commitment to God. The 
main feature of this dominion is that it is circumscribed by the interpretation and 
application of the shari'a. The institutionalisation of ifta, as the activity of asking 
religious scholars for advice in dealing with daily life, is the main social practice 
attached to this domain. The enforcement is subject to the commitment of the 
individual. 
The engagement between the first leaders and creators of Saudi Arabian 
Kingdom can be taken as representing the indivisibility of the two dominions, because 
the Al Saud family also exercise a role as guardians to maintain Islam. Therefore, the 
authority of both the ulama and the government are rooted in religion: the former, as 
interpreters of the sacred sources, became an important source for the definition and 
recreation of the norms of the society and the government. The latter also has religious 
responsibilities to conform, and contribute, to the creation and recreation of the norms 
and practices of the polity. These aspects give the main feature to this relationship, the 
interdependence between the two actors. 
It is necessary to cross these two domains if one is to understand where and how 
the ulama can act as religious custodians and can interfere in the political dominion, on 
the one hand; and where and how the political authority can interfere in the private 
domain on the other. This research focuses on the contemporary period from the end of 
the 1970s until 1999. This period is important since the consequences of the 
reorganisation of the judicial system and the creation of Ministry of Justice (1971), are 
going to be examined. At the same time the effects of the take-over of the Great Mosque 
and the regional challenges emanating from the Iranian revolution and the Second Gulf 
war are analysed. 
1.3.1. Hypotheses 
The relationship between the ulama and the government has been perceived as 
being one of interdependence, albeit with an underlying asymmetry of power, 
sometimes in favour of the former, and at other times in favour of the latter. This 
relationship is also considered as one that entails in certain circumstances either conflict 
or cooperation, according to the domain and the event in question. In order to clarify 
how the research has been focused it is necessary to provide a system of relationships, 
aimed at providing a guide to the content of this study. 
This system of relationships is divided into two sets of hypotheses. The first set 
refers to the relationship between the ulama and the government when there is 
cooperation between them. The proposals contained in this set aim to explain the 
existence of mutual dependency between these two authorities. The second set refers to 
the development of the relationship of the ulama and the government amid the existence 
of conflict, explaining how it was produced by the overlap between their respective 
domains. 
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I-There is an interdependent relationship between the offlcial ulama (religious 
authorities) and the government (political authorities) created by their dependency 
on each other's legitimacy. 
1.1. Agreement between the government and society on rules and values, 
which are produced and reproduced by social practice, is the most 
important part of the regime's legitimacy. 
1.2. The government is dependent upon the ulama by virtue of the latter 
being the sole interpreters of the religious sources and therefore the 
main providers of the content and recreation of both values and rules 
to which government and society conform. 
1.3. The dependency of the ulama upon the government stems from the 
role of the government as the main enforcer of the legal rules, which 
in turn is built on the government resources. 
1.4. The government will continue to need the senior ulama as long as 
the ulama act as moderating agents among the spectrum of religious 
tendencies. 
1.5. In times of external or internal challenges to the integrity of the 
security of the Kingdom, the ulama and the government are more 
likely to act together. 
II . The conflict between ulama and government occurs when one of the two 
interferes in the sphere of the other's authority. 
2.1. The existence of two legal dominions, one dependent on 
governmental rulings and the other dependent on religious rulings, 
creates the possibility of conflict between the government and the 
ulama. 
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2.2. The government has tried to depend less on the legitimacy of official 
ulama creating other frameworks of authority dependent on itself. 
2.3. When elements in the society (especially non-official ulama) contest 
the senior ulama's support for government policies, the official 
ulama will pursue a policy of reinforcing their independence from 
the government, with the aim of maintaining their own legitimacy. 
1.3.2. The fieldwork 
The importance of conducting interviews in Saudi Arabia was the main priority 
of the researcher from the beginning of this research. This was a rather difficult task to 
achieve because the sensitivity of the topic raised discomfort and suspicion. During the 
initial two and half years of the research, the researcher established contact with several 
Saudi academics and religious scholars in order to conduct interviews and to obtain 
permission to undertake research in Saudi Arabia. It was not until 1999 that permission 
was finally granted. 
The main goal of the interviews was to try to discover the perceptions of the 
ulama and the different social actors in Saudi Arabia about the role of the ulama and 
their dealings with the government. The interviews began in England from 1997 but the 
majority of them were undertaken in Saudi Arabia during the period of fieldwork from 
February until June 1999. In total, thirty-one interviews were realized. 
The methodology employed to carry out the interviews was, according to the 
classification of Denzin, mainly based on non-scheduled interviews and un-structured 
interviews (Denzin, 1975: 122-143). The first type of interview is one in which the 
questions are worded in terms that are familiar to the interviewees; consequently, the 
interviewer had to construct the questions according to the particular world vision of the 
interviewees. Another feature of the non-scheduled interview is that the order of the 
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questions asked corresponds to the readiness or willingness of the respondent; and 
finally having some freedom of schedule, the interviewer can ask another question 
according to the content of the answers received (Ibid. 125-126). 
The second type of interview is one in which the interviewee gives complete 
freedom to the interviewer to ask questions in different areas without following any 
standardised set of questions, and it becomes more of a friendly conversation. This 
second type of interview can also be called an active interview, where interviewer and 
interviewees both generate, in a dialectical way, an understanding of the reality studied. 
"Active interviewing is a form of interpretation involving respondent and interviewer as 
they articulate ongoing interpretative structures ..." (Holestein and Gubrioum, 1995: 
16). 
The questions, employed in this research, aimed to cover three areas; namely the 
patterns of socialisation of the ulama and their understanding of the social and political 
issues. The way to decide which questions were to be asked was determined by the 
place of the persons within Saudi society and the setting of the interview. 
The settings of the interviews differed greatly. A number of interviewees were 
meet only once and within time constraints while others were interviewed with few time 
constraints on more than one occasion. A few were reluctant to answer anything more 
than general questions. The outcome was dependant firstly on the willingness of the 
individual to be interviewed and secondly on the relationship established. The fluidity 
of some interviews and dialogues was reflected in the length of the interviews. 
The sensitivity of the topic, plus the fact that the researcher is a non-Muslim 
woman, were more of an advantage than a disadvantage. Generally speaking, the 
religious scholars and other persons who participated were friendly and generous with 
their time and knowledge. The researcher did not feel at a disadvantage because of the 
conditions mentioned before. 
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Most of the time the researcher accompanied by an interpreter, provided either 
by the interviewee or arranged by another party. Although the researcher's command of 
spoken Arabic is not fluent, she was still able to follow the conversation in Arabic and 
to check the accuracy of the translation. 
To protect the anonymity of the interviewees they are categorised into ulama, 
academics, and non-academics persons connected to different avenues of life. Religious 
scholars are referred to by capitals letter (A, B, etc.) while small letters (a, b, etc.) are 
used for the last two categories. 
1.4. Treatment of the Problem 
In order to establish the theoretical bases it is necessary to look at the 
dimensions of authority and legitimacy, as practices of power that define the main 
actors of this study. Therefore, the point of departure in the theoretical chapter is a 
conception of power that accounts for the participation of the actors not only at an 
institutional level, but also from the society itself, since the constitution of the political 
system and in general of any political system has to comprehend both levels, social and 
political. A revision of the concept of power will be presented, as a feature that is 
involved in the creation and recreation of authority and legitimacy. This revision is 
approached by referring to the debate on agency and structure, within which this 
discussion is situated. 
The second part of the theoretical chapter analyses three different approaches 
used for the understanding of a political system and the ways which authority and 
legitimacy are articulated. This begins with the classical approaches of political science, 
sustained on the bases of structuralism and functionalism. The works of Easton and 
Apter are analysed, leading to the proposals of the structuration theory and the insights 
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towards the issue of norms. A brief elucidation of the relevance of some principles of 
the theory of structuration by Giddens is presented with a view to stressing the social 
dimension of a political system and understanding how legitimacy involves the social 
practices for the production, maintenance and reproduction of legitimacy. 
An understanding of how social practices are important in revealing legitimacy 
in Saudi Arabia requires an analysis of the history of the formation of the Kingdom. 
Hence, the third chapter focuses on the development of the notions of authority and 
legitimacy in the social and political process that accompanied the creation of Saudi 
Arabian Kingdom. The approach followed in this chapter is to divide the historical 
developments by looking first at the origins of the state, namely the first and second 
Saudi Arabian states, and secondly by examining the formation and consolidation of the 
current state of Saudi Arabia until the decade of 1970s. In the first main section, 
covering the first and second Saudi Arabian states, emphasis is given to the causes 
surrounding the emergence of the Wahhabi movement and its significance for the 
construction of a permanent form of authority in the area, as well as to the ideological 
bases where the notions of authority and legitimacy are sustained. In similar terms, 
attention is given to the practices of the government and the ulama in the three periods 
mentioned. The last section of the chapter deals with the contemporary period: the 
reigns of King Saud and King Faysal. The analysis centres on how, with the 
consolidation of the state, the relationship between the government and the ulama 
entered a new phase of definition. 
The fourth chapter attempts to show how the legitimacy of the system in Saudi 
Arabia is attached to current social practices, where the ulama are to a great extent the 
creators and promoters of norms and values. Analysing the organisation of the legal 
system, delineating the domain of both actors, provides a way of understanding the 
dimensions of legitimacy. However, others aspects such as the reproduction of social 
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life, where the ulama exercise a continuous influence, determine in the long run the 
maintenance of the legitimacy of the system. The issues of the place of the family and 
women both in society and in the religious life shows how these contribute to sustaining 
the legitimacy of the system. The participation of the ulama in the public domain, in 
terms of the areas such as education and bank regulations, show the tensions existing 
between the government and the scholars. Another area of importance is the foreign 
policy of Saudi Arabia, which seeks to reaffirm its Islamic credentials. Although the 
participation of the ulama is not present in the decision-making process, Islam plays an 
important part for certain issues and scenarios. 
Saudi Arabia in spite of its conservatism and Islamic credentials has not been 
exempt from the emergence of religious contestation. The fif th chapter has as its main 
aim to show that the ulama and the government are not the only competitors over the 
interpretation of Islam, but that there are other groups inside Saudi society that contest 
the official voices, including the non-conformist ulama. How this contestation of the 
legitimacy of the regime affects the relations between the ulama and the government is 
examined, assessing different conjunctures and actors that have contested the religious 
credentials of the regime and the religious scholars. The Mecca Uprising, and the 
different groups that emerged during the Second Gulf war will be the object of analysis. 
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Chapter Two 
The Saudi Arabian Political System 
The main goal of this chapter is to establish a proper focus on how to approach 
the relationship between the ulama and the government. As in any political system, the 
distribution of, and bargaining over, power is the main axis, particularly in the process 
of the creation, exercise and maintenance of both authority and legitimacy, as the main 
issues that form the content of the relationship between the ulama and the government. 
It is necessary to examine first of all the dimension of power; this is followed by a 
discussion of the question of authority and legitimacy, since both embody power 
relations. The explanation of these relevant concepts will be framed within the 
discussion of the agency-stmcture debate,'^ showing the latent tensions in the different 
perspectives that are considered. 
This relationship must be set within the political system to which both the ulama 
and the government belong, taking into consideration the Saudi political system as a 
whole, since both authority and legitimacy involve processes that are in a continuous 
formulation by social actors and institutions. This is preceded by an examination of the 
different approaches required to understand a political system. 
After the main components of the relationship have been discussed and the 
approaches are examined, it becomes necessary to explain in analytical terms how these 
components operate within the structure and dynamics of the Saudi political system. 
"Agency is any human being able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal 
powers, including that of influencing those deploy by others" Giddens, Anthony (1984). The Constitution 
of Society. (Cambridge: Polity), p. 14. Following the definition of Giddens "structures are a virtual order, 
that only exist at the moment of instantation (at the moment of the action) and as memory traces them" 
Ibid. p. 17. These definitions are going to be explained in section 2.2.3. For a consideration of the 
temporal dimension associated with agency see: Emirbayer, Mustafa and Ann Mische (1998). "What Is 
Agency" in American Journal of Sociology 103, (4): 962-1023; or a general account on the state of affairs 
of the debate see: Shilling, Chris (1999). "Towards an Embodied Understanding of the Structure/Agency 
Debate" in British Journal of Sociology 50, (4): 543-562, 
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This is done by highlighting the question of maintenance and reproduction of both 
authority and legitimacy, since these are at the very heart of the interdependence 
between the ulama and the government. 
2.1. Authority and Legitimacy 
In order to consider an explanation of the dynamics of the principal concepts of 
this study (authority and legitimacy) it is necessary first of all to posit an explanation of 
power, which is the base and the link between authority and legitimacy. The following 
conceptualisation of power aims to show, in general terms, the different threads 
embodied in the consideration of power from a structural point of view or from an 
agency perspective. 
An explanatory definition of the concept of power is "either having power to do 
something or to affect someone and one's having power over another" (Ball, 1993: 
548). According to this definition it is possible to identify two main views. Some 
scholars try to identify power as something static that is the result of some abilities or 
resources. In other words, they define power according to the attributes or origins of the 
structure or system within which the actors operate. Others conceive of power as the 
result of the manipulation of resources or abilities by an actor, or according to the means 
employed in the exercise of power. This division is the basis of the argument located at 
the heart of the debate in politics, the issue of agency (agents) and structure (institutions 
or conventions), and it is the defining axis on which the definitions of power are centred 
in this section. 
Dahl defines power as a multidimensional concept, from the agency point of 
view, in reference to the actors and the outcomes of the application of power. For 
example, he considers power in relational terms, where "A has power over B to the 
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extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957: 202). 
According to Clegg, the assumptions implicit in this definition emphasise a causal 
relationship, which is determined by the effects of A over B. Furthermore Dahl's 
distinguishes the importance of the scope of the exercise of power by A over B in terms 
of the resources used towards B, and finally, the scope of A over B, is determined by 
B's type of answer or acts to that exercise of power (Clegg, 1989: 51-52). 
Another approach based on the agency of power is the one provided by Arendt. 
She considers that power is not the privilege of one individual but it belongs to a group 
of persons, since a person can have powers to the extent that other people empower 
them in order to act in their name (Arendt, 1986: 64). As in Dahl's definition, there is a 
causal link associated with Arendt's conception, since power is acquired and exercised 
in relation to others, but the latter's emphasis is on the importance given to the group of 
persons (social meaning of power) rather than on the holders of power per se. 
A definition situated more in the perspective of structure, although attempting to 
link both agency and structure, is the one provided by Bacharach and Baratz. In contrast 
to Dahl's argument, they couch their definition in terms of the unseen effects of the 
exercise of power, and the clarification of the key issues advanced by him, as well as the 
impact of structure on the configuration of power. Furthermore, they acknowledge the 
importance of structure in enabling A to exercise power over B. According to them, in 
every exercise of power there is the mobilisation of bias, by which they recognise and 
acknowledge that behind any exercise of power there is an organised set, a structure as a 
condition for the configuration of power. Structure thus denotes power, rather than 
being something residual or tangential to power, so anything that challenges values or 
institutions, is considered important. This argument is directed against the positivism 
attributed to Dahl and his followers. Bacharach and Baratz contend that power is the 
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product of both structure and agency, and that factors other than the simple effects of 
decisions have to be taken into consideration. 
Bacharach and Baratz consider the latent dimension that plays in the structure 
and the agents creating and exercising power. This latent dimension is perceived as the 
unseen nature of power, whereby A can use power in order to avoid B raising any issue 
that would challenge the values or institutions that sustain a setting. In this case, A 
would threaten B with the application of sanctions if B raised any challenge to those 
important elements, such as a threat to "the rules of the game" (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962: 948-950). 
A main pillar in the current debate about the conceptualisation of power is that 
advanced by Lukes. He accepts the previous two points of view, both from the pluralist 
approach and the Bacharch and Baratz approach. He advances a third dimension by 
introducing the understanding of power based on the ideal of what people would do if 
they knew what their real interests were (Lukes, 1974: 20).' For Lukes, then, the real 
significance of power in politics is produced when someone can affect the freedom of 
another individual, when one actor deprives another actor of vital resources, 
emphasising the inequality of resources and abilities among actors.^ 
As has been explained, the conception of power revolves around the two issues 
of agency and structure. The definitions show how power is considered from the agent's 
point of view as power over someone or something. The context in which an agent can 
have access to resources and the situation of the exercise of power corresponds to power 
' In this case, Lukes is referring to the differential of power among actors due to structural constraints. 
According to Clegg, Lukes' understanding of power has a hnk with Habermas' conception of the ideal 
speech situation. For Habermas, language is the expression of action; only an ideal (free) speech situation, 
where power does not constrain the speakers to express their real preferences. But when power is present 
it inhibits the speakers. Clegg, Stewart (1989). Frameworks of Power. (London: Sage Publications), p. 
134. 
' The principal critics towards Lukes's conception of power argue that politics is not only "power over", 
but also power can be reached by dissuasion or persuasion (agreement), or it can be without any damage 
—sharing with the power holder the benefits of his position. Ball, Terence (1993)."Power" in Goodwin, 
Robert E . and Philip Petit. A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers), p. 551. 
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in structural terms. The consideration of how power can be translated in unequal terms 
according to Lukes, covers two main perspectives. Hence taking account of those axes, 
the question of authority as the embodiment of the creation and exercise of power must 
now be considered. 
From the agency point of view is Weber's definition of authority. In his view, 
authority is a relationship of domination where 
"a manifest will (mandate) of the dominator or dominators 
influences the acts or actions of others (subordinator or 
subordinators). These acts or actions are produced as i f the 
subordinated had adopted the content of the mandate of the 
dominator (s) as an ideal of their acts" (Weber, 1992: 170-172). 
As may be appreciated from this definition, the emphasis is on the agents and 
the causal relationship as addressed in Dahl's approach, specifically on those wishing to 
have power over others in order to dominate, and those who obey. 
Another traditional definition of authority rooted in the perspective of power 
over others is the distinction between two types of authority, but dependent on a causal 
relationship. "An authority" is possessed by virtue of a demonstrated knowledge, skill 
or expertise concerning a subject matter or activity; "in authority" is a property of mles 
and offices created by rules (Watt, 1982: 16 and Friedman, 1990: 57). 
A definition of authority often employed in politics is the one based on the 
distinction between de facto authority (fact or actions) and de jure authority, a concept 
related to the notions of conformity to the rules established (Goodwin, 1992: 260). The 
understanding of authority conveyed in this interpretation is based on the exercise of 
power by itself in the first case, while in the second there is a dimension ascribed to it in 
relation to the recognition of the holder of power by individuals or groups. 
Eickelman and Piscatori conceive a specific type of authority, the sacred 
authority, in the context of Muslim societies. This type of authority is mainly related to 
the type of authority exercised by the ulama, and covers three dimensions related to the 
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importance of acknowledgement by the people, the position (an authority), and the 
importance of the roles as a determinant of the reinforcement of the authority. The first 
dimension, the ideological, corresponds to the fact that the bearers of authority represent 
not only the moral values cherished by the community, but also the symbolic reference 
points of the society, including sacred texts. The second dimension is locational and 
refers to the investiture of authority granted to the institutions and persons that are 
entitled to interpret the sacred texts. In this way, the identification of authority becomes 
a matter of the position of the person in relation to the appropriation of religious 
symbols. The third dimension is associated with the functions of the sacred authorities 
that serve to bolster their positions of authority and to mediate among the different 
sections of the society (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 58). 
An emphasis on authority as a relationship between dominators and 
subordinators is provided by Beetham. He stresses the idea that authority is not only the 
possession of property or the control of some necessary social activity or skill, but also 
the relationship between the dominant and the subordinate. The main feature of the 
power relationship that establishes authority is specified by rules and creates a division 
between the persons who have the power to command and the persons who have to 
obey. Hence, authority constitutes both an aspect of power relations and a means of 
power in its own right. (Beetham, 1991: 49). 
According to these definitions, one can specify some dimensions of the concept 
of authority: a) the possession of a mandate (Weber), the right to command {de jure) 
and the possession of knowledge, skill or expertise (in authority), associated also with 
sacred authority; b) the exercise of authority and c) authority as a relationship between 
dominators and subordinators organised around a set of rules, or the property created by 
rules and offices created by rules (an authority). Finally, a dimension implicit in these 
definitions is the idea that authority covers not only the dimensions already outlined, but 
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is also a relational concept in the sense that it is defined according to the perceptions of 
the people. In other words, following Arendt's definition, power is not originated by the 
holders of power but by the group of persons who regard them as authority.'^ This 
classification of the dimensions of authority is based on the perspective of the agent, for 
example by virtue of possession of mandate, right to command, possession of 
knowledge, simple exercise of authority (outcomes) and finally one that includes the 
two perspectives, authority regarded as a process organized through rules. 
It is important to bear in mind that both the explanations about, and the 
dimensions of, power and authority provided here are general. Furthermore, power 
should not be conceived as static. It must take into account the specificity of the 
environment wherein authority is located and through which mechanisms authority is 
articulated, since each set of rules and authority is the result of the specificity of each 
society or political system. 
Based on the dimensions of authority mentioned above, the ulama will be 
referred to as "in authority", because a) they have the expertise relating to the religious 
sources (Qur'an, sunna and shari'a); b) they are responsible for the exercise of 
authority through the proclamations of fatawa and their implementation on social 
policies; c) they have authority and exercise it according to both the religious rules that 
are the bases for social and political life in Saudi Arabia and also represent an 
"authority" because their authority is also derived from the offices that they occupy, for 
example The Board of Senior Ulama, Ministry of Education, etc. 
For its part, the government has authority because a) it has the economic and 
political resources controlled by the offices that it occupies (with the title and office as 
king, the ministries, etc.); b) it exercises authority through royal decrees and 
See also Green, Leslie (1988). The Authority of the State. (Oxford: Clarendon House). 
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subordinated institutions or agencies; and c) it works within an established framework 
of religious and political rules. 
The examples presented in this study are found within the type of political 
system, which exists in Saudi Arabia as a Kingdom based on the Qur'an, shari'a and 
sunna. In terms of the interplay between the government and the ulama, it is noticeable 
that there is an unequal relationship between the ulama and the government in terms of 
the resources to which they have access. However, the relationship is also one of 
interdependence for the following reasons: 
While the ulama have control over the religious interpretation and the 
application of the shari'a {de jure authority), the King has the material and political 
resources to enforce the law. 
The King and the ulama are subordinated to the religious law, but while the 
ulama have the monopoly to inteipret it, the government controls the resources to 
implement it. 
Up to this point the conceptualisation of power and authority has been reviewed, 
but the means by which authority is created and recreated, or how authority can acquire 
more power has not yet been clarified. For these reasons it is important now to look at 
the process of legitimation necessary for the existence, maintenance and reinforcement 
of authority. 
One of the most important theories about legitimacy is the theory formulated by 
Weber. Weber regards legitimacy as "the prestige of being considered binding" (Weber, 
1992: 170), where people's behefs establish the legitimacy of an authority and/or the 
legitimacy of power. The main features of these beliefs are that they can be based on the 
distinction between disinterested motives and self-interest. The first type of interest is 
conceived in three ways: a) affective terms, which is determined by emotions; b) 
rational terms as an "expression of ultimate values", which means when the beliefs are 
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based on the agreement of ethical, religious or another kind of values; c) religious terms, 
determined only by values coming from religion; and d) legal terms where the manner 
in which authority is acquired is recognised as legal. In the case of self-interest, there is 
a further consideration relating to the external consequences (Ibid. 26-28). 
Lipset, following the path of Weber, conceives of legitimacy as "the capacity of 
the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are 
the most appropriate ones for society" (Lipset, 1984: 86). For him, whether or not the 
groups are regarded as legitimate or illegitimate depends on whether the system agrees 
with their values. But in order to produce and maintain legitimacy, he finds that the 
system needs to have effectiveness. This concept means "the extent to which the system 
satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population and such powerful 
groups within it such as big business or armed forces see them" (Ibid. 88). In summary, 
he proposes that belief is the most important part of legitimacy, and that legitimacy 
depends on the relationship between government and governed, which can be sustained 
by the effectiveness of the system. 
According to Beetham the reduction of legitimacy to a belief carries some 
misunderstanding. First of all, it misrepresents the relationship between legitimacy and 
people's beliefs. Therefore, a given power relationship is legitimate not because people 
believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs. A 
further reason may be adduced, based on the fact that there are aspects of legitimation 
that are not just beliefs but are an important part of legitimacy, such as legality or 
consent (Beetham, 1989: 10-12).'^ 
''' One critique of Beetham's observations is the one provided by Alagappa who succinctly refutes the 
Beetham's arguments of the former, establishing that although Weber might not have developed a 
structure of legitimacy, but that does not make his observations invalid. Alagappa also reinforces the idea 
of belief as the element of law and consent, since both concepts need to be grounded in the beliefs of the 
people. Aiagappa, Muthiah (ed.) (1995). Political Legitimacy in South Asia: The Quest for Moral 
Authority. (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 14. On the other hand, Cotrell also highlights the 
importance of values of stability and order as integral to the notions of legality that Weber failed to take 
into consideration. See: Cotrell, Roger (1983). "Legality and Political Legitimacy in the Sociology of 
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In similar terms to Beetham, emphasising an agreement with the norms. Barker 
outlines the key aspects, which make legitimacy political. Those aspects, he contends, 
are the ones sustained in the rights based on the institutions and procedures, although he 
concentrates on the holders of the authority. According to him, political legitimacy 
exists when there is a justification of a right to do specific and distinct things; the 
enforcement of command and the monopoly of such commandment. Second, the moral 
claim involved in political legitimacy derives either from the character of the institution 
or persons claiming or enjoying it, or from procedures which they follow in taking or 
exercising power due to the absolute character of such a claim sustained in normative 
consideration (Barker, 1990: 23). 
Beetham in his analysis of legitimacy identifies three major dimensions of 
legitimacy: a) it conforms to established rules; b) the rules can be justified by reference 
to shared beliefs by both dominant and subordinate elements; and c) there is evidence of 
consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation (Ibid. 16-17). 
The first of these dimensions, is related to the acquisition and exercise of power 
according to the established rules (these can be natural laws, customs or conventions). 
The second dimension of legitimacy is related to authority to the extent that the type of 
authority is the result of people's beliefs, which define what authority is legitimate, how 
power can be exercised, and how individuals possess power. Following the remarks of 
Alagappa about this dimension of legitimacy, it is important to consider that political 
institutions play a major part in determining the norms, resource allocation, and the 
social context for action and therefore they mould behaviour (Alagappa, 1995: 15). 
Consent, for its part, makes the relationship of power a binding force, introducing a 
moral component and creating a normative commitment on the part of those engaging in 
it. On the other hand, consent acts as a symbol of acknowledgment or public agreement 
Max Weber" in Sugarman, D. (ed.). Legality, Ideology and the State. (London: Academic Press), pp. 69-
93. 
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with the powerful dominator. The way that consent is produced is determined by the 
social and cultural factors of a given society. According to Lipset, the effectiveness of 
the system can be regarded as the government's effectiveness based on the social 
values. 
In analytical terms, it is also important to distinguish between the objects and 
sources of legitimacy. There are three objects of legitimacy: persons, positions, and 
acts; and three sources: property, endorsement, and authorisation. Persons can be 
legitimised through their own beliefs, which they call property, to the extent that they 
reflect the values of the group or society. The positions of actors can also be legitimised 
by the endorsement or group support of persons; and, finally, the acts are legitimised by 
persons who are more influential or powerful than those who exercise the acts (Walker, 
Thomas and Zelditch, 1986: 620-627). 
It is important to emphasise that a person can be legitimate as far as his/her 
values are concerned, but it can happen that the positions or the acts performed may not 
necessarily be a source or manifestation of legitimacy, or that while a person may be 
lacking of legitimacy, this does not necessarily apply to either his/her position or act(s). 
These distinctions are important to keep in mind because they explain into a great 
extent, the origin and exercise of authority and legitimacy. 
The main area of agreement among the foregoing scholars relates to the 
dimension of beliefs. However, disagreement emerges when one tries to assess this and 
to understand it as a relationship that is dynamic and interactive. But the solution 
proposed by Beetham, the agreement of the system of norms with the shared beliefs 
between government and governed, is useful, since, as has been established earlier, the 
issue of authority and legitimacy entails a relational approach. Power, authority, and 
legitimacy can not be solely the prerogative of those in power, but must also be 
considered in relation to society in general. Therefore the process involved in authority 
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and legitimacy make it necessary to look for an approach that explains how they are not 
only produced but also reproduced constantly by the society in general and by those 
actors who are in authority. 
2.2. Different Approaches 
At the beginning of this chapter it was established, that in order to understand 
the relationship between ulama and the government in Saudi Arabia it is necessary to 
look for an approach that would consider these two actors as part of a political system. 
Also from the analyses presented earlier, both authority and legitimacy have to be the 
focus, as they represent a relationship that involves not only the authorities but also 
society in general. 
In the subsequent sections different approaches are examined. An approach that 
it is relevant to consider is the systemic approach, the bases of which are grounded in 
structuralism and functionalism,'^ as perspectives that attempt to define the variables 
that are included in every political system. 
In the following sections two representative works which take this approach to 
the political system are explained, namely the works of Easton and Deutsch, and also of 
Apter's work. The way in which these approaches provide an explanation of the 
political systern, by outlining the variables at stake, is examined. The configuration of 
power and the issue of legitimacy are also considered here, as being issues that are at 
the centre of any political system. These approaches attempt to analyse the stability of 
Structuralism is the study of reality in terms of the wholeness of the units, trying to understand the 
elements of the units, the relations among them and their contribution to the integration of the unit. 
Functionalism tries to focus on the whole units through the study of the function or behaviour of the parts, 
in terms of interdependency and differentiation. Moore, Wilbert E . (1978)."Functionalism" in Bottomore, 
Tom and Robert Nisbet (eds.). A History of Sociological Analysis. (London: Heinemann). pp. 321-36L 
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the system, and consequently to gauge the likely endurance of legitimacy and 
authorities in a political system. 
This attempt to bring together an explanation that links the structure and agency 
debate is based on the theory of structuration advanced by Giddens and by his 
explanation of the role of agency in creating and recreating structures and social 
systems. The notion of rules and their importance for the establishment of a relationship 
describing and informing authority and legitimacy is presented from Giddens 
perspective as well as from those of Onuf and Sewell. 
2.2.1. The allocation of values 
The significance of Easton's approach to understanding a political system lies in 
the fact that he acknowledges the importance of legitimacy and stability as the main 
variables that define such a system. Therefore in order to locate Easton's conception of 
legitimacy it is necessary to understand the components of the political system and their 
relation to the issue of power, authority, and legitimacy, emphasising at the same time 
the theoretical and methodological implications of his proposal. 
Easton defines a political system as those interactions through which values are 
authoritatively allocated for a society (Easton, 1965: 21), distinguishing three main 
components: authorities, regime and political community. The authorities are considered 
to be the main gatekeepers of the system.'*^ The regime includes the procedures and 
rules of the system and is composed of values (goals and principles), norms, and the 
structure of authority. The political community is the group of persons who share a 
division of labour, supported by positive feelings regarding the group, for the settlement 
of political problems (Ibid. 183-184). 
Deutsch also considers the authorities as the main component of the system. Deutsch, Karl (1974). 
Politics and Government. How People Decide their Fate. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), pp. 238-
243. 
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The allocation of values is determined, according to Easton's theoretical 
perspective by the structure of the system. "Structure on the one hand includes the 
interrelationship between all political roles, and on the other hand, such goal-oriented 
collection and combinations of roles as are embodied in groups and organisation" (Ibid. 
86). Therefore, the allocation of values is determined by the interaction between the 
components of the political system, the role that they perform, and the values that 
determine those roles. 
According to Easton's perspective, the structure is a constraint for the 
participation of the components of the system and is given by the role performed by the 
components of the system. In the case of structures of authority, these are determined by 
the limits of their roles. The same applies to the regime and community, where 
everything is mled (and each component by itself has to be limited) according to the 
values. In this regard, Easton presents a notion of power over someone or something, 
defined by the roles performed by the main actors of the system (Ibid. 207). 
The creation of inputs (demands from the community) and outputs (policies 
directed to the community) is the central feature around which Easton's political system 
revolves. His view of stability is based on the maintenance of balance between the 
inputs and the outputs that are processed by the authorities. This process of inputs and 
demands is the auto-regulation feature of the system, and is the reason why the balance 
of this process is important for the maintenance of the system. While Easton considers 
that the balance between inputs and outputs is necessary to maintain the stability of the 
system, Deutsch goes further by analysing the issue of government performance 
according to its dimensions: efficiency —making an outcome more likely to happen— 
and effectiveness —the ratio between change in the probability of the outcome and the 
costs incurred in producing it (Deutsch, 1974: 240). 
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Support for a political system is the linking variable between the system and its 
environment, since it serves to underpin the components of the system: authorities, 
regime and political community. Without support,^° the authorities would be unable to 
process the demands, it would be impossible to achieve a degree of stability, and the 
community would lack cohesion (Ibid. 157). 
Easton points out that legitimacy is paramount for the maintenance of support, 
since legitimacy is the only aspect that endures over the long term and contributes to 
strengthening support for the regime. This understanding of legitimacy coincides with 
Weber's definition of legitimacy. Easton advances a conception of values around which 
the political system revolves, conferring on the leadership the role of appropriating the 
values. The latter represent the relationship that exists between government and 
governed. Easton classifies legitimacy in three forms: ideological, structural and 
personal, each according to their "purpose". 
Ideological legitimacy relates to the moral values concerning the vahdity of 
authorities and the regime. In the case of authorities, the ideology will reflect the ethical 
principles that justify the distribution of power, its use and its limits, stating the 
responsibilities of the persons involved in the relationship(s) of power; that is to say, in 
the Tightness of the authority. Easton emphasises that the question of why members of 
the system obey is the most useful dimension of compliance, since it is necessary for the 
maintenance of the stability of the political system. The same is true when ideology 
relates to the regime, since this refers to a belief in the rightness of the norms and 
structure of the use of power (Easton, 1965: 292-293). 
Structural legitimacy is the validity of the roles in accordance with the norms of 
the regime and its goals. The legitimacy of authority is determinant for the creation of 
There are two kinds of support. Specific support is related to a particular output and is dependent of 
daily life. Diffuse support is the one that is considered as a reservoir which is invoked in times of stress 
and prevails in the long run. Easton, D. (1965). A System Analysis of Political Life. (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd.). pp. 273-274. 
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diffuse support, which can contribute to the maintenance of the legitimacy on the long 
run. The third type of legitimacy, personal, refers to the occupants of the roles of 
authority and is explained in terms of personality, behaviour and symbolic connotations 
in accordance with moral values.^' Deutsch's view coincides with that of Easton 
regarding the types of legitimacy, but he goes further and highlights the importance of 
legitimacy by results." 
The important elements of Easton's approach are the identification of the main 
components of the political system, such as authorities, regime, and political 
community. His approach assumes a conception of power over someone or something, 
where the distribution of power includes both authorities and regimes, and where the 
community's only role is the formulation of demands and the expression of support or 
lack of it towards the outputs of the regime and authorities. 
The way in which Easton and Deutsch conceive legitimacy in structural terms is 
important, but it is also necessary to look at legitimacy and authority in terms of a 
continuous process that is in constant elaboration. Easton, in particular, emphasises the 
issue of rules and roles, but once these are defined, they remain static. 
2.2.2. Between functions and structure 
The basis of Apter's approach lies first of all in the distinction between structure 
and functions, and, secondly in how these two levels operate in the political process. He 
agrees with Easton on the importance of legitimacy and authority for the understanding 
Hudson has discussed the crisis of legitimacy in the Arab political systems, following the classification 
of Easton. See Hudson, Michael, (1977). Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy. (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press). For a discussion about the issue of legitimacy in contemporary Arab 
regimes, based on Hudson's remarks, linking the impact of the recent policies of economic liberalisation 
and its effects on regime legitimacy, see Murphy, Emma (1998). "Legitimacy and Economic Reform in 
the Arab World" in The Journal of North African Studies 3, (3): 71 -92. 
Deutsch conceived three different types of legitimacy: by procedure, according to the validity of the 
procedure to attain an office or position (according to the typology of Easton this will correspond to 
legitimacy of a regime); by representation meaning the representativity of the authorities with the political 
community (into some extent this also can correspond to personal legitimacy); and by results. Deutsch, 
Op. at. pp. 15-18. 
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of a political system. However the main difference between the approaches of Easton 
and Apter is the dynamics underlined by the latter. His aim is to understand how a 
political system establishes authority, has stability, and increases efficiency, and he 
achieves this by focusing on the government as the main component of the system. In 
this way, his perspective takes the government as a point of reference in the 
explanations of the systemic variables. In this section a consideration of the main 
components in Apter's approach to a political system is presented, emphasising the 
important issue of consumatory values, the use of coercion and the availability of 
information,^^ as the defining variables for the legitimacy of the government. 
The assessment of Apter, through his reference to modernisation, is grounded in 
a normative approach that explains how policies are implemented according to the 
values of the society. He states that modernisation is a matter of choice, and that the 
particularity of modernisation is considered according to the values of the society 
(Apter, 1965: 1). To understand why and how particular choices are made, it is 
necessary to analyse the motivation and symbolic behaviour that influence a decision in 
the direction of a particular choice. 
The government is the main enforcer of decisions, since what the government 
chooses has implications for all members of the society, as opposed to the choices of 
individual groups. However, the government's choices are limited according to two 
kind of values, the consumatory and instrumentalist. These values will lead to what 
Apter calls stiuctural and functional requisites, and structural and contingent functions, 
and are in his view the defining axis for the conformation of the political system. 
Legitimacy in this context is based on consumatory values, solidarity and 
identity, and the contingent functions. He defines solidarity as the shared feelings that 
Apter formulates a typology based on the structural, differences, in terms of behaviour and the type of 
values orientations. He establishes the model of secular libertarian authority and the sacred collectivity 
and then their subtypes. See Apter, David, (1965). The Politics of Modernisation. (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press), pp. 22-33. 
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give the members of a group a sense of mutual responsibility; while identity is the 
definition of individuals as to the character of their relations with one another (Ibid: 
240). But in order to maintain legitimacy, these values have to be reinforced according 
to the contingent functions given by the assessment of the viability of the government 
by the society in relation to the source of social norms, the synthesis between past and 
present and the delimitation of membership of the community. Therefore i f the 
government fails to fulf i l one of those functions, legitimacy will be eroded. 
Apter links government and society in a unidirectional way, focusing more on 
the actions of government towards society than trying to asses the dialectical links 
established by both elements. This can be appreciated from his explanation that the 
functional requisites of the government, such as information, will be based on 
"knowledge of the limits within which the public will support action" (Ibid. 238). 
Another requisite is coercion; this function is used when there is no information, when 
the government wants to prevent information, when knowledge from previous decisions 
has been ignored or when there is a conflict between the two types of values (Ibid. 239). 
The combination of the grades of coercion and information determines the types of 
authority in a system. 
The structure of authoritative decision-making, a pattern for making legitimate 
decisions (regarded by the society as legitimate) must be answerable to a group other 
than itself. This last requisite is connected with the control that the government 
exercises over other groups in society. Again the mixture of these two will produce 
different systems as regards the degree of information and coercion. 
Apter sees the interaction of the society with the government, predominantly in 
structural terms. The contingent structures of the government represent the dimensions 
of viability and efficiency. These substructures of the government are constituted by 
political recruitment, enforcement and punishment, resource determination, and consent. 
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The first, political recruitment means the way in which individuals become part of the 
government, and the stratification in the political hierarchy. The second, enforcement 
and punishment, relates to the way in which the law is applied or is contravened. The 
third substructure, resource determination and allocation, relates to the means by which 
resources are deployed by the government in society. Finally consent refers to the assent 
given by social groups (official or unofficial according to the country) toward a ruling 
before it becomes binding (Ibid. 246-247). 
This way of understanding the system is comprehensive, since Apter tries to 
capture not only the structure, but also the structure's relationship with functions. This 
produces a means of assessing values as a reflection of the synthesis whose creation is 
being sought. The values in Apter's work are the point of reference of the variables that 
he identifies. But he does not establish the means whereby values are generated and 
maintained. Similar to Easton, he does not address properly the nature of society or 
political community, because he concentrates more on the structure. 
It has to be noticed that structuralism does not take into account agents and their 
impact on the relationships in the system, rather it focuses more on pre-deterministic 
ideas about human history and the lack of impact that an agent can have. The critics of 
functionalism state that this approach offers only a pseudo-explanation, since there is a 
lack of recognition of the complexity of the process. The evolution of state structures, in 
the latter perspective, results from the interplay between structure, strategy and struggle 
(Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 194-195). Another important criticism of structural-
functionalism is that the interdependence of the units is taken for granted, without 
considering the unequal effect that a bad performance of one unit may have on the rest 
of the units. (Mitchell, 1965: 476-477). 
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2.2.3. The duality and the rules 
An alternative answer to the problem of the separation between structure and 
agency is Giddens' proposals in his structuration theory. This approach aims to explain 
that the agent is an active participant and not only a receptacle of functions or roles, in 
contrast to the assumption of structuralism and functionalism. Structuration theory links 
stRicture and agency, contending that social structures are both constituted by human 
agency and at the same time are the very medium of this constitution (Giddens, 1976: 
121). Structuration theory has as its main focus the notion of agency and action that 
create and recreate social systems, explaining the recursive character of social life. 
Every act of production is at the same time an act of reproduction and the structures that 
enable the actions are at the same time reproduced (Thompson, 1989: 58). The task in 
this section is to provide some insights into this theory with the aim of advancing the 
understanding of authority and legitimacy as a process of continuous reproduction. 
Firstly, the notion of agency is explained, as one of the main pillars of structuration 
theory, followed by Giddens' conception of the social system and its features. It is 
important to emphasise that structuration theory is grounded in the major debate taking 
place within the social sciences, not only as a challenge to structuralism or 
functionalism but also as the synthesis between different approaches in social science, 
such as phenomenology and hermeneutics. Secondly, in order to advance the 
understanding of authority and legitimacy as a process, which is determined to a great 
extent by the existence of a relationship based on rules, Giddens' conception of rules 
and the criticism made by Sewell and Onuf are analysed. 
Giddens argues against the determinism of structuralism, presenting a notion of 
agency where the individual is more in charge of her/his own destiny, and where social 
practices are at the centre for the creation and reproduction of social life across time and 
46 
space. He concentrates largely on highlighting the skills and knowledge that human 
beings possess and manage in their daily activities. 
The agency or agent is regarded as any human being, able to realise certain 
processes such as rationalisation of action, reflexive monitoring and the motivation of 
action. The rationalisation of action is the process whereby individuals maintain a 
theoretical understanding of the grounds of their activities (Giddens, 1984: 5). In the 
same way, Giddens ties his notion of agency to the process of reflexive monitoring 
which involves the ability of the agent to monitor his or her own activities as well as 
those of others (Ibid. 3). Regarding the motivations of the agents, there are three levels 
of analysis: discursive consciousness (what is said), practical consciousness (what is 
done), and unconsciousness. The first two levels are the most important, since they are 
the ones in which most people realise actions and monitor their conduct (Tucker, 1998: 
Sl).^'* 
The features given to agency reflect the importance of the agents in creating and 
recreating social systetns through their daily life. The process described earlier is the 
base that the agents use to determine the course of their actions. This means that agents 
accumulate during continuous interactions what Giddens calls mutual knowledge, 
which allows the agent to discern among the different ways of proceeding in different 
situations. This type of knowledge is pragmatic and most of the time is taken for 
granted, but it serves to inform the agents of ways in which social practices can be 
undertaken. These notions of storage of knowledge are very particular to each society, 
because the members of each society have different ways of dealing with daily life 
(Giddens, 1984: 22). 
The enactment of daily life by agents reproduces the structure and the social 
system. Giddens goes a step further than structuralism and post-structuralism, 
*^ For a consideration of the temporal dimension associated with agency see: Emirbayer, Mustafa and 
Ann Mische Op. Cit. 
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contending that "structures are a virtual order, that only exist at the moment of 
instantation (at the moment of the action) and as memory traces them" (Giddens, 1984: 
17). Structures are conformed by resources and rules that contribute to the production 
and reproduction of social practices (duality of the structure), being both a constraint 
and enabler of those processes. Meanwhile, social systems are "the situated activities of 
human agents, reproduced in time and space" (Giddens, 1984: 25). If one can not 
identify the structure, one can nevertheless identify the structural properties of the 
systems which are recursively implicated as both a medium and outcome of the social 
practices. Hence there are two properties: structural principles, which are those that 
remain for the reproduction of social totalities, and institutional principles which are 
conformed by the social practices that remain for a big span of time and space (Ibid. 
17). An example of the first is the principles of capitalism that Giddens identifies as 
labour force and capital; an example of the second would be marriage as an 
institutionalised practice. As can be seen, Giddens bases the differences on the theory of 
systems and functionalism with its idea of structure and system. 
Rules and resources are at the core of the production and reproduction of the 
structure. Rules are the procedures relating to daily life and must not be confused with 
the laws, which are interpretations of the rales in codified form. Giddens stresses the 
importance of rules in daily life, since they help the reproduction of daily life on the one 
hand, and on the other are created from those practices. Therefore, the importance of 
mutual knowledge goes together with the creation and recreation of rales through social 
practices and their maintenance as regularised practices. It is in this way that the agent 
participates in the creation and recreation of the norms and therefore of the structure. 
The resources are considered to be of two types: allocative resources (command over 
materials) and authoritative resources (command over people). 
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Also related to the issue of agency is the question of power and its link with 
command over resources. According to Giddens, there are two ways of regarding 
power. The first is as a relational conception, and the second concerns ability and 
resources to act. Power, in the context of this perspective, has a transformative and 
relational dimension, since action is tied to the exercise of some sort of power. The 
transformative dimension refers to the actor's ability to affect the development of an 
event. Even in cases where there is no action the agent still can influence the power of 
other actors. Securing an outcome through others' actions is the relational dimension 
(Giddens, 1984: 14-15; 1993: 214). As can be appreciated, Giddens agrees with 
Bacharach and Baratz regarding the two faces of power, but he goes further in 
explaining the duality of power: "resources (focused via signification and legitimation) 
are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by 
knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction" (Giddens, 1984: 15). 
In contrast with the perspective of functionalism on the issue of power, where 
the differentials of power are not taken into account, Giddens emphasises the 
importance of the distribution of power and the negotiable character of it. This notion of 
power is the base for his dialectic of control, where he recognizes that certain actors will 
have more access to certain resources than others, but the subordinates nevertheless will 
also have resources that will allow them to contest those actors. 
In the analysis of the structural properties of social systems, Giddens recognizes 
three main structural properties associated with rules and resources: signification, 
domination and legitimation. These three types of properties are interrelated. The 
signification structure is related to the theory of coding, and presupposes the role of 
power, where domination sets the framework for codes of signification (Ibid. 33). He 
adds that the symbolic orders and modes of discourse pave the way for an institutional 
ideology, defined as "those asymmetries of domination which connect signification to 
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the legitimation of sectional interest" (Ibid.). The third type of structure is the 
legitimation that Giddens associates with the legal order. He departs from the Weberian 
notion, which sees the legal order being passive and objective. Structurationist 
legitimacy is conceived as being an active engagement in the production of compliance 
(Cohen, 1989: 184). Having established the connection among the three types of 
structure, Giddens points out that the content of the structure of domination based on 
allocative resources and authoritative resources contribute to the generation of 
institutional orders as political and economical institutions. 
Despite the criticism of structuralism and functionalism, Giddens accepts the 
notion of the integration of the system and the reproduction of structure as the flow over 
time and space of the social practices. However, Giddens regards conflict as the cause 
of the system breakdown. Cohen, following the former, emphasised the notion of 
change or transition in a society because the conflict (Cohen, 1989: 267-273) 
One of the major criticisms of Giddens's perspective is his treatment of 
structures and specifically of rules. Since authority and legitimacy are understood as 
relationships based on norms, it is important to consider the criticisms provided by 
Sewell and Onuf. The notion of structure being composed of resources and rules, 
according to Sewell, is based on a misunderstanding. Although structure and rules have 
a virtual existence, resources are not virtual. Allocative and authoritative resources have 
an actual existence. Therefore it is necessary to recognise structure and rules as virtual, 
since they are reproduced by the continuity of social practices. But while the 
components of the structures are dual, rules and resources are interdependent on each 
other, since the rules are the result of the manipulation or possession of resources. At 
the same time resources are the result of rules, as rules determine possession and the 
way resources are used. In this way, the distribution of power has to be considered as a 
medium created and recreated by cultural rules (Sewell, 1992: 11). 
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In a similar way, Onuf criticises the lack of explanation in Giddens' account 
about rules and its relation to resources. Rules determine the allocation of resources, in 
the same way that rules constitute resources. Onuf considers that Giddens should 
identify the importance of rules in the creation and maintenance of structures of 
domination (Onuf, 1989: 63-65). 
The predominance of the rules as a linkage between agent and structure is the 
alternative proposed by the constructivist approach, in order to overcome the problem 
between agent and structure. Identifying the lack of explanation in Giddens' 
structuration theory on how agents and structures constitute each other, constructivism 
emphasises the role played by the rules (Gould, 1998: 80). Although constructivism is 
anchored in similar bases to structuration theory, since the duality of the agency is at the 
core of this approach, it departs from structuration theory in considering rules as the 
medium through which society is reproduced. According to Onuf, the duality set out by 
Giddens is in fact a double duality since it refers to the duality of the structure in 
reference to the transformation of relations, and the duality of the systems in relation to 
the reproduction of relations (Onuf, 1989: 61). 
Onuf contends that any human being acts in order to achieve goals, and the rules 
are the ways by which social actors identify those goals. Agency is considered as a 
social condition (also stated by Giddens), where the agent rationally decides among the 
various options that are presented by the rules. Hence acting is constructing and 
reconstaicting the world. But the action is organised by the rules, which at the same 
time affects the ways agents may act. In this sense, Onuf regards the relational feature 
of the rules as being in the middle ground between structure and agency. Rules create 
structure and create agency, in contrast to Giddens' conception of rules as part of the 
structure. 
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Social practices, therefore, revolve around rules, creating, following, rejecting or 
changing them. In other words, social practices form the content of the rales and their 
maintenance (Onuf, 1989: 52). Onuf identifies three main types of rales. Firstly, rales as 
principles inform the agent about the ways things are and work, and at the same time, 
state the consequences that will ensue if this information is not followed. The second 
type is the so-called instraction and directive rales; the former telling the agents what 
they should do with information, and the latter telling them what they must do. The 
third type of rale, commitment rales, refers to those that establish the rights and duties 
of an agent(s) in relation to other(s). Rules are constitutive and regulative at the same 
time, transcending the classification of functionalism, since they are normative (telling 
the agent what should be done) and doing is constracting. Depending on the frequency 
of their practice, rales can be formal, becoming predominant over others, or can become 
legal (Onuf, 1998: 68-69). 
The rales have different effects, and practices can form a pattern (never fixed) of 
agents' intentions called institution. In other words, institutions involve social practices, 
as in the case of Giddens' theory. But rales have another effect, since they can affect or 
limit other agents' choices or actions, based on the existence of asymmetric relations. 
This asymmetry indicates that some actors will use some rales to obtain advantages 
over other agents, describing this as the condition of the rule (Onuf, 1998: 63). And 
finally, since rules determine the limitation of others actors' goals or acts, Onuf then 
establishes that the agent does not enjoy full autonomy or full independence, since this 
is limited by others in the course of social relations. 
Up to this point, and tested against the determinism of stracturalism, 
functionalism and systemic theory, the approach of stracturation theory has 
demonstrated the importance of the agent as an active part in the creation and recreation 
of structures and social systems. In the long term, in any political system, the recursive 
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character that pervades all the notions of structuration provides the key to the 
importance of the social practices of daily life as determinants of the creation and 
recreation of authority and legitimacy. The discussion about the role of rules vis-a-vis 
agent and structure shows, firstly, how rules determine the realisation of actions by the 
agents, who are also their creators, and secondly, how important rules are for the 
constitution of structure. The creation and recreation of rules is therefore important for 
the maintenance and reproduction of forms of authority and legitimacy, according to the 
rules of each society. 
2.3. Understanding the Saudi Arabian Political System 
The study of the system as whole, where the parts are arranged not only in terms 
of distribution of power but also within the principle of self-regulation, allows the 
identification of the units and their role in the maintenance of the system within the 
terms drawn up by Easton. On the other hand, according to Apter, the relationship 
between government and society is the main axis to generate the stability, efficiency 
and, in this way, the legitimacy of the system. The values, which the authorities and 
society invoke, are an integral part of this relationship. The analysis of political systems 
through the different approaches examined in this chapter shows the different variables 
that must be considered to arrive at an understanding of every political system and the 
processes of authority and legitimacy. Therefore, a basic starting point is a definition of 
power, not limited to the structural level, but as something that is both structure and 
agency. Using Onuf's methodological proposal, the point of departure has to be the 
rules that regulate daily life, and from them one can move either to the structural level, 
agency or both. In this way, the religious and the political authorities are the main 
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generators of rules, or at least of their interpretation. At the same time society, in 
general, creates and recreates the rules in daily life, as stated by Giddens and Onuf. 
It is important now to examine the approaches used to define Saudi Arabian 
political system. Wenner and Long focus on the monarchical character of the structure 
of government. These scholars have arrived at their conception of the Saudi monarchy, 
mainly, by contrasting it with its Westerns counterparts, emphasising the questions of 
religion, tribalism and the nature of the power of the monarch, and pointing out that 
theses features are not found in European monarchies. (Wenner, 1975: 173; Long, 1994: 
91). Others, such as Luciani, prefer to focus on the determinacy of the economic aspect 
in politics, emphasising dependence on oil in the form of rent (royalties) and the 
authoritarian internal administration (Luciani, 1990: 76). 
Mordechai bases his study on an analysis of the royal family's power. He 
conceives of the Saudi Arabian political system as being an oligarchy whose pillars are 
the Saudi family, the ulama and the umara (pi. of emir), particularly after the death of 
Abdul Aziz. In his view, the modernisation programme has consolidated the 
concentration of power of the royal family to the detriment of the ulama and umara, and 
even the appearance of entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and the middle class, in general, has 
not altered the predominance of the royal family (Mordechai, 1990: 155-158). 
The most common description of the Saudi Arabian political system is as a 
theocracy,^^ but as Al-Rasheed points out, this definition focuses only on the historical 
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alliance between Wahhabism and political power, which is important in terms of the 
spiritual-ideological foundation of the regime, but ignores other characteristics that give 
peculiarity to the Saudi Arabian state. She maintains that the amalgamation of Islam, 
tribal loyalties, identities, and differences among the three main regions is the basis of 
See Salame, Ghassan (1987). "Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia" in Arab Studies Quaterly 9, (3): 306-
325. 
Locally known as the call to recognition of the unity of God, based on the main principle of their creed, 
tawhid. See next chapter. 
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the Saudi society values, which are not imposed from above. These factors are shared 
between government and society and are the basis for political behaviour, while at the 
same time constituting its constraints (Al-Rasheed, 1996c: 96-119). 
The most recent analysis of the political system is that presented by Fandy. He 
uses the concepts of familialism (a 'iliyya) and kinship {qaraba) relations as a way of 
explaining the allocation of values and the social practices in Saudi Arabia. The 
connotation of the term familialism is more than just the idea of tribes linked to 
genealogical ties; it denotes the ideas of responsibility, accountability and 
interdependence. These notions, according to Fandy, are found in all the aspects of 
Saudi political system and play an important role in determining societal membership 
and social cohesion (Fandy, 1999: 24). The fact that a prince is directly responsible for 
the maintenance of one hundred families has many repercussions. The families are 
dependent not only in formal terms (the source of job) but also in terms of the provision 
for education, jobs or any other important service related to the welfare of the families. 
Most of the time the relationship with the princes passes from generation to generation, 
keeping the links between the princes and the families. It is in this way that the power 
and distribution of welfare pass from the inner circle of the royal family to the basic 
level of Saudi society (Ibid. 30). 
In an attempt to build on these approaches, it is important to emphasise that 
power is not only the product of its distribution in the structure, but is also the outcome 
of activity by the agents. A distribution of power would not work if it could not be 
sustained in the social practices of the social system to which it belongs. Therefore, the 
system of familialism and qaraba relations proposed by Fandy, and the integration of 
the different aspects encompassing the political system according to Al-Rasheed, 
provide a useful basis on which to build. They bring in the local features of the 
Kingdom and at the same time place emphasis on the role played by agents. 
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The following analysis concentrates to a major extent on the institutional level, 
identifying the practices and norms that have acquired formalisation over the course of 
years. Consequently, the next section will analyse and describe the regime, through the 
study not only of the authorities but also of the institutions, in order to discover how 
power relationships are practised and affect the legitimacy and authority in the system. 
After this a study of the political community is presented, identifying the main actors 
and the channels between government and community. 
2.3.1. The regime 
The current Saudi Arabian regime is a reflection of the history of the Kingdom, 
where Islam and bedouin society played, and still are playing, important roles as the 
bases of the system. At the level of authorities, the values of Islam and bedouin society 
determine, to a great extent, the norms that regulate the structure (principles and 
institutions) and the agents in the social system. In this regard, the regime is a mixture 
of tradition and modernisation, and has to find its way within the increasingly complex 
framework that is expected of a modern state. At the societal level, what Easton refers 
to as the political community, the norms are necessary to explain how the system is 
reproduced and the account for the ways in which society and government establish a 
relationship. 
The foundation of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom is very closely interconnected 
with Islam. The alliance between Muhammad ibn Saud and Mohammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab in 1745 gave birth to the religious and political movement known as 
Wahhabism. This movement was of pivotal importance in enabling the Al Saud family 
to gain control of the regions that today form the Kingdom. Moreover, from the point of 
view of religion it is important that the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina are part of 
the Kingdom, since these reinforce the commitment to adhere to the observances of 
Islam. 
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The foundation of the state is inextricably intertwined with religion and is the 
reason why Islam is the main source of legitimacy for the government in particular, and 
for the system in general. Qur'an, sunna and shari'a are the essential guides for the 
regulation of daily affairs in the Kingdom. Al l members of Saudi society, including the 
King, are subject to Islamic law. In appearance it seems that the Kingdom is a very 
conservative country, but in fact it is known for its ability to react to change and to cope 
with modernisation, balancing with the traditional elements of the system. Piscatori 
points out that, in the case of Saudi Arabia, modernisation has been compatible with 
Islam (Piscatori, 1980: 321); and Niblock shares this view. Furthermore, Niblock also 
observes that the modernisation process experienced by Saudi Arabia has produced the 
consolidation of traditional forms of authority, since the parts of the social structures 
that are called "traditional" have been accommodating the modern economic 
development and thus reinforcing the existing patterns of authority relationships 
(Niblock, 1982: 75-76). 
The foundation of the Kingdom also meant the subjugation of some of the tribal 
groups of the Arabian Peninsula. The Al Saud today is the product of the different 
marriages with daughters of tribal emirs, which was a way of consolidating alliances 
between the House of Al Saud and extending its domination and influence. In spite of 
the process of urbanisation initiated in the 1960s, tribal values remain an important part 
of the political process. 
The sense of identity in terms of tribal affiliations or settled people is a feature 
of Saudi culture, which continues to influence considerably social relations among 
different groups. The inclusion and exclusion in social relations is bound up with the 
idea of a closed identity with marriage offering the example of those practices —where 
a bedouin tribal group will reinforce its identity by excluding the marriage with settled 
people, and vice-versa. Pride and shame are connected to this practice, since marrying a 
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family member within the same social group is a cause of pride, while a mixed marriage 
would isolate the couple from the family and group ties, as it would be considered as an 
act of shame. 
It is also important to stress that even today, at the governmental level, many 
aspects of the consultation process are derived not only from Islam itself but also from 
tribal customs and practices. As Joseph Kostiner establishes, the tribal values 
compensate both for the creation of a formal and unfamiliar bureaucracy and for the 
absence of political parties (Kostiner, 1990: 245). 
In general terms, the state plays a central role in shaping the structure and 
dynamics of political life in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned above, the state is still a 
mixture of traditional bases (religious and tribal roots) and modem elements, generated 
through the creation of economic development and as a response to the integration of 
the Saudi Arabian economy with the world economy. The Al Saud is without doubt the 
main actor in the political system. There is close identification of the family with the 
state and, of course, the name of the country is taken from the name of the family. 
The main authority of both the political system and the regime is the King, based 
on the figure of tribal chief and Imam. The King is formally the main receptacle of 
power, since he is the Head of State, Prime Minister, Commander of the Armed Forces 
and also holds the titles of Leader of Saudi Tribes, Guardian of the Two Holy Cities and 
Imam al-Muslimin (religious leader of Muslims). His control over resources, 
authoritative and allocative, is considerable. He has the right to nominate his cabinet, to 
appoint the members of the Council of Ministers (since its creation in 1953), the 
Consultative Council (created in 1992), and the top ulama (since 1971), and in addition 
has the authority to produce royal regulations that do not come within the scope of the 
Islamic law. This latter prerogative is very important because it was the main tool used 
to advance changes at the structural level, especially those concerned with the 
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modernisation programmes. The consolidation of those government structures was 
carried out mainly during King Faysal period. 
The second group of actors considered here are the ulama. They, too, are related 
to government staictures as they are in continuous interaction with society in order to 
regulate the daily life in the Kingdom. Consequently, there is a distinction between the 
official ulama and non-conformist ulama. The basic distinction is that the official ulama 
occupy positions at the institutional level, whereas the second group performs the 
traditional activities of an alim with no link to the state authorities. This will be studied 
in the following section. 
In respect of the role that they play on the institutional level, the ulama still have 
a direct and privileged access to the highest locus of decision-making (Korany, 1991: 
330). This can be seen by examining the institutions that are under the ulama's 
jurisdiction.^^ First, they participate in the institution called Ahl al- 'aqd wa al-hal (those 
who loose and bind), which is in charge of the legitimation of the King's succession. 
This institution played an important role in the legitimation of King Saud's deposition 
and the election of prince Faysal in 1962 as King. 
The Board of Senior Ulama {Hay'at kihar al-ulama) is without doubt the 
principal organisation of the ulama. The council was established in 1971, during King 
Faysal's reign. By Royal Decree the King nominates its members. The Council is 
responsible for issuing the most important and sensitive fatawa. In parallel there are 
other institutions related to this Council like the Higher Council of Qudat, and the 
Institute for the Issue of Religio-Legal Opinions and Scientific Research {Dar al-lfta 
wa'l-Ishraf 'ala al-Shu'un al-Diniyya), among others. 
The Institute for the Issue of Religio-Legal Opinion supports the Board of 
Senior Ulama, and was set up in 1953. Its main responsibility is for issuing/atowa in 
This will be analysed in the fourth chapter. 
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order to regulate daily life, as well as to propagate the Wahhabi doctrine at home and 
abroad through the publication and distribution of publications. Also, its range of 
activities covers the sponsorship of conferences and research projects, and the training 
of preachers in order to achieve the spread of religion abroad. The symbolic 
consequence of the publication and distribution of religious texts is the projection of the 
country's role as the propagator of Islam, as well as the reaffirmation of its 
identification with Wahhabism (al Yassini, 1986: 71). 
The top ulama are in charge of the Ministry of Justice (composed mainly of 
shah 'a courts and the High Judicial Council), which was formed in 1971, as mentioned 
earlier, under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. The administration of justice 
is divided into three levels: the Summary Courts, the Shari'a Courts and the Supreme 
Judicial Council. The first type of Court hears mainly cases of major crime offences The 
Shari'a Courts are those that deal with more serious offences regarding criminal and 
financial acts, but they also they cover issues regarding personal status. These courts are 
presided by one judge in cases of civil order and for criminal offences a panel of five 
judges is required (Vogel, 2000: 90). Finally, the Supreme Judicial Council is composed 
of twenty members and constitutes the authority to hear the cases of appellation. 
Another institution that is part of the Ministry of Justice is the Board of 
Grievances. Originally the idea behind this was that the King could receive directly the 
complaints of his subjects and their demands. Nowadays, this function and idea has 
acquired the status of a board, which hears not only grievances from the citizens to 
government, but also deals with the conflicts between various ministries and 
departments in different government institutions. In addition, it mediates in disputes, 
which require either royal decrees or new initiatives based on the Qur'an, shari'a and 
surma. 
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The ulama are also in charge of the Ministry of Education (including the general 
presidency for the education of girls and the supervision of the Islamic University, 
Umm al-Qura University and Imam University), which was incorporated into the 
Council of Ministers in 1953. Another institution under the ulama's control is the 
awqaf, which in 1953 became the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Endowments, and which 
subsequently assumed control of the Qur'an Printing complex and the Kiswah factory. 
The ulama are in charge of the Committee for the Commendation of Virtue and 
Prevention of Evil {Hay'at al-amr b'il ma'ruf w'al-nahi 'an al-munkar). This 
Committee has an important function relating to the social life of the Kingdom, who is 
responsible for the enforcement of public morality in accordance with Wahhabi 
principles. The religious police, as they are known, are responsible for supervising the 
correct application of and respect for Islamic law. Although their power has varied at 
times, generally speaking, they can imprison and punish people who do not follow the 
correct practice of Islam. For this reason, they can be considered as the executive arm of 
the ulama and also a kind of censor of the system. The religious police come within the 
jurisdiction of the Interior Minister, but they have their own administration whose 
senior official is an alim with the rank of minister (Ibid. 70).^^ 
Some of the members of the upper social class are involved in the political 
system as ministers and, therefore, to a certain extent have access to the centre of 
decision-making. In the Kingdom there are two major administration-related Councils; 
the Council of Ministries and the Consultative Council, established in 1953 and 1991 
respectively. The former consists of 27 ministries, among which the most important are: 
the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of the National Guard, 
the Ministry Defence and Aviation and the Ministry of Oil. Due to their importance, 
these ministries are under control of the royal family. Since the creation of the Council 
An analysis of the evolution of the institutions considered here is presented in the fourth chapter. 
61 
of Ministries the main positions have been held by princes, but currently there is a 
tendency to give access to "commoners". Important exceptions are the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, and the Ministry of Petroleum, both of which have 
been headed by commoners. 
The Council is responsible for implementing the policies set out by the King 
(royal decrees and orders), formulating regulations within the "secular area". These are 
related mainly to economic programmes (approval of the annual budget), industry, 
planning and commerce (concession and monopoly contracts granted to individual 
companies, the formation of stock companies and the authorisation of foreign 
companies to operate in the Kingdom), and range from the national to the local level. It 
is also the Council that ratifies international agreements and treaties of the Kingdom 
with foreign countries (Huyyete, 1985: 85; Al-Farsy, 1990: 43-48). The decisions of the 
Council, however, are subject to the approval of the King, who is President of the 
Council. 
The Consultative Council was established in 1992, as part of the reforms known 
as the Basic System of Government, and its members are appointed by the King. 
Members are drawn mainly from the upper class. According to the terms set out in the 
decree, the King has the prerogative to renew the membership. The members of the 
Council are not members of any other government institution. The ninety members, 
who have been chosen until now have been civil servants, businessmen, and the 
religious establishment, appear to represent a cross-section of the Saudi elite (Gause, 
1994: 109). The task of this body is to monitor the performances of the ministries, and it 
has the right to ask for the attendance at the Council sessions of any minister or 
governmental official. It can only recommend regulations, or amendments to draft 
regulations, to its president, who conveys them to the King. The basic system of 
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government also contains regulations related to local administration, allowing the 
formation of local councils. 
As has been seen, the regime in Saudi Arabia embodies four types of authorities: 
the King, the Princes, the ulama, and the members of the upper class, each of them 
representing a mixture of traditional and modern values. Among the authorities of the 
regime, the King has the greatest scope of authority, but he still has to obtain consensus 
and legitimation within the royal family, the ulama and the commoners in the 
ministries, as the analysis of the institutions shows. In particular, legitimation has to 
come from the ulama, since the ministers are responsible for implementing policies. 
Moreover, it is still necessary to examine how the links between legitimacy and support 
are created and maintained; this is the concern of next section. 
2.3.2. The political community 
It is often pointed out that in Saudi Arabia there is no participation in the 
political system because the government is authoritarian and there are no channels 
available. However, there are forms of participation based on an amalgamation of 
traditional customs and social values mixed with the demands of the oil boom. An 
appreciation of traditional values remains important i f one tries to achieve an 
understanding on how and in what way the political community is involved on the 
political system. 
It is also important to notice that solidarity links inside the family are related to 
the familial lines and a generational factor. The most powerful group is the royal family. 
The size of the family is thought to number some 5000 members, and it can be 
considered as the only political party in Saudi Arabia (Al-Yassini, 1985: 92). 
Academics have pointed out that there are power struggles within the family (Quandt, 
1981: 108; Korany, 1991: 329-346; Dawisha, 1979: 130). Since the mle of King Fahd, 
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there has been a main circle, called the Sudairi seven (King Fahd, and Princes Sultan, 
Abdul Rahman, Nayif, Turki, Salman and Ahmad).Then there is second circle known 
as the "conservatives", headed by Abdullah the current crown prince^ *^ and princes 
belonging to the Thunayan family branch, for example the ex-King Khaled and the 
Jiluwi collateral branch of Al Saud family, and the sons of King Faysal.^' Another 
division based on lineage overlaps these two circles. The latter generation, such as the 
grandsons and great grandsons of King Abdul Aziz, have had a more western education, 
while previous generations had a court education.Therefore, it is important to 
recognise that depending on his position within the family, the King would exercise 
complete or partial control of the affairs of the Kingdom (Dawisha, 1979: 131). 
The religious leaders (also the non-official ulama) continue to play an important 
role in society, since they are the propagators and reinforcers of the wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam. In the past, becoming an alim was considered the main career 
that would produce social mobility, especially during the period of Abdul Aziz up to 
King Faysal. During the last decades, the Kingdom has prepared thousands of ulama, to 
teach abroad or to f i l l positions inside the Kingdom. In spite of the lack of hierarchy 
among the ulama, there is a close relationship between non-official ulama and official 
ulama, since the latter may be the teachers of the former and are also involved in the 
promotion and nomination of the former. On the other hand, as will be discussed in the 
following chapters, the non-official ulama play an important role in legitimising the role 
of official ulama, both, among themselves and within the society. For this reason, their 
Their mother is Hassa Bint Ahmad al-Kabir Sudairi. Lees, Brian (1980). A Handbook of the Al Saud 
Ruling Family in Saudi Arabia. (London: Stacey). p. 44. 
Abdullah is son of Ai-Fahda bint 'Asi al-Shuraim (Shamar tribe), two of his sons are holding positions 
in the national army. Ibid. p. 36. 
'^ On the politics of succession and analysis of the different factions inside the royal family see: 
Henderson, Simon (1995). After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia. (Washington, D .C . : The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy). 
-^ See Samore, Gary Samuel (1989). Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953-1982). (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Harvard) 
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demands as a group can find a channel through the official ulama and among other 
social actors such as tribal leaders or businessmen. 
Associated with the royal family, the tribal leaders are a group that is also 
considered to have a role in the political community. As mentioned earlier, the 
foundation of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom was based on consolidation through 
marriages between the royal family and daughters of the emirs of the most important 
tribes. Among the tribal groups associated with the House of Al Saud are the Thunayan, 
Jiluwi, Sudairi and Shammar. On the other hand, the National Guard, the military force 
in charge of the defence of the royal family, is composed of bedouins. 
The importance of the tribal leaders, nowadays, stems from their role as 
intermediaries between government and society. Even with the modernisation and 
consolidation of the state, they continue to have an important role, not always formal 
but running in parallel with local government in terms of seeking consensus regarding 
government policies, and as arbitrators in local disputes. 
The influence of groups, such as the merchant families of the Hijaz region and 
the families of Najd on the Al Saud, is determined by historical links and geographical 
considerations. As is pointed out by Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, during the last two decades 
the Najdi families were largely favoured, mainly because the centre of power for the Al 
Saud is in this region. Indeed, the policies pursued by the government since the oil 
boom were aimed at getting more Najdi people incorporated into the state apparatus and 
involved in business activity (Chaudhry, 1997: 156-163). In spite of this policy the 
traditional merchant families in Jeddah or the Hijaz region have enjoyed their 
prominence in the economic activities. The activities of businessmen are practically 
restricted to the construction sector, the registration of foreign companies and financial 
activities. 
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There is a close relationship between the royal family and businessmen. It is a 
patron-client relationship, since they participate in commercial activities through the 
princes. This relationship creates links between the princes and commoners, thus giving 
the commoners economic and social status. 
In addition the oil boom and the policies adopted mainly since King Faysal's 
reign, have created the professions and education of persons as teachers, doctors, 
lawyers or officials in senior positions of bureaucracy or mid-ranking civil servants 
considered as middle class."''' They depend on the government for salaries and the 
permanency of their jobs. These groups could act as informal pressure groups, 
especially with the problems that have appeared since the decline of oil revenues, but 
until now no clear pattern has emerged.'^ '^  However, these groups should also be 
considered from another perspective. The fact that they are also, to a certain extent, 
intermediaries between society and government means that they are involved in the 
implementation of the welfare distribution programmes, and therefore may be regarded 
as another channel linking government and society. 
2.4. Remarks about the Saudi Arabian Political System 
As has been seen, the political system of Saudi Arabia is characterised by the 
participation of the ulama and the government in the production and reproduction of 
social norms. The cause, as has been shown, lies in the way that the structures of the 
system have been shaped, and the channels or relationship that have been produced as a 
result. 
Rugh, William (1977). "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia", International Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 27, ( I ) : 7-20. 
See Heller, Mark and Nadav Safran (1985). The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi 
Arabia. Harvard Middle East Paper. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). 
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The systemic theory and its manifestations in structuralism and functionalism 
have been useful as a point of departure. Power, as has been analysed, not only lies in 
the structure but also in the relations of power that are established at the community 
level, and these are important to explain the features of the political system. 
The relationship between the regime and community is very complex, since it is 
transacted through formal and informal channels. The growth and specialisation of the 
government has reinforced the traditional patterns of authority within the Kingdom. At 
an institutional level, the structure of the government explains which authorities and 
which institutions have power and participate in the decision-making process. It was 
stated that the King and the royal family have a broad political power. However, if one 
does not look beyond this one's understanding of the system will be only partial, since 
the performance of the role of the individuals and institutions has to be undertaken 
according to the values of the social practices involved. Therefore, one has to look for 
notions of authority and legitimacy, based not only on the weight of the past, but also on 
processes that are in a state of continuous elaboration. These are established partially by 
the government (at the institutional level) and are vital for the dynamics of the society 
that is involved in their creation and maintenance. 
The role of values was considered from Apter's perspective, since they 
determine to a great extent the configuration of the power stmcture and the performance 
of the roles associated with the government. As mentioned earlier, there are two main 
sources of values, religion and tribal practices. These are used under certain 
circumstances by the government in order to reinforce its position just as the values are 
also used by different social groups to accept or reject governmental policies. It is at this 
level that the role of the ulama is most important since they contribute to feeding and 
spreading those values among the population. 
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Chapter Three 
The Formation of the Kingdom 
In order to understand the configuration of the political and religious authorities 
in today's Saudi Arabian Kingdom, there must be an analysis of the historical 
background. The main aim of this chapter is to trace how social practices shaped and 
influenced the creation of structures of authority and established the forms of 
legitimacy. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter is divided into three main sections 
whose objectives are to describe the historical context in order to study the different 
aspects that were involved in the formation of Saudi Arabian society and its political 
system. The study begins with the historical analysis of the causes that favoured the 
emergence of the Wahhabi {da 'wat al-tawhid) movement,^'' focusing on the formation 
of the so-called first and second Saudi states. The next main section deals with the 
period of the establishment of the modern Saudi Arabian Kingdom by Abdul Aziz A l -
Saud and is followed by an analysis of the consolidation of the political system during 
the regimes of King Saud and King Faysal. 
The historical study is accompanied by an analysis of the origins of the central 
authority and the religious authorities, examining the evolution of these authorities in 
terms of permanencies and changes in the creation and recreation of power and its 
domains. The analysis of the content of the main Wahhabi doctrines focuses on the 
bases for the "definition" of authorities, society and their roles. After the study of the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during King Abdul Aziz's period, an 
analysis is given of the evolution of both types of authorities, during the successive 
regimes of Kings Saud and Faysal. 
Although the members of this movement referred to themselves as muwahidun (the people in favour of 
the unity of God), this term is also applied to other religious movements in the Islamic world. Wahhabism 
was a term used by the opponents of the movement and it is currently in use by western sources. 
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3.1. The First and Second Saudi States 
The aim of this section is to outline the dynamics of society in Najd and the 
expansionist goals achieved during the first two Saudi states. The study of the historical 
period provides a basis for understanding the analysis of the content of the religious 
Wahhabi doctrine and for analysing the relationship between the ulama and government 
in the following sections. 
The origins of the Saudi state date from the eighteenth century, when the 
alliance between Muhammad ibn Saud and Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab was 
forged. This alliance between religion and politics became the main driving force for the 
emergence of two stable and lasting chieftancies^^ that are known as the first Saudi state 
(1745-1818) and the second Saudi state (1824-1891). 
As is pointed out by Corancez, three important factors help towards an 
understanding of the dynamics of the two historic Saudi states: climate, religion and 
government (Corancez, 1994: 113). The geographical and ecological conditions 
influenced the development of diverse settlements and nomadic life.''^ The second 
factor, religion, was used to overcome the divisions of the diverse communities and 
gave a ralson d' etre to the expansionist movement. This factor, together with attempts 
to establish a central authority, was influential in establishing forms of government 
during the historical periods of the Kingdom up to the time that the modern Saudi 
Kingdom was established. 
The geographical and historical conditions of the central part of the peninsula, or 
what is now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, are clearly important. The central 
part of the peninsula is composed of four main regions, which evolved with different 
""^  The chieftancy was a prevalent form of organisation in the Arabian Peninsula since pre-Islamic times. 
Chieftancy refers to an organisation of "loose tribal alliances based on power sharing, mutual 
responsibilities and duty sharing among nomadic and sedentarised people under a ruler from a major 
tribe" Kostiner, Joseph (1993). The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftancy to 
Monarchical State. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 3. 
" A full analysis of the ecological and geographical factors as determinants for the political behaviour in 
Central Arabia is found in: Helms, Christine (1981). The Cohesion o/Saudi Arabia. (London: Croom 
Helm), pp. 29-75. Vassiliev, A. (1999). The History of Saudi Arabia. (London: Saqi Books), pp. 29-63. 
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features according to their geographical and historical settings. Najd is the region 
located at the centre, with al-Hasa to the east, Hijaz in the west and Asir to the south. 
Najd, in turn, is flanked by the Jabal Shammar and Qasim areas. 
The central region of Najd is the area where Wahhabism emerged. The hardship 
of natural resources in this particular region led to isolation and a lifestyle created by 
vast desert areas such as the Nafoud in the north. Rub al Khali in the south and the 
Dahna desert in the east, which determined its frontiers. Consequently, in Najd the 
relationship between the nomadic population and the settled areas was fundamental to 
the life in this region. The main urban areas were Riyadh, Hail, Buraida and Unaiza, 
which were mercantile and manufacturing centres for the trans-peninsular caravans 
(Helms, 1981: 33).'** 
The Arabian Peninsula was the intermediate point between Europe and Asia for 
the spice trade, and for the pilgrimage routes to Mecca and Medina, from remote times. 
Three main pilgrimage routes crossed the peninsula from different points such as Hufuf, 
Kuwait and Najaf. The rise and decline in importance of tribal groups or of towns was 
determined by the creation of stopping places on the trading and pilgrimage routes. 
Two regions in the peninsula were economically active, al-Hasa and Hijaz. The 
first focused on trading in pearls and agricultural goods, the second on the commercial 
activities along the pilgrimage route and on the importation and exportation of goods to 
and from the port of Jeddah. In fact, Hijaz due to its commercial activities, was more 
urban-orientated than Najd, and had a continuous form of central authority. Also, the 
relationship between the urban Hijazi population and the tribal groups was more 
conflictive, since the latter were a constant interruption to the routes of commerce of 
Hijaz, in contrast to the state of the relationship that existed in Najd (Ibid. 31). 
See Yapp, Malcolm (1980). "The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" in Cotrell, Alvin (ed.). The 
Persian Gulf States. (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press), pp. 41-57; Lorimer, H. 
B . completed and edited by R. L . Birwood (1970). Gazetter of the Persian Gulf Oman and Central 
Arabia 2A Geographical and Statistical. (Farnsborough: Gregg International and Westmead and Irish 
University Press). 
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In general, the tribal communities and settled populations were dependent on 
each other, due to the complementarities of the two modes of life. On the one hand, the 
bedouins had a market to sell their livestock and extend their authority over the settled 
area; on the other, the settlers obtained goods from the bedouins, and protection for the 
transit of caravans, and the prevention of any threat from an enemy tribe (Helms, 1981: 
65). 
The tribal system had a hierarchy based on the purity of the tribe's ancestors, as 
well as on the amount of authority and power of each tribal group. The ascendancy of 
tribes was based on the claim of ancestors; the dominant tribes were those that could 
trace their origins to Qahtan or Adnan. Those without such ancestors were considered as 
inferior tribal groups and had to pay a kind of tribute (called khuwa) to a superior tribe 
in order to obtain recognition and protection. 
The predominance of a strong sense of group solidarity (asabiya) was another 
important factor in the nomadic life. Each family unit of the tribe was required to 
contribute to collective tasks, such as the establishment of regular troops or providing a 
specific number of camels or horses for that purpose. Each tribe enjoyed recognised 
rights over the use of water and pasture in the limits of a demarcated territorial space 
known as dira. Those rights were maintained by customary law (Ibid: 49). 
The towns were also governed in terms of kinship. Originally the settled 
communities were set up by a branch of a tribal group, keeping semi-nomadic life at the 
beginning and maintaining affiliation with their own tribal group (Uthaimin, 1997: 3). 
In the second part of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman and Safavid empires 
surrounded the central part of the Arabian Peninsula. The first of these exercised a 
relative control in some of the areas adjacent to Najd. The areas of Hijaz (since 1517), 
Yemen, al-Hasa and al Qatif"*^  respectively were under Ottoman control. The power of 
These last tliree areas were outside the Ottoman control between 1635 and 1670. 
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the Ottoman central authority became increasingly more fragmented by military 
authorities or political chiefs who governed the peripheral part of the empire, especially 
in the Fertile Crescent. Local notables governed the towns or villages independently and 
the bedouins never totally submitted to the Sultan's authority. Meanwhile, the Safavid 
Empire (1501-1763) was extending its territory along the opposite coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula and as far as India in the east and Mesopotamia in the west. 
The ulama, in addition to the military, constituted a key element in the Ottoman 
Empire. Due to the close relationship between the Sultan and later the Caliph, the ulama 
were heavily dependent on the central authority. They comprised a religious elite that 
was associated with commerce and wealth from the awqaf (Hodgson, 1974: 141). 
Hence with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the power of the ulama began to 
decline, as part of the changes in the dynamics of the empire. The ulama, who were 
mainly followers of the shafi school of law, gradually became more sufi oriented, 
although they combined a belief in the supremacy of the shari'a with both Sunni and 
sufi interpretations. 
The prevalent current in the Arabian Peninsula was based on official Ottoman 
Islam and the growing return to popular beliefs such as astrology, and the belief in 
saints, alongside the spread of Sufism. This was very important since the revivalist 
movements show the tension between formal Islam (the Islam of the official ulama) on 
the one hand, and, the Sufism and other popular cults. It is in this respect that the 
Wahhabi movement can be regarded as an opposition movement to both official 
Ottoman Islam and the popular cults prevalent in the region; and from a political point 
of view it was seen as a threat to the different chieftancies in the area. 
As has been indicated the first Saudi state stemmed from the alliance between 
the Emir Muhammad ibn Saud and Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab in 1745 at 
Dara'iya. According to the official historians, both families were descendants of noble 
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tribes. The origins of the Al Saud family can be traced to one of the major tribal clans of 
Anaza, beginning with the grandfather of Mohammed ibn Saud the founder of the 
settlement in Dara'iya. The ancestors of Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab were from a 
division of the Tamim, also part of the Anaza confederation, who settled in Uyaina and 
were dedicated to religious studies. 
The activities and teachings of Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab in 
Huramaila alarmed the Emir of al-Hasa who expelled him, seeing his stance and his 
teachings as a source of challenge to the Emir's authority (Uthaimin, 1970: 100-103). 
The destination selected by the Sheikh was Dara'iya, since this was a settlement under 
the control of the main enemy of the al-Uyaina and Huramaila authorities, Muhammad 
ibn Saud. 
Dara'iya was surrounded by local chieftancies, such as the Banu Khalid who 
controlled the area of al Hasa and the eastern coast, and the clan of Mu'ammar who 
controlled the southern part of Najd in which was located the main urban settlement of 
Uyaina. 
Muhammad ibn Saud accepted the religious precepts of Sheikh Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab, and the latter accepted the authority of the Emir Saud. Together they 
laid down the basis for the creation of today's Saudi Arabian Kingdom: 
"T fear, that if 1 help you and we win the world, you and I , you 
may leave me to seek your fortune elsewhere; and secondly I am 
entitled by the laws of my land to certain revenues on the 
earnings of my subjects from agriculture and trade and the rest. 
You will not ask me to forgo this right". The sheikh replied: as 
for the first matter, give me your hand on it. And as regards the 
second, perchance Almighty God will conquer your conquests, 
and recompense you with spoils of war far more ample than 
your present revenues" (Philby, 1955: 39-40; see also ibn Bishr, 
1971: 12). 
The main expansionist drive was under the Emir and the Imam Abdul Aziz ibn 
Saud (1765-1803), since they managed to control all central Najd. Wahhabi forces 
annexed the Qasim area, al-Hasa and in the south, and their control reached to the 
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borders of Yemen. Some of the main tribal groups submitted to the Wahhabis, such as 
the Qahtan, Subai and Bani KhaHd and Shammar. However, the submission was not 
always complete, since either the villages or settlements as well as the tribal groups 
shifted alliances according to circumstances and to the perceived advantages or 
disadvantages of the benefits in joining Wahhabis forces or not. 
Nevertheless, the extension of the movement between the 1780s and 1790s 
allowed the Wahhabis to gain control of the main trading routes, especially with the 
capture of Buraida, Unaiza, Hail and al-Hasa. Furthermore, they also extended their 
incursions along the east coast, forcing the Sultan of Oman to pay tribute to the Emir of 
Najd. 
When Saud ibn Abdul Aziz (1803-1814) succeeded his father, the Wahhabis 
once again conquered new territories, provoking reactions against them by the Ottoman 
Empire and the British authorities. The raids of the Wahhabis on lower Iraq and Syria, 
including the famous massacre and destruction of the Hussein tomb in Kerbala (1803), 
greatly concerned the Ottomans. Furthermore, the extension of the movement along the 
east coast of the Arab Gulf was stopped to a great extent by the presence of Britain and 
its alliance with the sheikhdoms of the Gulf.'*" 
The advance of the Wahhabis towards Hijaz province, and the latter's 
submission in 1803, altered the dynamics of the trade. Regarding commerce, the 
Wahhabis banned all taxes, and were very strict about the admission of pilgrims, which 
of course led to a decrease of the pilgrimage and trading activities. Hence the Hijazi 
The control of the littoral of the Gulf coast extended from Basrah to Dibbah in the Gulf of Oman. The 
activities of piracy by the Wahhabi Qawasim were the main concern for Britain, since the piracy 
interfered with the safety of British trade and communications with India. In 1820, Britain started to 
formalise an alliance with the Trucial sheikhdoms (Ujman, Ras A l Khaimah, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and 
Sharjah). Towards the end of the nineteenth century Bahrein, Kuwait and the Trucial Sheikdoms signed 
an agreement of no-alignment, by which Britain would have control their foreign affairs, and especially 
the prohibition of piracy and slave trade. See, Hawley, Donald (1970). Trucial States. (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd), pp. 40-125. 
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population was deprived of their main source of income, and became dependent on the 
policy of subsidies from the Najd authorities (Vassiliev, 1999: 105). The control of this 
commercial province and the opposition of Wahhabis to the religious authority of the 
Sultan as Khalifa of the Muslim community provoked retaliation from Ottoman forces 
(Al-Shafy, 1967: 283). The first Saudi state ended with the arrival of Ottoman forces, 
which finally destroyed the first Wahhabi state in 1818. 
During the second Saudi state, the Al Saud family was able to regain control of 
some areas in the central part of the peninsula. The recapture of Riyadh by Emir Turki 
ibn Abdullah restored Al Saud authority, after the departure of Egyptians forces from 
central Najd by 1819. The lasting rule over Najd was that of Turki ibn Faysal, first 
period from 1834 to 1838, second from 1843-1865. Although he met other contenders 
to his authority, such as Khalid ibn Saud (1838) helped by the Egyptians, and Abdullah 
ibn Thunayyan descendant of Muhammad ibn Saud (1842-1843), he managed to retain 
his authority. 
Under Faysal, the Emirate of Riyadh extended its territories to Qasim, and Jabal 
al Shammar became its vassal. Control over al-Hasa and the east coast was achieved 
once more, but the agreement of Britain with the Trucial Emirates and Oman stopped 
the activities of the Wahhabis in the lower Gulf. 
The area of Qasim was a constant challenge for the central authority. As has 
been mentioned, Qasim lies midway between Jabal Shammar and Southern Najd, so 
that the loyalty of the population was often divided between the two powerful Emirates. 
The Shammar, led by the Rashidi family, captured Qasim with the help of the 
Ottomans. 
The death of Emir Faysal caused rivalry among his sons, Abdullah, Muhammad, 
Saud and Abdul Rahman. Faysal nominated Abdullah as his successor, but the latter 
was challenged by Saud, who deposed him. The Ottomans took advantage of the 
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situation to capture al-Hasa and Asir while the descendants of the House of Al Saud 
were engaged in internal disputes. Gradually, the authority of Al Saud was reduced to 
central Najd, and although authority was regained by Abdullah and Muhammad, the 
Wahhabi state did not manage to strengthen its position. 
By contrast, the Rashidis in Hail were growing stronger, taking advantage of the 
situation in order to occupy southern Najd. Firstly, at the time when the son of Saud ibn 
Faysal challenged the Wahhabi authority, they appointed an Emir for Najd; and 
secondly, after the revolt of Abdul Rahman in 1891, they direct took control of the 
whole Najd. 
3.1.1. The ideological content of the Wahhabi doctrine 
The work and postulates of Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab'*' are understood in 
the context of the fourth Islamic law school, the Hanbali'*^ and particularly in the works 
of Taqiyy al Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (hereafter Ibn Taymiyya), the follower of this 
school. The Wahhabi movement was a reformist movement, but like all other religious 
movements it arose from a particular context, as was explained in the previous section, 
and in this sense was a response to it. The tenets of the Wahhabi creed are regarded as a 
response to the religious and political problems at the time of its emergence. The 
significance of this movement lies in the fact that it created the basis for the 
establishment of the Saudi Arabian state. The analysis presented in this section shows 
how the principles of the Wahhabi doctrine affected the demarcation of a new society 
based on submission to Islam and the expansion of the Islamic call throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
See Uthaimin, Abd Allah. (1972). Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab: His Works. (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Edinburgh). 
The premises of this school are the oneness of God, the incomparability of God, the plurality of 
attributes, the supremacy of the Qur'an and Sunna and the refusal to accept any innovation (bida). Laoust, 
Henry (1965). Les Schismes dans I'Islam. (Paris: Harmattan). pp. 117-118. It is important to mention that 
this school had been considered since its origin as focusing on a mild ascetic life, self- discipline and 
social criticism of the morals of society. See Hurovitz, N. (2000). "The Schools of Law and its Historical 
Context" in Islam Law and Society 17, (1): 37-64. 
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The principles of the Wahhabi creed constitute a critique of the state of Islam in 
the Ottoman Empire in particular, and of the distortion that it had suffered after the 
period of the four caliphs (rashidun) in general. Similar criticism were also voiced by 
Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya in their times. The absence of a stable authority and 
differences among tribes in terms of lineage and power were meant to be surpassed by 
the call for the restoration of Islam. The membership of this new realm was portrayed in 
terms of submission to God, and as egalitarian members in the Islamic community 
(umma), in contrast to the inequality found in bedouin society. It is in this sense that it is 
possible to state that Wahhabi doctrines were influential in the creation of a "new" 
society in central Arabia. 
The basic tenets of the doctrine of Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab (hereafter the 
Sheikh) were the supremacy of the Qur'an and sunna, as the only two sources of 
revelation. The principles advanced by Wahhabism revolved around the notions of 
tawhid, ijtihad and taqlid, whilst rejecting and condemning the practices of tawasul, 
shirk and bida.'^^ 
The central tenet of the doctrine was the notion of tawhid, oneness of God, 
which is why the movement is known as al-da'wa al-tawhidiyyah (the call to 
recognition of the unity of God). On the one hand, tawhid was a clear reaction against 
all the deviations of Islam, particularly Sufism, and against the popular beliefs spread 
towards the second half of the eighteenth century, in order to emphasise the supremacy 
of one God; and on the other, the principle was the basis for dividing the world between 
the Wahhabis and "the others". 
There are three kinds of tawhid: tawhid ar-rubiyyah, tawhid al asma'wa-s-sifat, 
and tawhid al-idihiyya or al-ibadah. The first refers to the affirmation of the belief that 
God is the creator and provider of the universe. Following this principle, God knows the 
See Margoliouth, D. S. (1937). "Wahhabiya" in EI (in French). (Leiden, Brill), pp. 1141-1145. 
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destiny of men, since He created them according to His own purposes, such that men 
must follow. His path and be rewarded, or deserve punishment (Uthaimin, 1972: 118). 
For that reason an imam must believe in predestination, accepting the wil l of God and 
trying to keep the correct path. 
The second one, tawhid al asma 'wa-s-sifat, refers to the view that the oneness of 
God is in accordance with the doctrines and interpretations of the ancestors about the 
names and attributes of God, in the way that God wanted and in agreement with what 
the prophet explained to his followers (Ibid.) This is the basis for declaring that God is 
perfection, and is unique and that no creature in the world is comparable with Him. 
The third type of tawhid, tawhid al-ulihiyya or at-tawhid al ibadah, refers to the 
worship of God alone. The acceptance that God is not only the creator and the Lord, but 
is also the sole object of devotion is the basis of this form of tawhid. In this regard, the 
shahada (faith profession) is envisaged here as the way of showing that one must obey 
God alone, and these are the terms that define a Wahhabi vis-a-vis others. For the 
Sheikh, Muhammad is only an apostle whose teachings are to be followed, not a 
prophet to be worshiped.'*'* This declaration of acceptance signified that in daily life 
those principles were followed, since practising according to religious precepts is 
accepting the fundamental tenet of Wahhabism. Faith in God and His commandments 
forms part of this type of tawhid, as Helms points out. This type of tawhid is associated 
with daily life and the behaviour that the believer, according to the Islamic precepts, 
should observe (Helms, 1981: 89). 
The notion of tawhid was paramount for establishing the difference between 
Wahhabis and others, identifying themselves as the true believers, as opposed to the 
various other diverse groups of Muslims. The consequences of the principle of tawhid 
Rashid, Rida (ed.). Majmuat at tawhid an Najdiyya. p. 127. Quoted by Uthaimin, Op. Cit. p. 233. 
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for the dynamics of life in the peninsula were considerable. Through this principle 
loyalty was no longer identified with tribal affiliations but with the worship of God. The 
difference among tribal lineages was blurred through membership of the Islamic 
community (umma). 
The second principle is intercession (tawasul). Based on the concept of tawhid, 
worship must be addressed only to God. As a part of worship, prayers include the 
request {su'al). The Wahhabis were against intermediation between God and his 
creatures. The Sheikh points out that 
"such prayers are polytheistic and those who utter them are 
not only similar to the old pagans against whom the Prophet 
fought, but even surpass them, for while the pagans invoked 
their gods in times of ease and turned to God exclusively in 
periods of crisis, these people associate others with Him at all 
titties".^'* 
As can be inferred from this tenet, the practice of tawasul is contrary to the 
tawhid, especially its first and third aspects. This principle again is very strong on 
condemning pagan rituals and represents a warning against polytheism, reinforcing the 
notion of the oneness of God and emphasising the difference between the correct 
application of Islam and the practices prevalent at that time. 
The rejection of intercession was one of the most notable features of the 
Wahhabis, since they condemned visiting graves and erecting domes because they 
became places where prayers of intercession were said. However, they differentiated 
between permissible and objectionable acts on this question: 
"The first one would be as a reminder of the world to come, 
as a means of keeping alive the memory of dead persons, and as 
a source of mutual benefit for the visitor who is following the 
sunna and for the visitor who is offering prayers for him.""^^ 
Ibn Ghannam (1949). Tarikh najd al-muamina: rawdat al-ajkar wa-l-afham li murtad Hal al-imam wa 
ta'dad ghazawat dhawi l-islam. Cairo, p. 67; Majmu'at ar-rasail wa-al-masail an najdiyya pp. 3-4. 
Quoted by Uthaimin, Ibid. p. 236. 
Majmu'at ar-Rasail wa-l-masail an najdiyya .p. 279; Qasim, Abd Allah (1931). A!- buruq an Najdiyya 
fii ktisahazu lumat ad Dajawiyya. Cairo, pp. 144-1445 quoted by Uthaimin Ibid. p. 240. 
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An objectionable act was considered to be the erection of domes and mosques in 
the tombs in order to ask dead persons to intercede with God. 
"He (the Prophet) forbade this at the end of his life. After 
this [forbidding of taking graves as Masjid (place of worship], 
he cursed anyone who did any such deed within this context. 
Prayer at the graves is one of these deeds, even i f no Masjid has 
been built. This is the meaning of his words." He feared (his 
grave) would be taken as a Masjid". The Companions never 
built any place of worship around his grave. Any place which is 
intended for prayer or where prayer is performed has indeed 
been taken as a Masjid.(Muhammad ibn Abdul Al Wahhab, 
1996: 83-84). 
The portrayal of Wahhabism as an extreme belief stems from the practices of the 
Hanbali school regarding the morals of society. In the case of the Sheikh and his 
followers, this activism led them abolish the malpractices of Islam. The destruction of 
tombs and mosques dedicated to the memory of any dead person was considered one of 
the Wahhabis main tasks."*^  The destruction of Kerbala and the tombs of Aisha are often 
cited as examples of the excesses of the Wahhabis. 
The definitions of unbeliever (kafir) and the fight (qital) against the unbeliever 
represent the lines that divide the Wahhabi polity from other groups (either polytheists 
or non-Wahhabi Muslims) where the definition of unbeliever is an attribute of otherness 
tout court (Al Azmeh, 1993: 144). The Wahhabis regarded as unbelievers those persons 
who after becoming Muslims persisted in polytheistic practices or prevented others 
from following the correct application of Islam. According to the Sheikh infidels can be 
divided into four groups: 
" 1 - Those who know that tawhid is the religion of God and His 
Prophet and that to have recourse to beings others than God is 
polytheism and who refuse to follow the former and renounce 
the latter. 
2- Those who accept these two principles but continue to believe 
in saints. 
47 
Al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abdul edited by Muhammad Munir.(1927). Kitab at-tawhid alladhi huwa 
haqq Allah 'ala l-Abid. (Cairo) p. 52; Ibn Abdallah, Sulayman (1901). Kitab al Tawhid and Tawhid al-
Khallaq fii Jawab ahl al Iraq wa Tadhkirat uli l-albab fii tariqat ash Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd -al-
Wahhab. p. 52; Rashid, Rida Op.Cit. p. 403 quoted by Uthaimin, Ibid. 242. 
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3- Those who feel hatred for others who do so (believe and 
practice tawhid) and affection for those who do not. 
4- Those who join their townspeople in war against 
monotheists"."*^ 
However, as is pointed out by Uthaimin, there is no agreement on the question 
of iqtal, since in some writings it appears that the monotheists can only fight when they 
are attacked, but in others writing it appears they can attack infidels or persons who do 
not ful f i l the five obligations of Muslims. Moreover, the Wahhabis described people 
who rebelled against their authority, apparently for political reasons, as apostates 
(Uthaimin, 1972: 255). According to Laoust, the Wahhabis took a stronger line on these 
issues than their Hanbali predecessors (Laoust, 1948: 525). These principles explain the 
motivation behind the expansionist movements, reinforcing the Wahhabi identity as true 
believers, against the non-believers, and fulfilling a religious obligation as well as a 
political benefit. 
The forbiddance of shirk is another principle of the Wahhabi doctrine and is 
formulated in opposition to the principle of tawhid. There are two types of shirk, the 
major one refers to the association of any other being with God in worship; the lesser 
one excludes worship and can be swearing, showing off, etc. The former requires the 
individual to be excluded from Islam and paradise, but the latter does not.'*^ Regarding 
the obligation of the five pillars of Islam, the non-observance of the shahhada is 
considered a major shirk. 
Wahhabism has a very strong objection to innovation (bida), represented as any 
doctrine or action not based on the Qur'an, sunna or on the authority of the 
Companions. This position is a reflection of the general principles of the Hanbali 
school, and is intended to restore the true I s lam.The Sheikh, basing himself on the 
Ibn Giiannam, Op. Cit. p. 108; Majmu'at ar-Rasail wa-l-masa'il an Najdiyya IV p. 300-301 quoted by 
Ihid. p. 254. 
Rida, Rashid. Op. Cit. p. 8 quoted by Ibid. p. 259. 
™ Helms, Christine, Op. Cit. p. 90. 
sunna rejected any bida.^^ In contrast, his son Abdullah, defined it as anything that was 
introduced after the third century of Islam; he restricted the application of bida'a to 
matters related to the doctrine and practice of religion. 
Ijithad and taqlid were principles that also caused polemic. Ijtihad is an opinion 
on certain issues first based on the Qur'an and the sunna, then on the opinion of the 
Companions and their successors (the three other imams, founders of the other three 
Islamic schools) and finally on the opinion of the scholars. The last point was 
introduced because they were claiming for themselves the right to exercise ijithad. For 
this reason, the Wahhabi scholars established two different kinds of ijtihad, absolute 
and limited, and a practitioner was a mutlaqm, a muqayyad or merely a mujtahid. The 
first were in a special category since it referred to the four imams, founders of the four 
Islamic schools. The third refers to persons who possess outstanding knowledge in a 
particular area on which they pronounce an opinion (Uthaimin, 1972: 262). 
Regarding the question of taqlid (imitation), they established that the only path 
to follow was that of the Prophet's path. However, they distinguished between the taqlid 
for questions of law, which is not allowed, and the case offuru' (derived legal rules) as 
long as it is based on agreement with the holy sources. 
As has been noticed, religious principles strongly underlined the oneness of 
God, contrary to the religious practices of that time, and created an acceptance of 
political authority. The doctrines also served to redefine the bonds among the members, 
thereby weakening tribal differences. These religious principles established a new 
organisation where members were defined as tnie believers in both theory and practice 
against each other Muslims and non-Muslims, giving an impetus and a raison d'etre to 
the expansionist Wahhabi movement, at the same time reinforcing Wahhabi identity and 
its way of organisation. 
" Ibn Ghanani Op. Cii. p. 143 quoted by Uthaimin, Op. Cit. p. 263. 
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3.1.2. Authority in the works of Ibn Taymi3rya and Mohammed Ibn 
Abdul al-Wahhab 
Since the death of the Prophet the issue of authority over the religious 
community, has been a polemic issue among religious scholars,^^ each school 
advocating different bases for its establishment. In the Hanbali school, Ibn Taymiyya 
covered the issue of authority in his treatise Siyasa al-Shar'iyya. The works of the 
Wahhabis apply the same principles proposed by Ibn Taymiyya. 
Ibn Taymiyya's concepts of authority were mainly focused on the importance of 
the ulama's role, as religious authorities responsible for the heritage of the golden age 
of Islam. In fact, he regarded the combination of umara (plural of amir) and ulama, 
following the path of the Qur'an and the shari'a, as the base for the formation of an 
Islamic state. His basic assumption was that politics and religion are intertwined since 
"there can not be religion without the coercion of the state, and without discipline of 
revealed law the organisation of the state becomes tyrannic". This was echoed by the 
Sheikh who considered the existence of an imam necessary in order to maintain the faith 
and the observance of Islam. 
According to ibn Taymiyya, the Qur'an and the sunna did not say anything in 
particular about the form of government that has to be followed, going against the ideas 
prevalent at that time. He considered that the procedures relating to the Prophet's 
succession were different in respect of each of the first four caliphs. Moreover, he 
pointed out that what God establishes is the necessity of a head in the community 
^' The question of the succession of the Prophet and later forms of authority have been regarded in 
different perspectives by the schools of law and by different scholars. Some scholars consider that the 
separation of religion and politics happened after the death of Prophet Muhammad with the beginning of 
dynastic rules like Umayyad and Abbasid and especially with the emergence of the ulama as the scholars 
learned in religious matters. See Lapidus, Ira (1975). "The Separation of State and Religion in the 
Development of Early Islamic Society" in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 6: 363-385. 
See Ayubi, Nazih (1991). Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. (London, Routledge). 
pp. 13-26. Faksh, Mahmud (1990). "Concepts of Rule and Legitimacy in Islam" in Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 13, (3): 21-36. 
83 
(Laoust, 1948: 172). Based on these reasons, Ibn Taymiyya and the Sheikh did not 
question the origin of political authority, even if it were imposed by force. An authority 
is legitimate since God allowed its existence, as is indicated in the tawhid ar-rubiyyah. 
For both scholars, the avoidance of any separation of religious and political authority in 
the community is more important than questioning the origins of authority. 
In sum, Ibn Taymiyya did not consider the necessity of the caliphate; he states 
the importance of the authority irrespective of its origins and accepts the existence of 
several imams at the same time as a reflection of the reality during the Mongol 
invasions and the fragmentation of authority. Therefore, the centre of gravity shifted 
from the khilafa and the khalifa to the community, where the unity was preserved by 
obedience to the shari'a (Rosenthal, 1962:52). 
The Wahhabi scholars followed the same principle proposed by Ibn Taymiyya. 
For the Sheikh it was important that the authorities had religious knowledge, stressing 
the knowledge of Qur'an and sunna as necessary to the fulfilment of the imam's main 
task of preserving religion. For these reasons, the Sheikh laid down that anyone who 
takes this task upon himself must know what to command and what to oppose, be kind 
in applying this, and to be patient with all possible consequences (Uthaimin, 1972: 276). 
The exercise of authority is a religious function, since all the work that is done 
by the authorities is aimed at the fulfilment of God's commands. Both scholars agreed 
on this. The main aim of authority is to enforce the duties of Islam, the correct 
application of law, the welfare of the community, and ensure that it is observed in the 
religious and secular areas of life (Laoust, 1939: 301). 
The Wahhabi scholars also agreed that the ruler must ask for the ulama's advice 
in order to iTile with justice (Uthaimin, 1972: 276). However, Ibn Taymiyya considered 
the ulama are as important as the imam, although he considers the role of the ulama 
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vital in advising the emir, it is the latter who decides when to consult them, indicating 
with this the discretionary powers that the Imam can enjoy. 
The legitimation of power is seen by Ibn Taymiyya as residing in the baya'a 
(oath of allegiance), where the authority and the community are linked by the obedience 
to God and the Prophet, with the aim of maintaining the welfare of the community. In 
this sense, the government is conceived by ibn Taymiyya as a contract between the ruler 
and the ulama, sanctioned according to religious principles. The principal feature of this 
government is its co-operative character, since both parts are obliged to help each other 
and fulf i l the commands to maintain the welfare of the community. Hence the fulfilment 
of the law makes both imam and society subordinate to the rules of Islamic law and in 
this way legitimacy is conferred along with the preservation of Islamic law. 
The head of the community has the power and authority to command good and 
to forbid evil, without religion he can not prevail. The preservation of this world and its 
preparation for the next world is the main duty of the authority This power is, therefore, 
one of the religious instruments that will bring man close to God (Laoust, 1948: 172-
174), since it is applied for the fulfilment of religion. Although there is in Ibn 
Tamiyya's work a certain notion of equality between members of the society and the 
authority (as both are part of the agreement), the powers and resources that the authority 
possesses are superior and consequently enable it to ensure control of aspects of life. 
For these reasons the authority must look after both the spiritual and material welfare of 
the community (Laoust, 1939: 298). 
Submission to the law in Ibn Taymiyya's view is not passive, and in this respect 
his view differs from that of his predecessors (Lambton, 1981: 48). The performance of 
the rites in Islam makes such submission active, since all Muslim must, within their 
abilities, strive to bring about the success of God's word. Those who hold positions of 
authority must obey God, respect religion and look after the welfare (maslaha) of all 
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Muslims (Laoust, 1948: 179). Again, the legitimacy is attained in the exercise of the 
divine rules, whose implementation depends directly on those who exercise power. If 
you have sound emirs and ulama, then you will have a sound community (Ibid. 169). 
Invoking the principle of the welfare of the community, the head of the state or 
wali al-amr and his representatives can create regulations in cases not contemplated by 
the shari'a,^^ according to the needs of the community and following the precepts of the 
shari'a (Rasheed, 1973: 29). This principle is known as Siyasa al-Shari'a and the 
government must consult the ulama or the judiciary institutions in order to ensure that 
the regulations do not contravene Islamic law. 
The obligations of the members of the community towards the imam were 
regarded as total, absolute and unconditional. Ibn Taymiyya proposed a critical attitude 
of the community toward the authorities, but he did not advocate open rebellion or 
dissidence in the community. Furthermore he considered that the unity and maintenance 
of the community was important in order to avoid disorder and fragmentation. 
The type of government analysed in this section is one based on the shari'a, in 
which the role of the umara and ulama are the pillars. Ideally this system has to work in 
accordance with obedience of the shari'a, where co-operation between government and 
governed operates on this basis to produce and maintain the unity of the community. 
The notions of the fulfilment of shari'a law and the function embodied in the principles 
described earlier gives to the notion of authority and legitimacy a normative aspect. 
Obedience to the imam who follows religion goes in tandem with the goal of the 
authorities, limiting men to obey God and his Prophet, as the basis of the normative 
character (Laoust, 1939: 527). However, as has been noted, the origins and functions of 
Ibn Taymiyya pointed out the importance of the authority enforcing the Islamic law in general, but also 
its role in establishing the dynamics of economic life. See Laoust, Henri. (1939). Essai sur Les Doctrines 
Sociales et Politiques de Taki-d-din Ahmad B. Taimiya. (Cairo: Imprimerie de ITnsitut Frangais 
d'Archeologie Orientale). pp. 456-469. 
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the imam can be discretionary and there is no place for rebellion, since this will be 
against the unity of the community. 
The source of legitimacy for both the ulama and the government, therefore, 
comes from the religious basis and its implementation, as well as from the oath of 
allegiance. But the power of the imam is above of the ulama, since he appoints the latter 
and in case of failure he has the power to depose them. 
3.1.3. The ulama and political authority during the first and second 
Saudi states 
The power and influence exercised by the ulama during the first and second 
Saudi state were paramount for the configuration of a central authority. The recreation 
of the values and practices for the restoration of Islam conceived by Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab influenced considerably the nature of the relationship between the 
religious and political authorities when he was alive. The analysis of the administration 
of the authority during these two periods is the object of this section, especially during 
the first state, since most of the division between religion and politics followed the same 
pattern thereafter. 
Muhamnaad ibn Abdul Wahhab was indeed the main religious figure during the 
first Saudi state. He was very active, teaching the Wahhabi precepts to students and 
spreading his ideas to other ulama and Emirs of the peninsula."^ "* In general, the 
influence of the Al al-Sheikh family in religious and educational affairs was very 
impoitant. Even after the death of the Sheikh, his sons continued the policies established 
by their father. Palgrave observed that the Al al-Sheikh family had a "predominant 
A l Aisa, Mai (1996). Al hayat al 'ilmiahfii najd min qiyaam da'wat al-sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab hata nihaiat al dawla Al-Saudiyya al-ula [Life of Knowledge in Najd from the Time of the 
Islamic Call from Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab until the End of the First Saudi State]. Riyadh: 
King Abdul Aziz Research Centre. 
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influence" and the Al Saud never attempted to contradict them in any matter (Palgrave, 
1865: 378-380). 
The Sheikh held different responsibilities in addition to those specifically 
connected with religion, but there were also those related to political activities. 
According to Ibn Bishr, the Sheikh had a saying in any final decision, even in military 
campaigns (Ibn Bishr, 1971: 52). The Sheikh was the advisor of Emir Muhammad ibn 
Saud, and later of his successor Emir Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud (1765-
1803). He occasionally acted as the representative of the emirs in dealing with political 
agreements with different factions or authorities. 
The military campaigns were conducted under the mantle of a religious 
rationale. The recognition and acceptance of the Al Saud authority was at the same time 
an acceptance of the religious principles of Wahhabism. Therefore, those who refused to 
acknowledge the authority of Al Saud were also, in effect, failing to recognise 
Wahhabism; consequently a jihad (holy war) was declared against such people. As has 
already been stated, the non-believers could even be those Muslims who continued with 
polytheistic practices or deviated from the Wahhabi tenets. In such matters, the 
influence of the Sheikh was important, since it was he who would determine who would 
they have to fight and to whom they have to spread the Islamic call, based on religious 
precepts and in agreement with Emir Muhammad ibn Saud. 
The central political authority had the right to ask for forces to be provided by 
the subjugated areas, recreating the bedouin custom. Each village, town or tribe had to 
provide a contingent of men to take part in the military campaigns following the tribal 
traditions, and fighting the infidel was a religious command. The number of men to be 
recruited was based on the proportion of active men in the town, village or tribe and 
according to the circumstances of the campaign (Al-Shafy, 1967: 151). 
The finances of the movement were at the beginning under the control of the 
Sheikh. The Bait al Mai, or treasury, was composed mainly of the zakat. One fif th of 
war spoils {al-ghanima) also went to Bait al-Mal, with the reminder was divided among 
the fighters (Al-Shafy, 1967: 86). Once Riyadh was captured, the Sheikh transferred 
control of the treasury to Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud. The explanation most 
frequently given for this is that the increase in funds received as a result of the extension 
of Al Saud control through the peninsula, was proving to involve too heavy an 
administrative burden for the Sheikh (Ibid. 87). Thereafter, the Bait al Mai remained in 
the hands of the central authority. 
It is important to consider that the sources of revenues and also the ways in 
which they were used by the authorities continued to be enforced by the successive 
rulers until the time of Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman. Uthaimin and Burckhardt have 
provided good descriptions of the kinds of zakat and other fees paid to the central 
authority (Burkhardt, 1831 I I : 151-162; Uthaimin, 1998: 178-179). In the case of the 
zakat, apart from being a religious duty it also symbolised obedience to the central 
authority (Al-Shafy, 1967: 209). The amounts of zakat levied were fixed according to 
the number of possessions (animals) and agricultural products (dates, grains, honey, 
etc.). Commercial trade was also subject to a levy, as were the tribes themselves. The 
payment of fees was a further source of revenue for the treasury, and was collected at 
the same time as the zakat. However, the most important revenue came from those who 
owned land in the rebellious areas. After such a district repeated its refusal to recognise 
the central authority, the public treasury took considerable amounts of land away from 
the existing landowner (Burckhardt, 1831 I I : 154-155). 
The disposal of the money acquired by the Bait al Mai is important in relation to 
the division of power. According to Burckhardt, the zakat taxed on the bedouin tribes 
passed directly to Emir Saud's purse, meanwhile the zakat from the towns or farmers 
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was going to the treasury (Ibid. 152-153). The remainder of the money was diverted to 
needy people, the construction or maintenance of mosques, the payment of salaries for 
the ulama as qudat, teachers and preachers, and the payment for the collectors of the 
zakat. 
At the local level each village had its own treasury, but the zakat was collected 
and registered by persons sent by the central authority. The funds obtained from these 
treasuries were divided into four parts: one of which was sent to the central treasury, 
poor people and the ulama (including the maintenance of mosques and the provision of 
public services), assistance to poor soldiers, and the entertainment of guests in the 
village (Burckhardt, 1831 I I : 156). 
As may be deduced from the description of their finances, the ulama were 
financially supported by the central authority. The image of the Ottoman ulama, as was 
noted in the first section, was associated with corruption derived from the misuse of 
aw^af funds and the customary judges of the tribes who used to receive money earned 
from performing their functions. This economic dependence of the Saudi ulama can be 
explained, then, in terms of an attempt to strengthen their status among the people and 
restoring their image of not being associated with corruption. 
The exercise of authority at a local level was in the hands of the local Emir. The 
tribal practice whereby the elders of the town were the ones who chose their Emir, was 
followed at the beginning of the first Saudi state, although the final decision had to be 
ratified by the central authority (Lorimer, 1970: 1063). As the central authority 
gradually had to cope with more territories, the tribal practice was abolished and the 
central authority assumed responsibility for appointing members of local families to 
become the local authorities (Vassiliev, 1999: 124). These locals Emirs were assisted by 
a qadi, and in the case of big cities the qadi was assisted by a mufti and the muhtasib 
(moral policeman). 
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Succession to the rulership among the members of the Al Saud family was based 
on a variety of different practices, with the ulama being the providers of legitimacy and 
stability to the Saudi realm. In the first state, the successor of the Emir Muhammad ibn 
Saud was his eldest son, Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad. It is important to point out, firstly, 
that the oath of allegiance to Abdul Aziz was sworn before the death of his father, and 
was requested by the Sheikh himself; and that while Muhammad ibn Saud held the title 
of Emir (based more on territorial connotations), his son received the joint title of Emir 
and imam. The reasons for Abdul Aziz having second title was that he was known for 
his religious knowledge, acquired from the Sheikh, and therefore he was qualified to 
become the imam of the community.'^^ Other reasons are related to particular 
circumstances, since it was to Abd al Aziz that the sheikh transferred control of the Bait 
al-Mal, and conferring the title of imam on him was to give him a new status relative to 
the scope of his authority. 
In the case of the transference of power from Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn 
Saud to his eldest son, again the Sheikh ordered the people of Najd and other areas to 
give the oath of allegiance to Saud as heir apparent (Ibn Bishr, 1971: 83). After the 
assassination of his father, Saud immediately replaced him both as imam and Emir. 
From that time, the Al Saud authorities adopted both titles automatically. The last Emir 
during the first Saudi state was Abdullah ibn Saud who was taken prisoner and later 
killed by the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople. 
During the second Saudi state, the ulama, and in particular the Al al-Sheikh 
family, performed the role of guarantors of the transmission of power and maintenance 
of stability among the community, especially during the period known as the civil war 
(1865-1876). This period was characterised by disputes among the four children of 
'^^  Explanation provided to the researcher by Dr. Abdullah Al-Uthaimin, March 1998, Durham. 
Imam Faysal (Abdullah, Saud, Muhammad and Abdul Rahman) over the authority of 
the Al Saud dominions. 
An example of the role assumed by the ulama as guarantors of the transmission 
of power is the one performed at the time of the problems of authority and succession 
after the death of Imam Faysal. Although Imam Faysal declared his eldest son as his 
successor, his second son Saud launched a revolt against his brother. The position 
assumed by Sheikh Abdul Rahman, son and successor of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab, was supportive to Emir Abdullah. In a public address, Sheikh Abdul Rahman 
stated that, according to the Wahhabi precepts, the existence of the community was due 
to its the submission to Islam and its obedience of the imam Abdullah, adding that 
allegiance had previously been declared to the imam by the people of Najd in front of 
him. Moreover, Saud had previously declared his allegiance to his brother, so now that 
he was rebelling against him and inviting people to fight against his brother he deserved 
to be attacked (Crawford, 1982: 232). 
During the capture of Riyadh by Saud ibn Faysal, the stance of the ulama once 
more played a significant role. Sheikh Abd Al-Latif ibn Abdul Rahman legitimated the 
position of Saud as the new Emir. As Crawford analysed, the inability of Abdullah to 
face his brother, fleeing Riyadh and seeking the help of the Ottomans'^ ^ were the 
circumstantial factors that gave legitimacy to Saud. Sheikh Abdul Latif declared him 
imam on the premise that "the affairs of the Muslims can not be right without the imam 
nor can there be Islam in his absence..."(Ibid. 235). 
In 1871 Abdullah, aided by the Ottomans, defeated Saud's forces and entered 
Riyadh. Once more the oath of allegiance was given to him and Sheikh Abdul Latif 
It is important to state that principles by which the search for aid from the polytheists and in this case 
the Ottomans considered as unbelievers by Sheikh Abdul Latif ibn Abdul Rahman. "The plea for aid had 
to be done in the genuine interest of the Muslims; the Idolaters to whom the request was directed were not 
to possess, nor be supported by, government power, and the polytheist were not to play any role in the 
formation of policy" (Risala xxiv quoted by Crawford, M.J. (1982). "Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and 
the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-century Sa'udi Qadi's Dilemma" in Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 14: 236. 
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restored the allegiance given by his father previously. However, his position changed 
soon when Saud (also aided by the Ottomans) managed to re-enter the capital in 1872, 
so once more Sheikh Abdul Latif invoked the earlier oath of allegiance. However, Saud 
died shortly afterwards (1875), but this time, in order to avoid chaos and to maintain the 
unity, Abdul al-Latif and the Al Saud family chose Abdul Rahman as imam (Ibid 241). 
When Abdullah started to advance towards Riyadh, once more Abdul al-Latif took the 
lead in arranging a truce between the brothers, and Abdul Rahman agreed to give the 
Imamate to Abdullah. However, the Emirate did not last long because of the Shammar's 
offensive against Najd at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Ulama authority, especially during the first state and during the lifetime of the 
Sheikh, was therefore exercised in a kind of partnership between the two co-founders. 
Both authorities, the Emir and the Sheikh, consulted each other in different fields, such 
as religion, administration and military affairs. "No camels where mounted and no 
opinions were voiced by Muhammad or his son without the approval of the Sheikh" 
(Rentz, 1972: 57). Later, the domains of both authorities began to be delineated as result 
of the pressures arising from the extension of the territories. Education and 
administration of justice were the areas in which the ulama exercised control. Sheikh 
Muhammad and his successors also gave legitimacy to the transfer of power among the 
members of Al Saud family and, as has been shown, this role was decisive in 
maintaining the community and/or the domains of authority. 
3.2. The Beginnings of the Third Saudi Arabian State 
(King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, 1902-1953) 
The period of Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman ibn Saud (1902-1953) constitutes 
the basis for the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, when political control 
passed from chieftancy to an institutionalised government and when a state was created. 
The period is important for this study since it provides a general framework for 
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understanding how the division of power emerged and how different actors and 
processes contributed to the consolidation of a state. 
The study of the historical context given here brings in the different dimensions 
that were involved in the formation process of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The first 
dimension corresponds to the demarcation of a territory, which was for the 
consolidation of authority at both levels, internal and external. The second dimension is 
concerned with how society experienced the reshaping of its membership in terms of 
loyalty to Abdul Aziz and to Wahhabism. The third dimension covers the development 
of the authority in terms of expansion and consolidation, was an aspect determined by 
both political and economic factors. 
The dimensions mentioned above are better understood i f one tries to distinguish 
the three levels of analysis that were involved in the process of state formation. The first 
is the involvement of foreign powers in the region, the Ottomans and Britain; the second 
comprises the role of the local chieftancies and the dynamics among them; and the third 
is how the consolidation of Abdul Aziz's authority was produced, as well as the 
expansion of his territories. 
Regarding the first level of our analysis, some useful elements need to be 
specified. Firstly, the role of the foreign powers was important in terms of their support 
for the local powers and vice-versa, and its effects on the limitations or creation of 
dominions. The general policy that Britain and the Ottomans adopted towards the end of 
last century and the beginning of this century was to maintain a status quo in the zone 
and to avoid any direct conflict, which meant the manipulation of their "protegees" to 
advance their own causes. Later, due to the events in the First World War, their 
relationship became openly hostile to each other, affecting the dynamics of the zone. 
The Ottoman Empire, although it was in decline at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, tried to recover control in Central Arabia. Its main dominions were 
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the area of Hijaz, Central Arabia and Asir. In Hijaz, the Hashemite family recognised 
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, having been vassals of the sultan since the 
sixteenth century. In Central Arabia, the Ottomans established garrisons especially in 
Qasim and al Hasa, and with the help of the Rashidis also managed to have some 
control over Najd (Yapp, 1987: 173-178). In the south of the Peninsula, they were 
involved in internal politics, since they had exercised control of Asir since 1840. 
The British became involved in the coastal area of the Gulf because of their 
interest in maritime communications with India. They began to establish bases, firstly in 
Persia (Bandar Abbas), and then (on the basis of treaties of friendship which led 
eventually to British protection) with the sheikhdoms of the east coast of the Arab Gulf. 
Britain also established a colony in Aden in 1839, which was strategically vital later due 
to its proximity to the Suez Canal. As Yapp points out, Britain became the policeman of 
the Gulf, regulating commerce and fighting piracy along the coast (Ibid. 17). 
The second level of analysis relates to the role of the local powers, such as the 
ruler of Kuwait, the Hashemites in the Hijaz, the Rashidis in Northern Arabia, and the 
Saudis in Central Arabia. These four local powers developed relations, which alternated 
between stmggle and co-operation in order to consolidate and expand their dominions, 
creating different alliances among themselves and with the foreign powers. 
The Shammar's main centre of power was Hail, a rich oasis that flourished and 
the basis of trade. It was an important point of intersection for the trade caravans, 
especially the Syrian and Mesopotamian caravan routes. The Shammar were governed 
by the Rashidi family, having been "nominal vassals" of the Ottoman Empire since the 
middle of the eighteenth century. However, the Rashidis' relations with the Ottomans 
were not systematic (Al-Rasheed, 1991: 204). Cooperation between the two grew when 
the Ottomans tried to concentrate on their dominions in Eastern Arabia. At this 
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particular period, the Rashidis had their own interest in an alliance with the Ottomans, 
in order to retain their authority in central Najd. 
The Hashemites were in the area to the west of Najd, known as the Hijaz. They 
had been vassals of the Ottoman Empire since the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
The Ottomans became interested again in this area due to the construction of the railway 
from Syria to Medina, and the potential, which this plan offered them, for the recovery 
of control in Asir and the extension of their dominions towards the inner part of Yemen, 
as well as in the eastern Arabia. 
To the east, in the coastal area, were territories under British protection such as 
Kuwait and the six trucial sheikhdoms that had signed the treaty of friendship and non-
alignment with Britain in 1853 (Ajman, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Umm al Qawayn, Sharjah 
and Ras al Khayma). At the beginning of the twentieth century these were important 
trade centres. 
The third level of analysis relates to how the authority of Abdul Aziz was 
established. For this purpose, it is important to focus on the policies he adopted 
regarding his conquests, his position vis-a-vis the ulama, local notables groups and the 
tribal leaders, and above all the formation of the military forces which enable him to 
extend his dominions. 
Having completed a description of the three levels of analysis, it is important to 
point out that the formation of the third state involved the domination of townspeople 
over the tribes. The conclusions drawn by Niblock state that: "the establishment and the 
expansion of the Saudi state were dependent primarily upon the initiative, leadership 
and support of townsmen" (Niblock, 1982: 77). Furthermore, he considers that the 
economic interests of townspeople played a crucial role —in comparison with those of 
the bedouins— at the expansion of Abdul Aziz's dominions." The subjugation of 
This issue is disregarded by others such as Aldamer who contends that in Central Najd commercial 
activity was not important. Aldamer, Faysal bin Abdul Rahman (1996). Economic, Social and Political 
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numerous tribal groups and areas was achieved by religious fervour with the creation of 
the ikhwan and with the motivation of economic gains. 
The inclusion of towns or villages in the routes of trade and pilgrimage was 
related to the politics of the region as well as to the geographical conditions of the area. 
There were three main pilgrimage routes from Hufuf, Kuwait and Najaf to Mecca. The 
latter passed by Hail, the Kuwait route passed by Buraida and the Hufuf one passed by 
Riyadh (Lorimer I I B, 1314-1328). These routes were a source of income for the towns 
as well as the tribes since the caravans had to pay an amount of money in order to avoid 
any plundering.''^ 
Helms has argued that in the beginning Abdul Aziz's policy was aimed at 
establishing control of the urban areas, with the objective of having a base for economic 
and political expansion (Helms, Christine, 1981:113). On this basis the expansion can 
be examined in two main phases. The first of these is from 1902 until the annexation of 
al-Hasa and the agreement with the Ottomans in 1914. The second focuses on the 
effects of the two World Wars on the dynamics of the area until the formal declaration 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. 
3.2.1. The recapture of Riyadh and the establishment of control 
over Hasa 
1902 is marked as the beginning of the third Saudi Arabian state with the re-
conquest of Riyadh by Abdul Aziz. This was a product of the local context, where the 
alliance between the Emir of Kuwait, Mubarak, and Abdul Rahman was crucial due to 
their mutual needs. For the Emir of Kuwait, it was necessary to defend the Emirate from 
the Rashidis and thus against the Ottomans; and it was essential for Abdul Rahman to 
Development and their Impact in the Role of the State: A Case Study of Saudi Arabia. (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Manchester), p. 65. 
There were also other important communication routes such as those from Kaf to Hail (from the 
Mediterranean basin to Central Arabia), from Hail to Buraida and Anaiza and from these towns to 
Riyadh, Medina and Mekkah. See Lorimer, H. (1970). Op. Cit. vol. II . pp. 1328-1341. 
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attempt to recover his past dominions, and at the same time to gain the attention and 
support of Great Britain. On these premises an offensive against the Rashidis forces was 
necessary for both sides."^ '^  
The forces and authority of Abdul Aziz were initially concentrated mainly on 
townspeople, rather than on tribal groups. His authority was centred in Riyadh, and later 
towns in South Najd swore allegiance to him, for example al Kharj, Aflaj , Hauta, Hariq 
and Wadi Dawasir. 
After Abdul Aziz obtained control of the south, he moved his forces to the north 
into the area of Qasim. This was an important region from two points of view: 
strategically, because Qasim was a region bordering on the territory of Jabal Shammar, 
and economically because it was an important agricultural and commercial district.^" 
The forces of Abdul Aziz succeeded in capturing one of the principal towns, Buraida, in 
1904 while the Rashidis, trying to maintain their influence over this area, were pushed 
back to their own territory, Jabal Shammar.^' 
The capture of Qasim gave Abdul Aziz the power to manoeuvre on the external 
level. He took the initiative to negotiate with the Porte through Mubarak, since he 
needed to consolidate his newly acquired territories and to avoid retaliation by the 
Ottomans (Benoist-Mechin, 1955: 100). The resuh of his approach to the Porte 
The situation in terms of the interplay with the foreign powers was difficult, since the Germans 
obtained a contract with the Ottomans to construct the Baghdad railway, and that was reflected in the 
close co-operation between Germany and the Porte. On the other hand, Russia attempted to develop a 
railway that would join Russia with Iran, having an exit to the Arab Gulf Lenczowski, George, (1952). 
The Middle East in World Affairs. (New York: Cornell University Press), p. 24. Those were the 
considerations that made Britain support Kuwait against the Rashidis. 
Qasim was and important supply centre for Hail. Dates were exported to Shammar, Ghee to Mecca and 
sometimes to Medina. Breeding horses was another considerable economic activity, since the horses were 
exported to India. Anaiza and Buraida were the main centres of this activity. Another economic and 
geographic factor in this region was that this zone is the main cross-roads of the trade routes between 
Riyadh, Kuwait and Hail. Buraida and Anaiza were the places of intersection giving these two cities with 
a high commercial status, even more important than Hail. Lorimer, H. B. 1970, II , Op. Cit. 1488-89. 
''' The Ottomans, concerned by the state of affairs against their proteges and their own troops in the area, 
and particularly with the revolt in Yemen, decided to reach an agreement with Abdul Aziz . Philby, H. St. 
(1955). Sa'udi Arabia. (London: Ernest Benn Limited), p. 248. 
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produced an agreement in 1905.^ ^ In this agreement, Abdul Rahman was his son's 
representative in the negotiations. The Ottomans sought to restrict his power, submitting 
him to the condition of a vassal of the Sultan.*''^  The agreement was the formal 
acceptance of Ottoman occupation over Qasim and the garrisons of Anaiza and Buraida 
in order that the area would be a buffer zone between the territories of Jabal Shammar 
and Abdul Aziz domains (Vassiliev, 1999: 219). 
The authority exercised by the Ottomans in Qasim, however, was nominal. The 
insurrection of the imam Yahya of Sana'a, and the conflicts in the Balkans and 
Armenia, meant that Ottomans troops had to be moved to those areas. After the defeat 
of Rashidis forces, the Ottomans forces failed to defend their authority against Abdul 
Aziz, who was helped by the local antipathy towards the Rashidis. Therefore the 
Ottomans negotiated with Abdul Aziz for their withdrawal from the region in 1906. 
Abdul Aziz's authority was mainly concentrated in the central part of Najd. His 
forces continued to be dependent on the townspeople and on the conquest of different 
districts in the south and north. At the local level, the territorial conquests were directed 
first of all towards the south, aiming at acquiring more recruits and supplies in order to 
launch his campaign to the north. As the number of these troops was growing, the needs 
to obtain booty, supplies and ammunitions increased, with Qasim (due to its economic 
and strategic importance) becoming central to the struggle with the Rashidis. At the 
external level, Abdul Aziz took advantage of the situation to expand his dominions, 
thereby avoiding a direct conflict of interest with the Porte. 
The strategy of Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rahman was to neutralise the Ottomans so as to as to obtain 
acknowledgement of Abdul Aziz's power. Sandria, Modjtaba (1989). Ainsi I'Arable est Devenue Saudite: 
Les Fondements de I'Etat Saoudien. (Paris: Harmattan). p. 96. On the other hand, the agreement also 
provided a way to request the attention of Britain and seek recognition from Britain of the rise of Abdul 
Aziz's power. 
The Ottomans concerned by the state of affairs against their "allies" and their own troops in the area, 
and particularly with the revolt in Yemen, decided to reach an agreement with Abdul Aziz. Philby, Op. 
Cit. p. 248. 
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In 1912 or 1913 Abdul Aziz initiated the creation of a new bedouin-based 
organisation, the ikhwan movement.^ '* The ikwhan forces provided the necessary forces 
to expand his power, and to establish control over the bedouin, so that the shifting of 
loyalties, tribal disputes and the plundering of the caravans were brought to an end. 
As in the cases of the two previous Saudi states, the religious ideology behind 
this new movement was used to overcome the tribal differences, but the difference in 
this latest attempt was in that the religious ideology was accompanied by the settlement 
with the bedouin. The ikhwan movement in practice brought about the subjugation of 
the bedouins by the townspeople. The newly settled population became extreme 
defenders of Wahhabism and the most motivated force in the fight against non-Wahhabi 
Muslims. The teaching of the tenets of Wahhabism by the ulama and the preachers 
{mutawwa'a), as well as the subsidy from Abdul Aziz for the establishment of these 
villages, became the basis on which the ikhwan spread. '^' (This will be analysed in 
section 3.5). 
According to Dickson, the usual way that a tribe was brought into submission 
was through its leader, who was sent to Riyadh. He would receive religious education, 
and he would return to his tribe thereafter, accompanied by some ulama chosen by 
Abdul Aziz. On some occasions, depending on the importance of the tribe, the tribal 
chief would stay in Riyadh at the expense of Abdul Aziz (Dickson, 1956: 154-156). 
This date is agreed by the following scholars of the ikhwan movement: Gouldrup, Lawrence (1982). 
"The Ikhwan Movement of Central Arabia" in Serjeant R. B . and R . L . Bidwell (eds.). Arabian Studies 
vol. V I . (Exeter: University of Exeter and Scorpion Communications) pp. 162-163. Habib, John (1978). 
Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan Of Najd and their Role in the Creation of Saudi Kingdom 
I9I0-1930. (Leiden: E . J . Brill); Helms, Christine Op.Cit. Another version is that the ikhwan movement 
started in 1908, as a colony of religious devotees at Harame, and after this colony began to be successful, 
it moved to Artawiyah (the first recognised ikwhan settlement). Habib refutes the accounts of Dickson 
regarding the participation of the establishment of the colony by Abdul Karim, who is identified as the 
founder of the Ikhwan colonies of Harame and Artawiyah. Also Dickson points out that the date of the 
settlement of the first colony is "a date prior to 1912" Dickson, H.R.P. (1956). Kuwait and her 
Neighbours. (London: Allen and Unwin). p. 27. This argument is followed also by Zaid Abdullah S. 
(1989). The Ikhwan Movement of Najd Saudi Arabia J908-1930. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Chicago). 
''^  An analysis of the social and political conditions of the ikhwan can be found in Gouldrup, Op. Cit. pp. 
164-165. 
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The location of the settlements was dictated by geographical strategy in terms of 
being bases for defence, expansion and as provision centres. They were established on 
the frontiers of Abdul Aziz's dominions, and each time that the ikhwan forces took 
possession of new areas, they established new settlements (Habib, 1970: 59). 
In the west, the Hashemites started an active policy in Central Arabia aimed at 
curtailing Abdul Aziz's power. This strategy came not only from the Hashemites but 
also from the Ottoman who encouraged challenges to Abdul Aziz's authority, through 
the sons of the deposed Emir Saud who carried out raids in central Najd. After the 
Hashemite incursion into Asir, the Hashemites took control of some oases that belonged 
to Abdul Aziz (Bisha, Turaba and Ronya in the southwest "border" between Hijaz and 
Central Arabia) which later became important as a point of struggle between these two 
forces. 
In the north the death of the new leader of the Rashidis, Abdul Aziz, brought 
instability to the Rashidi authority. Some tribes started to become autonomous, either 
rallying against Rashidi authority or supporting some factions in the power struggle 
among the different rivals. The importance of Hail as a point in the caravan route 
declined for the reasons mentioned above, and as a result, the importance of Riyadh 
increased, buttressed by the expansion of Abdul Aziz's control over the region (Musil, 
Alois, 1927: 247). 
The annexation of al-Hasa was followed from Abdul Aziz's desire to secure an 
important economic and strategic area. As Musil points out: 
"the greater and more powerful dominions of Eben Sa'ud 
became, the more he desired unimpaired trade relations with the 
world. His subjects needed markets for various products —such 
as wood, skins, fat, saddle, cloaks, sulphur, sheep, goats, 
camels— in order to get in exchange for them arms, ammunition 
and clothing" (Musil, Alois, 1928: 284). 
However, Golderberg establishes another reason behind the expansion to al-
Hasa, the British acknowledgement of Abdul Aziz's authority. The timing was thus 
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appropriate for Abdul Aziz to act. Firstly, the Ottomans were unable to dispatch forces 
to stop the annexation of al-Hasa because of the Balkans Wars; and secondly, Britain in 
spite of her refusal to assist Abdul Azis in case of an Ottoman reinforcement by sea, 
adopted a neutral position (Golderberg, 1986: 86). 
Politically, after Abdul Aziz took control of al-Hasa, he became a focus of 
attention for both the British and Ottoman authorities. Britain established formal 
communications with Abdul Aziz, recognising him as de facto ruler. Regarding the 
Ottomans, Abdul Aziz signed a treaty with them under which they recognised his 
authority over Najd and al-Hasa. Although the treaty was not implemented due to the 
beginning of the First World War, this was the first treaty with a foreign power that 
recognised his authority (Golderberg, 1986: 110; Vassiliev, 1999: 233-234). 
Economically, the annexation of this area provided him with sources of revenue from 
trade. 
3.2.2. The configuration of the Kingdom. 
The effects of the First World War and its aftermath affected the dynamics of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Firstly, Britain started to have a more active policy towards Central 
Arabia, aimed not only at protecting her dominions but also at contributing to the attack 
against Ottoman dominions in the Levant and in the Hijaz. At the local level, the First 
World War accelerated the desires of some chieftancies for independence from the 
Porte, and each actor in this scenario tried to benefit from the situation. 
Both Abdul Aziz and Sharif Husayn sought to take advantage of the conditions 
created by the First World War. The agreement reached between Husayn and Britain 
was contained in the famous correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Husayn, 
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began in the summer of 1915.^ ^ Husayn's desire to form a single Arab nation was raised 
in this correspondence. The British recognised his authority over the Hijaz in 1916, 
granting him a monthly stipend and a large quantity of ammunitions. In 1915, Britain 
had recognised the authority of Abdul Aziz as an "independent ruler of Najd, Al-Hasa, 
Qatif, Jubail and the ports and towns belonging to them" (Vassiliev, 1999: 238). Britain, 
also, agreed to protect Abdul Aziz and his dominions, and in exchange Abdul Aziz 
would keep the routes open to Mecca and Medina, and abstain from attacking the 
British protectorates on the coast, and refrain from concluding a pact with any other 
foreign power.''' Also, as a product of a verbal agreement (Uqair 1916), Abdul Aziz was 
encouraged to fight the Rashidis, allowing him to have a subsidy of £5,000, 3,000 rifles, 
4 machine-guns and ammunition in order to maintain a permanent force of 4,000 men 
for use against the Rashidi territories (Philby, 1930: 274). 
After 1916, when the British started to subsidise Husayn, the latter obtained the 
submission of some branches of the Anaiza tribes and parts of the Shammar, as well as 
rallied support from people in border towns under Al-Saud control such as Buraida, 
Unayza, Sharah and Madrib (Kostiner, 1993: 15-16). The aims behind this pohcy were 
to consolidate his authority internally, and to increase the number of his troops in order 
to launch his movement (the Arab revolt) aimed at expelling the Ottomans from Hijaz. 
In 1918, after the revolt ended, Husayn's forces attacked the oases of Khurma 
and Turaba^^ that had opposed his authority.^^ This situation became very sensitive for 
Abdul Aziz, since the ulama and ikhwan leaders in Najd wanted to attack the infidel 
Husayn (Benoist-Mechin, 1955: 206-207). However, Abdul Aziz's forces only re-
See Yapp, Malcolm (1987). The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923. (London: Longman), pp. 
278-28 L 
''^  See the treaty in Goldberg, Jacob (1986). The Foreign Policy o/Saudi Arabia: the Formative Years 
1902-1918. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). Appendix B. pp. 193-198. 
The Importance of this oasis for Husayn would mean an extension of his dominions, 193 kilometres 
east of Khurma, and for Abdul Aziz Turaba would mean 16 kilometres west of Khurma. These 
considerations were important, as also was the fact that the control of that territory would mean an 
alliance with the Subai tribe and its grazing zone. Helms, Op. Cit. p. 201. 
The Emir of Turaba had adopted Wahhabism and tacitly came under the protection of Abdul Aziz, this 
being the reason why the emir requested the help of Abdul Aziz to fight the Hashemites forces. 
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gained the oasis of Turaba, thereby avoiding a change of policy by Britain, because of 
its support for Sharif Husayn. 
Locally, Sharif Husayn approached the Rashidis in an attempt to seek an alliance 
against Abdul Aziz, preventing any possibility of an agreement between those two 
forces. In addition, he also approached some branches of the tribe of Utaiba and the 
sheikh of Qasim (Besson, 1980: 114). The relationship between Husayn and Britain 
started to deteriorate due to Husayn's claims of lack of support f rom Britain, which had 
promised him support to gain territories and thereby increase his authority. On the other 
hand, these claims were also made because of the British role in helping Abdul Aziz 
against the Shammar. 
Husayn was authorised by the British to move southwards, taking control of 
some parts of territory under the control of al-Idrissi, as a means of diverting his 
attention f rom Najd. This measure provoked the fears of al-Idrissi who decided in 1920 
to ask Abdul Aziz for assistance. Meanwhile, after the Khurma and Turaba incident, 
Husayn tried to form an alliance of the territories that surrounded Abdul Aziz's 
territories, such as those of Imam Yahya in central Yemen, the Emir of Kuwait and the 
Rashidis 
The decision of Abdul Aziz to attack Hail was strategic. Given that the alliance 
between Britain and Husayn was still strong, both Husayn and Britain would have 
retaliated against him. Domestically, he encountered diff icul ty in obtaining support for 
his decision to attack Hail rather than Husayn, since religion was the raison d'etre of 
the ikhwan forces and they considered Husayn an infidel.^*^ 
The defeat of the Shammar and the capture of Hail in 1922 completed Abdul 
Aziz's control over the trading routes leading to lower Mesopotamia and Syria, 
Abdul Aziz had to gather all the notables and leaders of the ikhwan forces in order to gain their support 
and legitimacy to stop the attack towards the Hijaz, and instead to launch an attack on Hail. See Benoist-
Mechin, Jacques (1955). Le Loup et le Leopard: Ibn Seoud ou la Naissance d' un Royaume. (Paris: 
Editions Albin Michel), pp. 212-217. 
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bordering the newly created British mandate of Transjordan, Iraq and Pa le s t ine .Af t e r 
the capture of Hail , the ikhwan forces continued to make raids into the northern part of 
the peninsula, as well as into Transjordan, Palestine and Syria (Besson, 1980: 148). 
The implications of these raids f rom a strategic point of view were important. 
The ikhwan control of Wadi Sirhan after the capture of Hail gave them the possibility of 
controlling a strategic area along the borders of the above-mentioned British 
mandates .The British were also concerned about this zone because of their project for 
the construction of a railway between Baghdad and Haifa, passing through the south of 
Wadi Sirhan (Helms, 1981: 212-213). As mentioned previously, most of the raids 
occurred within the natural grazing zones of the tribes. The existence of the mandates 
created new boundaries and new alliances among the tribes, and also led to tribal 
animosities (e.g. Ajman-Mutair). Some of the raids were carried out by the ikhwan 
under the mantle of religious revivalism, especially those against the territories King 
Husayn's sons, in Iraq and Transjordan, after the events of the Turaba oases. 
The necessity for defining clearly the boundaries of the British mandates 
brought about the negotiations at Muhammara, in May 1922, between Abdul Aziz and 
British representatives. These aimed at settling the borders of Iraq and Kuwait, but 
Abdul Aziz refused to ratify the t r e a t y . H e faced further negotiations to l imit the 
boundaries at Uqair in November 1922. The territories that he claimed in Iraq stretched 
f rom the right bank of the Euphrates up to Basra (Dickson, 1956: 272). These claims 
were not recognised, but some areas over which the Emir of Kuwait had exercised 
control, and which were claimed by Abdul Aziz, were granted to him. 
" Transjordan was created as a British mandate in 1921 at the Lausanne Conference and was confirmed 
by the League of Nations in 1923. The idea of an Arab Confederacy did not become a reality, and even 
Greater Syria was spht into two mandates, according to the stipulations of the Sykes-Picot agreement 
between France and Britain. See Yapp, Malcolm Op. Cit. pp. 301-337. 
-^ See Habib, John, Op. Cit. p. 109-110. 
The justification of Abdul Aziz's refusal to sign the contract was that the authority of the Zafir tribe and 
dim belonged to Najd. Vassiliev Op. Cit. p. 257. 
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In Dickson's words, the border imposed by the British representative, Sir Percy 
Cox, at Uqair in 1922, was a "linear one", depriving the tribes affected f r o m exercising 
their ancient rights to move freely through them. The line was according to European 
standards and was not understandable to the nomadic population (Ibid. 276). 
In spite of his signature on the Uqair treaty, Abdul Aziz refused to f u l f i l the 
stipulations and the protocols of the treaty. The tribes of the area, including those under 
his control continued to raid Iraq. However under the threat of a mpture of relations 
with Great Britain, he was forced to cease those attacks. 
The capture of Hijaz in 1925 was undertaken against the background of Husayn 
declaring himself the Caliph in 1924, after the Turks had abolished the institution, and 
at the time Britain had stopped paying subsidies to Husayn. According to Armstrong, 
the application of higher taxes to the tribes, as well as an increase in the quotas for 
pilgrimage and the services, caused discontent. On the other hand, the maintenance of 
an army made Husayn rely more on mercenaries rather than on local and tribal peoples 
(Armstrong, 1934: 207-208). 
The capture of Hijaz began in 1924 with the capture of Taif and Mecca. 
However, the British remained neutral in the struggle between Abdul Aziz and Husayn. 
Their justification was that the struggle was defined in religious terms, which were not 
of interest to Britain. The British were more interested in the stabilisation and 
consolidation of their mandates in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, as well as in the 
strategic considerations regarding the northern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Against 
that background, the treaties of Bahra and Hadda were agreed in November of 1924. 
They stipulated the boundaries between Najd, Transjordan, and Iraq and set regulations 
for the settlement of tribal issues that in the case of Iraq complemented the already 
mentioned agreements. The Bahra treaty established that Abdul Aziz's dominions in the 
north stretched to the area of Wadi al-Sirhan, with the British obtaining control of the 
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strategic corridor. On tlie other hand, the Rawaila tribe now came formally under the 
Najdi authority.'''* 
In the south, in Asir, the forces of Imam Yahya in 1926 were trying to move 
northwards, threatening Asir and Tihama, areas that had been under al-Idrissi's control 
as a result of the treaty with Abdul Aziz in 1920. This situation resulted in the 
formulation of the treaty of Mecca between al-Idrissi and Abdul Aziz, which led to Asir 
being de facto integrated into Abdul Aziz's dominions. The treaty established that the 
role of Abdul Aziz was to defend the territory f rom internal and external aggression, 
leaving the administration of the province in the hands of al -Idrissi family. '^ 
These treaties, and the final submission of the whole of Hijaz in 1925, together 
with the annexation of Asir the following year, completed a process of territorial, 
political and economic expansion of Wahhabism and of the central authority. However, 
it also created tensions among the different communities that were brought under the 
authority of Abdul Aziz. The best-known example of those tensions was the rebellion of 
someof the ikwhan forces. 
The rebellion of the ikhwan forces started soon after the capture of Hijaz and 
after the demarcation of boundaries had been arranged with Britain. The ikhwan's main 
leaders were al-Dawish f rom the tribe of Mutair, Sultan bin Humaid f rom the tribe of 
Utaiba, and Dhaidan al-Hithain f rom the Ajman tribe. After the capture of Hijaz, the 
tribal leaders had found themselves relegated in status. They were not given positions in 
the administration of the new province, despite their very important role in the capture 
of Hijaz and in the raids into the British mandates. 
The rebellious ikhwan forces were also reacting to restrictions placed on their 
activities. Their mobility (especially for the tribes of the north which had been deprived 
For a detailed analysis of tiie treaties see: Helms, Christine, Op. Cit. pp. 219-222. 
'"^  See Baldry, John (1984). "One hundred Years of Yemeni History 1849-1948" in Chelhod, Joseph (ed.). 
L'Arabie du Sud: Histoire et Civilization vol. II, la Societe Yemenite de I'Hegira aux Ideologies 
Modemes. (Paris: Editions G . P. Maisonneuve et Larose). p. 92. 
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of the trade centres of Kuwait and Iraq) was limited, and the religious jihad had been 
stopped. The rebel tribal leaders organised raids f rom 1927 until 1930.^^ Although, they 
were in clearly defiance of the treaties agreed by Abdul Aziz, they were basically trying 
to continue to survive or to live according to their ancient practices of nomadic l i fe . 
Abdul Aziz's policy for coping with the rebellion went through different stages 
and strategies. In the beginning, he tried to be conciliatory towards the demands of the 
ikhwan, following the advice of the ulama. Later, after continuous tribal raids into the 
neighbouring states had occurred, he initiated a policy of dividing the loyalties of the 
tribal leaders, by supporting subordinate sheikhs or subordinated branches when a tribal 
leader supported the rebellion. At the same time, he began to recruit townspeople 
because of their reliability. At the external level, British's concern over the revolt was 
reflected in her help to impose measures against the rebels in the territories under her 
protection. The ikhwan revolt was crushed in 1930, with the help of Britain. The revolt 
and its defeat meant the subordination of the tribal leaders to the central authority. 
The shape and structure of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been the result of 
the three dimensions covered here. None of them can be regarded as having more 
weight than the others, since as has been shown all three overlapped during the process 
of the formation of the state. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared formally in 
1932. However, as wi l l be explained, the road towards its consolidation was just 
opening. 
3.3. The Development of Abdul Aziz's Authority 
In the context of Saudi Arabia, the existence of a nomadic way of l i fe and the 
role of religion played a determinant part in the creation of the forms of authority. The 
See Dickson, H.R.P. Op. Cit. pp. 285-318. 
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development towards a more complex form of authority, f rom patriarchal to 
patrimonial, w i l l be analysed in this section. A patriarchal form of domination refers to 
the right of authority based on a historical claim and resting on an administration based 
on loyalty to the authority (Weber, 1991: 180). The establishment of Abdul Aziz's 
authority was based on the mandate received f rom his father and therefore linked to the 
historical claims of the A l Saud. It is on this basis that he received a set of rules and an 
"off ice" which had been created and shaped in the previous two Saudi states. However, 
Abdul Aziz and the process of expansion gave a new shape to the establishment of 
authority, transforming it into a patrimonial structure. According to Weber a patrimonial 
structure exists when the domestic power was decentralised to the children or another 
persons who are dependent on the family circle (Ibid, 1991: 758). The analysis given 
here focuses on stressing the bases of Abdul Aziz's authority, its exercise and the 
transition to a new form of authority anchored in religious and traditional values. 
Regarding the succession of authority, the re-conquest of Riyadh by Abdul Aziz 
meant that the Abdul Rahman branch of the A l Saud had re-established control of the 
area that had been under their control during the second Saudi state. Following his 
successful campaign, Abdul Aziz acquired the mandate of authority f r o m his father, 
Abdul Rahman, thus re-establishing primogeniture as a principle of succession.''^ The 
abdication of Abdul Rahman in favour of Abdul Aziz can be regarded as a strategy to 
overcome the problem of succession that Abdul Rahman faced in his time.^^ 
In that sense, the succession become vertical, from father to son, in contrast with the horizontal 
transference of power that followed after the death of the Great Faysal and contributed to the decline of 
the second Saudi state. 
Abdul Aziz's authority was opposed by different groups and regions on several occasions. Within the 
family, he experienced challenges from the sons of his uncle Saud, known as the Araif Firstly they allied 
themselves with the Rashidis, then with the Ajman in the revolts of Layla (central Najd), and later they 
established and alliance with the Hashemites. After Abdul Aziz defeated them, he airanged for each of 
the Araif to marry one of his sisters, neutralising the challenge of the Araif. For example Saud (leader of 
the Araif group) was married to Abdul Aziz's favourite sister, Nurah. See Bligh (1984). From Prince to 
King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century. (New York: University Press), p. 
17. 
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At the beginning of the third Saudi state, there was a division of authority 
between Abdul Rahman and Abdul Aziz. The notables of the city, especially the ulama, 
gathered in an assembly to swear the oath of allegiance to the new authority. Abdul 
Rahman intervened in favour of his son, transferring to him de facto authority declaring 
him to be Emir of Riyadh, and giving him an ancient sword that symbolised the day-to-
day rule and command of the family forces (Lacey, 1981: 66; Almana, 1980: 42; 
Armstrong, 1934: 64; Philby, 1955: 240). 
According to al-Zir ikl i , in his narration of the transference of power, the ulama 
conferred the right of the Imara to Abdul Rahman as the basis of the seniority principle. 
However Abdul Rahman responded to the ulama by transferring the authority to his son 
Abdul Aziz. The latter accepted on the condition that his father would supervise and 
guide him. (Al -Z i r ik l i , 1991: 130). However, the transference or inheritance that Abdul 
Aziz received at this stage was only the title of Emir and hakim'J^ while Abdul Rahman 
retained the title of Imam. Despite this, most people continued with the practice of 
calling the emir ' imam' also. 
In terms of the division of powers represented in the titles held by Abdul Aziz 
and Abdul Rahman, the first expressed the traditional religious authority and the 
headship of the Saudi family at both internal and external levels. In contrast, Abdul 
Aziz was the de facto authority trying to establish prestige as a leader and fighter and in 
that way to reinforce his legitimacy. 
At the beginning of the third Saudi State, Abdul Rahman did have a certain 
influence and therefore some power; he was not a nominal and ceremonial authority, as 
is alleged by some scholars.^" In the absence of Abdul Aziz, he was in charge of the 
administration of Riyadh, and helped his son to recruit levies for his forces. 
Furthermore, he negotiated with the Ottomans after the conquest of Qasim in 1905 on 
'''Ihid.p. 13. 
Philby, Op. Cit. p. 240. 
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behalf of his son. At the beginning of the negotiations, the Ottomans wanted him to be 
ruler of Najd (Vassiliev, 1999: 219), but eventually they stipulated that their control was 
over Qasim and agreed to give Abdul Aziz authority over Najd. Later Abdul Aziz's 
influence was shown when he swayed the decision of the ulama to approve the ikhwan 
(Benoist-Mechin, 1955: 182-184; Bligh, 1984: 24).^' 
The transformation of Abdul Aziz's titles was also related to the development of 
his campaigns and the scope of his authority. After the annexation of Jabal Shammar, he 
was designated by the ulama and notables as Sultan of Najd in 1921. The title of Sultan 
was a form used to recognise the scope of his authority, which was based on the central 
part of the Arabian Peninsula. The defeat of the Hashemites brought another role for the 
A l Saud family, that of responsibility for "guarding" the two holy cities and the 
pilgrimage. The ulama and notables of Hijaz declared him King of Hijaz in 1926. The 
use of the title King was to enhance his authority in formal terms in the Hijaz region, 
since King Husayn had proclaimed himself as such in 1916. The ulama of Na jd also 
proclaimed him as King of Najd, in order to give Najd the same status of Hijaz. The title 
of King began from that date, and in 1932 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was 
proclaimed. 
Based on his experience of the problems faced by his father's succession, Abdul 
Aziz tried to avoid internal family strife of the second state, nominating his successor at 
an early stage. In 1933, the Emir nominated Prince Saud as Crown Prince, fo l lowing the 
vertical and seniority principles established by his ancestors. He also requested the 
swearing of the oath of allegiance by the royal family, notables and ulama, but he could 
According to Armstrong, Abdul Rahman at that stage was hardly participating in any public event, but 
he attended the meeting of Abdul Aziz with the ulama. What this represents is the importance of Abdul 
rahman not only agreeing with his son in the implementation of his plans, but also the leverage of his 
religious stance vis-a-vis the ulama. Armstrong, H. C . Op. Cit. p. 112. 
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not avoid the conflict that arose f rom his own brothers, Muhammad and Abdullah over 
the issue of succession.^^ 
The dynamics of the administration of the territories differed according to the 
stages of Abdul Aziz's campaign. As has been established in the previous section, his 
power base rested on the townspeople. Therefore at the local level, he appointed 
members of local families as his representatives, while at the regional level he appointed 
members of his family. In the first case the individuals were either members of 
merchant families of the area (some of those who had been in exile in Kuwait), or his 
companions during the capture of Riyadh. The practice of appointing relatives increased 
in the second decade of the twentieth century, as a result of the need to tighten control 
during the creation and spread of the ikhwan forces. These representatives were in 
charge of the collection of taxes (zakat) and the recruitment of levies for Abdul Aziz's 
forces. 
Some examples can be given to illustrate how Abdul Aziz established his 
authority in the territories captured. In the case of the region of Qasim, he appointed 
Abdul Aziz al Sulaiman as Emir of Anaiza. He belonged to an important merchant 
family who had been in exile in Kuwait after the Rashidis had gained control of the 
area. The Emir of Buraida was Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Sudairi, a member of his own 
family and a companion in the capture of Riyadh (Vassiliev, 1999: 214-216).^'' 
Scholars suggest that marriage was the means by which Abdul Aziz 
consolidated tribal links. However, he only married women f rom three different tribes. 
His first marriage was to a daughter of the leading family of the Bani Khalid tribe, 
before he re-established control of Riyadh. After his nomination as Emir of Riyadh, he 
married the daughter of Abdullah ibn Latif, f rom the A l al-Sheikh family. This was 
**- Bligh, Alexander, Op. Cit. pp. 29-38. 
According to a report of the dessert patrol in Transjordan in 1937, the most important Emirates were 
governed by members of al-Saud family and some Najdis. Jarman, Robert L . (comp.) (1990). Jecklah 
Diaries 1919-1940. (London: Archive Editions), p. 499. 
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clearly an attempt to strengthen his religious credentials, although marriages between 
the A l Saud and A l al-Sheikh family had been common practice since the time of the 
first Saudi state. His third marriage was to the widow of the last Emir of Hai l , a member 
of the Shammar tribe. He also married two women f rom the powerful northern tribal 
group the Rawaila, and three f rom the al-Sudairi, with which the A l Saud family already 
had links. '^^  
As to Abdul Aziz's authority over the tribal population, this was to a great extent 
thanks to the creation of the ikwhan movement, which served both political and military 
purposes. As was explained earlier, his plan envisaged spreading the sedentarisation of 
the tribes and binding them to the central authority. The ideological outcome of this 
policy was that the nomadic population acknowledged the Wahhabi interpretation and 
pledged their obedience to Abdul Aziz. 
In parallel to the administrative development, the King continued to invoke the 
traditional form of governance, specifically the tribal and Islamic practice of open 
majlis with the townspeople and the bedouin, and the extraction of zakat. The practice 
of open majlis was an opportunity to tie bonds with society in general and with the 
bedouins in particular. According to Almana, the King distributed goods among the 
people who attended these sessions, having a central warehouse to organise the storage 
and distribution of royal gifts. The bedouin received three gold pounds, a robe and a 
cloak, and i f they had been of iimportance in terms of their role helping Abdul Aziz, they 
would receive more gifts (Almana, 1980: 177). In this way the King used the majlis to 
keep the loyalty of the bedouin and society in general fol lowing the bedouin customs 
Another way of exercising authority over tribal groups and settled communities 
was through the extraction of payment of z.akat and khums (one f i f t h of the booty 
captured during the tribal raids) from them. Although the zakat is a religious duty that 
This is based on Less, Brian (1980). A Handbook of al-Sa'ud Ruling Family of Saudi Arabia. Royal 
Genealogies. (London: Stacey). Also see the Appendix of the Royal Genealogy, Lacey, Op. Cit. 
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represents the submission of individuals to God, Abdul Aziz, fol lowing the practices of 
his ancestors, made the zakat also a contractual relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled. " In the Saudi Government Memorial i t is stated that: 
"To claim effective possession is collection of taxes and 
preservation of public security. These imply the existence of an 
authority on the spot able to compel obedience; and this power 
to enforce its mandate is the basic test for determining whether 
or not a state has acquired effective control over people and 
territory..."^'^ 
According to this statement, the contractual relation was based on the 
recognition of the authority, on the one hand, and on the other, an acceptance that the 
authority had to protect the persons levied with zakat. The expansion of the dominions 
brought the application of another type of tax that had hitherto been considered 
unlawful or un-Islamic: the market tax or maks (Helms, 1981: 160-161). This occurred 
especially after the annexation of al-Hasa province and the Hijaz. 
Once the expansion movement was finalised, the administration started to 
evolve towards a more complex form of organisation, making the structures of authority 
more institutionalised. This marked the evolution towards a patrimonial fo rm of 
organisation. It is important to point out that the existing practices in each annexed area 
were taken into consideration, as the case of the Hijaz shows. The administration of that 
area was the main concern of King Abdul Aziz, as it was an area that had an organised 
authority and influential groups, such as the merchant families and the guilds. 
Therefore, the King issued a Royal Decree establishing the organisation of a 
Consultative Council under the authority of Faysal (Abdul Aziz's son) as Viceroy of the 
Hijaz. This Council exercised considerable authority, sometimes disagreeing with the 
Christine Helms develops this issue, establishing the evolution of the zakat practice from the Prophet 
Muhammad and how it acquired different connotations according to the time and influence of the tribal 
customs. Therefore, the practice of religious taxes in the way that is portrayed by Abdul Aziz was a 
common practice for the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula. Helms, Christine. Op. Cit. pp. 151-178. 
Although as it can be appreciated, this application is made to sustain territorial claims like Buraimi 
Oasis, it reflects the implications of zakat to Saudi Authority. Saudi Memorial Government vol. I (1955). 
(Cairo), p. 495. 
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King on budgetary and commercial questions (Chaudhry, 1998: 71-72). The Council 
was replaced by the Council of Deputies, which was created in 1938.^^ 
Another important feature of the transition towards a patrimonial structure were 
the changes introduced in the central administration. From the beginning of the 1930s, 
Abdul Aziz started to rely more on civi l servants loyal to his authority, thus creating a 
form of government organisation. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
organised and headed by prince Faysal; the Royal Diwan was acting as an Interior 
Ministry; and the agency of finance was reorganised into a proper Ministry under 
Abdullah Sulaiman (from Najd). Abdul Aziz had several foreign advisors like Philby, 
Fuad Hamza (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) , Almana (Chief Translator in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) , Hafiz Wahba (Director of Education and later Saudi 
Ambassador in London), and Yusuf Yasin (Political Secretary). A l l of them were 
assisted by clerks and officers (Vassiliev, 1999: 293-299; Almana, 1980: 188-198). 
While the main appointments were decided by the King, posts of secondary importance 
were only subject to his approval. 
Towards the end of Abdul Aziz's period, the administration of the Kingdom 
relied increasingly on the role of the princes. Apart f rom the Ministries of the Interior 
and Foreign Affairs , three more ministries were created; the Ministry of Defence (1944) 
under Prince Mansour, son of King Abdul Aziz and assistant to Prince Faysal in the 
administration of Hijaz; the Ministry of Health (1951) was created and headed by 
Abdullah ibn Faysal; and the Ministry of Communications in 1953 under Prince Talal, 
son of King Abdul Aziz (Huyette, 1985: 61). 
The impact of the world economic crisis of 1930,^ ** and the economic effects of 
the Second World War in 1944,**^  aggravated the Kingdom's precarious financial 
The co-existence of this body and the Consultative Council for some time produced conflict between 
them. The King cancelled the Consultative Council and eroded the unity of the two principal Hijazi socio-
economic groups, the guilds and entrepreneurs. Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz (1997). The Price of Wealth: 
Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. (New York: Ithaca Press), p. 74. 
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situation. The King implemented reforms in taxation with the aim of unifying the 
system and granted an oil concession to a foreign company. 
The oil concession was given to Standard Oil Company of California. This 
company agreed to give Saudi Arabia a first loan of £30,000, and a second of £20,000, 
an annual rental payment of £5,000, and upon the discovery of oi l in commercial 
quantities two payments of £50,000 each during the first two years (Vassiliev, 1999: 
316). Oil was discovered in 1938 and after that further concessions were granted, 
enabling the government to increase its revenues from royalties derived f rom the 
extraction of the oi l . From the late thirties onwards, oi l became Kingdom's main source 
of revenue. 
As has been shown, Abdul Aziz's authority during the process of the formation 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia passed f rom one based on a patriarchal structure to one 
based on a patrimonial structure. Some scholars maintain that his success depended on 
the role played by foreign powers, but in fact that was only one factor; the dynamics of 
the local chieftancies and the internal politics of Wahhabism also played an important 
role in the establishment of a central authority in the Arabian Peninsula. The invocation 
of de jure authority, received f rom the legacy of his ancestors, was also critical. 
Furthermore, the exercise of this authority, re-adapting the ways of government 
fol lowing customary and religious practices, shaped the basis of the central authority. 
**** According to Lacey, the Kingdom depended heavily on the revenues derived from the Hajj. In 1930 
these revenues dropped from £5 million to £2mill ions. Lacey, Op. Cit. p. 229. 
In 1933, the general scope of these reforms was to centralise the extraction and spending of tax to the 
central authority where as previously the Emirs or governors were extracting the taxes and then 
expending them. In 1944, the reforms tried to unify the tax system of the Kingdom. Chaudhry, K . Op. Cit. 
pp. 58-62. 
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3.4. The Ulama in Abdul Aziz's Period. 
"/ am like you, one of you. But 1 am appointed to 
direct the affairs of our people in accordance with 
the book of Allah. Our first duty is to Allah and 
those who teach the Book of Allah, the ulama. I am 
but an instrument of command in their hand, (part 
of a speech that King Abdul Aziz addressed to the 
ulama. Rihani, Ameen (1928). Ibn Saoud of 
Arabia: Maker of Modern Arabia. (Boston and 
New York: Houghton and Mifflin). p.201. 
Religious authority during the period of Abdul Aziz played a major role in the 
formation of the state. The ulama during this period adopted new forms to exert their 
authority as part of the ongoing process of state formation. Their most important 
contribution during this period was to provide the ideological bases of the Saudi state; 
after all, the use of religion as a cohesive force was the main component in establishing 
A l Saud authority. The ulama's role focused on the appropriation of the necessary tools 
and "domains" to enforce their role as guardians of Islam. For this reason, the analysis 
must first of all begin by stressing the importance of the ulama in maintaining Wahhabi 
practices in Najd, especially after the Rashidis' annexation of central Najd. This is 
fol lowed by an analysis of the composition of the ulama, in order to determine their 
origins and their contribution. Of particular importance is the composition of the top 
ulama and the influence that the A l al-Sheikh family enjoyed in this group in general. 
The analysis w i l l also study the ways in which the ulama participated in affairs of state 
and affairs of religion; this w i l l be done by an analysis of their participation in the 
creation of the ikhwan forces and their role in the administration of the government. 
The ulama were the bonds that preserved the continuance of Wahhabism in 
central Najd after the decline of the second state. For the ulama, the observance of the 
precepts of Islam and the unity of the Muslim community were more important than the 
legitimacy of the temporal authority, as happened during the civi l war period in the 
second Saudi state. Therefore, indirectly, they kept Wahhabism alive after the 
annexation of Najd by the Rashidis. 
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One of the leading ulama f rom Najd and f rom the A l al-Sheikh family was 
Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif ibn Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Hassan ibn Sheikh al-
Islam. He stayed in Hail after the decline of the second state. The Emir of Hail , 
Muhammad ibn Abdullah, asked the sheikh to move to Hail in order to work as an alim. 
The sheikh stayed with the Rashidis where he continued to spread Wahhabism. Later, 
after the recapture of Riyadh by Abdul Aziz, he swore an oath of allegiance to the latter 
(Al-Sheikh, 1974: 134), although it was known that he was one of the persons initially 
detained in the tower of the city for refusing to acknowledge Abdul Aziz's success 
(Bassam, 1998: 220-221). Other members of the Al-al-Sheikh family who had remained 
in Najd under the Rashidis' authority were Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif Al-al 
Sheikh, Sheikh Omar ibn Abdul al-Latif Al-al Sheikh, Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Abdul 
Lat i f Al-a l Sheikh and his brother Sheikh Muhammad. 
There were also cases of ulama who did not belong to the A l al-Sheikh family, 
but remained significant after power had shifted to the Al-Saud. For example, Sheikh 
Ahmad ibn Ibrahim ibn Hamad ibn Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Tssa ( f rom the Banu 
Zaid tribe), under the Rashidis, had been appointed as judge in Sadr and Mujama at 
Najd. But, after the re-capture of Riyadh by Abdul Aziz he no longer held this 
appointment but he continued to work (al-Sheikh, 1974: 264). In al-Hasa, Sheikh Aisa 
ibn Abdullah Akasa ibn Hasan ibn Othman ibn Aksa ( f rom the Subai tribe) remained as 
an alim after the capture of this region by Abdul Aziz (Ibid.). 
In line with the practice of the previous historic Saudi states, members of the A l 
Sheikh family were appointed to the main religious positions during Abdul Aziz's 
period of rule. At the beginning of the third state, the leading alim was Sheikh Abdullah 
ibn Abdul al-Latif A l al-Sheikh. He was the most senior religious advisor to the King, 
especially on the issue of teaching Islam in the bedouin settlements (al-Sheikh, 1974: 
134-135). The influence that he exercised was enormous because he was in charge of 
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appointing the ulama for these settlements. In addition, his students, including members 
of his own family, came to occupy important posts during the period of Abdul Aziz and 
later. 
Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif was the creator and first president of the 
Committee for the Commendation of Virtue and Prevention of Evi l . This Committee 
was established in 1903, with the aim of enforcing strict observance of the principles of 
Islam. The Committee had branches in all major cities in the area annexed by Abdul 
Aziz. Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif was also the imam of the main mosque in 
Riyadh. 
After Sheikh Abdullah's death, his nephew. Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn 
Abdul al-Latif A l al-Sheikh, succeeded him in influence and in importance. The latter 
was recommended by his uncle to King Abdul Aziz to become the imam of the A l al-
Sheikh mosque in Riyadh. After the death of his uncle in 1953, Sheikh Muhammad ibn 
Ibrahim became the muft i and president of the ifta\ He proposed to Abdul Aziz the 
creation of the first Islamic college in the Kingdom, and this was set up in 1952. Later, 
he acquired further positions in line with the development of new religious institutions 
during the periods of rule of Saud and Faysal. 
It is clear to say that Sheikh Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif and Sheikh Muhammad 
ibn Ibrahim were the two most influential mentors in traditional religious education for 
the ulama, during the beginning of the third Saudi state until early 1970s, shaping the 
stmcture and role of the ulama in general. 
The ulama did not form a homogenous group, and among themselves there were 
several debates over theological and political issues, especially between the Najdi ulama 
and the ulama f rom other regions. One notable example occurred when the ulama f rom 
Qasim differed with their counterparts of Najd on the issue of who were the 
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unbelievers.'^" In the opinion of the Qasimi ulama, the Turks and other MusHms should 
not be called unbehevers. One of the proponents of this position went into exile to 
Kuwait during the First World War, and another (Sheikh Abdullah ibn Omar) was 
condemned to death for his disagreement on this and other issues (Wahba, 1964: 99). It 
is also important to stress that Najdi ulama took over responsibility for the main post of 
the ulama in Hijaz; even the appointment of imams from the other three schools of law 
under the Hashemites were halted in favour of the Najdi and Hanbali ulama (Chaudhry, 
1997: 94).* '^ 
The major ideological contribution of the ulama was their participation in the 
spread of the ikhwan movement. The acceptance of religion accompanied Abdul Aziz's 
authority to a large extent. The guidance and involvement of imams, judges and 
mutawwa'a in these settlements enabled them to influence people's beliefs and 
practices. The ulama of Riyadh, and especially Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdul al-Latif, 
determined which ulama participated in the spread of Islam. 
Making use of the nrain manual, "The Three Fundamentals and their Proofs", 
which was used in religious teachings to the bedouin,'^ ^ it is possible to state the general 
features of the way in which the religion was spread. The document is divided 
according to the three fundamentals of religion: knowledge of God, knowledge of the 
religion of Islam and knowledge of the Prophet. The first and second 'fundamental' of 
religion refer to the principle of tawhid and contain the notions of rewards for obeying 
God and punishments for disobeying him. Paradise is promised for those who obey, and 
condemnation to hell after death for those who disobey. These two eschatological 
notions of paradise and hell were strong and appealing for persons who had just 
It is important to consider that the region of Qasim historically had been the centre of disputes among 
Al Saud, the Ottomans and Rashidis. 
There is a scarcity of sources to cover the issue of differences between Hijazi ulama and Najdi ulama 
during this period. 
''^  Calverley, Edwin E . "The Doctrines of the Arabian 'Brethren' " in The Moslem World 11, (21). 364-
376. 
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accepted Islam and Wahhabism, especially the notion of a paradise, which contrasted 
starkly with the hardships associated with bedouin life. In the first fundamental, the 
issue of takfir was placed very much at the core of ikwhan beliefs and practices, 
purveying a strong sense of intolerance towards and superiority over the unbeliever, and 
emphasising the exclusivist nature of the ikhwan movement: "It is unlawful for the 
believer to be associated with the ones who do not believe in God and His messenger 
(Calverley, 1921: 365). 
The third religious fundamental presented in this document was knowledge of 
the Prophet, stressing how the Prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina in order to 
establish the community of believers, symbolising the abandonment of the nomadic life 
(seen as equivalent of jahiliyya or ignorance) and the adoption of a sedentary life and 
submission to God (Ibid. 373-374). 
After the success of the ikhwan campaigns and the halt of the expansionist 
movement due to the delimitation of borders, the ikhwan began to complain and some 
of them to openly oppose Abdul Aziz's authority. The ulama confronted them and sided 
with the King. At the beginning of the opposition, the ulama agreed with some of the 
demands made to Abdul Aziz by the rebel leaders, in a Congress, in 1927, organised by 
King Abdul Aziz for the ikhwan leaders and the ulama. Some of the responses given by 
the ulama were in accordance with the demands of the ikhwan, such as those including 
the prohibition of the introduction of the new technologies, the abolition of the existing 
laws in Hijaz, the prohibition of the entrance of the Egyptian mahmal, and the 
prohibition of the shi'a to practise their rituals (Wahba, 1964: 134-136; Habib, 1978: 
123-124).'" 
'''' The ulama who signed this fatwa were from Najd. They were: Mohammed ibn Abdul Latif, Saud ibn 
Atik, Sulaiman bin Sahman, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al Atik, Abdullah ai-Ankari, Omar bin Salini, Salih 
ibn Abdul Aziz, Abdullah ibn Hassan, Abdullah ibn Abdul Latit", Omar ibn Abdul Latif, Mohamed ibn 
Ibrahim, Mohammed ibn Abdullah, Abdullah ibn Zahim, Mohammed ibn Othman al Shawi and Abdul 
Aziz al-Shathri. Wahba, Hafiz (1964). Arabian Days. (London: Arthur Barker Limited), pp. 134-136. 
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The rebellion did not cease with this Congress. The demands of the rebel leaders 
became more radical in their content, expressing their dissatisfaction with the ulama for 
not enforcing the observance of Islam and not continuing with its spread, as the 
rebellious leaders were doing by declaring jihad in their expansionist campaigns. The 
position of the ulama regarding the issue of the ikwhan rebellion then changed and they 
closed ranks with the King. 
What was at stake was the position of the ulama as interpreters of Islam. The 
rebellious tribal leaders challenged this, since they considered themselves the true 
defenders of religion. On the other hand, the tribal leaders constituted a rival group for 
the ulama, given their influence on King Abdul Aziz decisions to decide the politics of 
the expansion (Kechichian, 1993: 75). 
After the capture of Hijaz and during the time of the ikhwan revolt, the ulama 
gradually became more organised with regard to their functions. At the top were the 
leading ulama, a group of fifteen ulama from Najd (headed by Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif 
and later by Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Abdul Latif),^'* then the judges of each town or 
settlement, and finally the imams and mutawwa'a at the bottom. In each settlement the 
qadi had to deal with questions of religion, inheritance and commercial issues, while the 
Emir had to deal with questions such as taxation, preservation of order and conscription 
of soldiers. The Emir, thus, sat in litigation on issues related to these matters or in other 
cases where the shari'a could not be applied (Gouldrup, 1971: 276). However, as 
Gouldrup has pointed out the jurisdiction of each judge depended not only on his own 
prestige but also on the support of the Emir to enforce the legal decisions (Ibid. 277). 
The mutawwa'a were agents of the central authority, since they were also in 
charge of the collection of zakat (Rihani, 1928: 203). The judges from Najd derived 
According to Ihefatwa issued on the occasion of the demands of the rebellious ikhwan. See Wahba, H . 
Op. Cit. pp. 134-136. 
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their salary from the zakat, in agreement with individual authorisation from the King to 
the Zakat's superintendent (Wahba, 1964: 71). 
After the annexation of the Hijaz, the unification of the law was decreed by 
Abdul Aziz, and the ulama from Najd were placed in a predominant position. The 
school that prevailed was the Hanbali school favoured by the Najdi ulama. At the same 
time, a court system was institutionalised in the Hijaz, following the Ottoman practices 
but applying the Hanbali school of law. Later this type of system was introduced 
throughout the rest of the Kingdom. 
Another area in which the ulama had a considerable influence and a 
predominant role was education. This was in spite of the fact that when educational 
policies were introduced in 1930, the ulama were opposed to the Director of Education 
due to the inclusion of subjects such as geography, drawing, and foreign languages in 
the national curricula.^'' In spite of the ulama's stance at that time, these studies were 
introduced, although the curriculum was nonetheless mainly dedicated to the study of 
religion. Towards the end of Abdul Aziz's period, pupils in the first grade of primary 
school were spending 22 hours studying religion out of a weekly total of 28, decreasing 
progressively to 25% in the last year of secondary school (Gouldrup, 1971: 261-262). In 
each of the stages of education, there were schools solely dedicated to the study of 
religious subjects, such as the schools for the study of the Qur'an, the villages schools, 
the religious section of secondary schools (located in Taif, Mecca, Anaiza and Shaqra) 
and the faculty of Islamic law (Nallino, 1961: 437-439). 
The participation of the ulama in politics was prominent in two areas, fomially 
as representatives of the Hijaz population in the first Consultative Council, and as a 
'''' See Wahba, Hafiz. Op. Cit. pp. 47-52. According to interview c, the attitude of the director of education 
was not against religion, since he himself was a graduated from al-Azhar. Wahba was well regarded by 
the ulama. However, the reaction of the ulama was more related to their lack of knowledge on these 
subjects, and their attitude against anything that was foreign. This traditional ulama's attitude on issues of 
education continued until the decade of 1950. Also the interviewee established that the attitude of Wahba 
towards the Hijazi ulama was of respect and allowed them to keep their educational posts, as it has been 
the King Abdul Aziz policy to respect the socio-political system of the Hijaz. 
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pressure group on some external policies. In the case of foreign affairs, the ulama 
opposed the agreement between Abdul Rahman and the Ottomans in 1905, because of 
the obligations contained in this agreement. Another example was the Khurma and 
Turaba issue, where the ulama and the ikhwan leaders were pressing Abdul Aziz to help 
the Wahhabis. The pressure was intended to stop Abdul Aziz becoming an instrument 
of British policy in the region (Ibid. 211). 
The ulama's participation in the process of state formation then was vital in 
reinforcing the central authority. Not only did the ulama keep alive the Wahhabi 
doctrines, but also participated in the creation of the ikhwan movement which, as has 
been pointed out, was crucial for the formation of the state. They also acted as a 
pressure group, reinforcing their role and that of religion on different occasions. Their 
reaction in relation to the rebellious ikhwan was to defend their own positions as the 
group in charge of the maintenance of Islam. On the other hand, the government had to 
turn to the ulama in order to declare that the rebellious leaders were not legitimate and 
to act against them. The ulama's support of Abdul Aziz was aimed at strengthening 
their place in the consolidation of the central authority. The central authority 
strengthened the role of ulama by incorporating them in its plans for the development 
on of the Kingdom. 
3.5. Authority during Saud and Faysal Periods 
During the reigns of King Saud ibn Abdul Aziz (from 1953-1964) and King 
Faysal ibn Abdul Aziz (1964-1975), society and state underwent continuous 
transfomiation due to the consolidation of the state and government. This section 
analyses how the difference between the two monarchs regarding the direction of the 
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country produced changes that affected the articulation of power and forms of authority 
in the Kingdom. This re-definition of the relationship will be reviewed by analysing 
how the organisation of the state defined domains for the ulama and the government in 
particular, as well as for other social groups. The definition will be framed in its own 
context, addressing the issue of conflict between the two Kings Saud ibn Abdul Aziz 
and Faysal ibn Abdul Aziz, and the socio-political situation of the Kingdom. Finally, 
factors such as the insertion of the Saudi economy into the international economy, and 
the regional and global events that affected the Kingdom will be examined with the aim 
of highlighting the scope of the relationship between the ulama and the government. 
Much of the re-organisation of the religious authority contributed at this stage to 
the ulama's strength and formalised their authority vis-a-vis the government and society 
in general. The ulama, as is shown here, were systematic in their support of before the 
King —as in the case of the ikhwan— and the recently created governmental structure. 
Rather than oppose the changes, as they did in the case of their opposition to television, 
or girls' education, they generally cooperated with the government in order to guard 
Islamic values, and to continue to be the "state ideologues". 
One of the main institutional changes was the creation of the Council of 
Ministers by King Saud, following the decree of his father. However, he was not as 
concerned as with the role of this new institution, as he was with the traditional forms of 
government. But the demands of the new wealth and the aim of guarding the new state 
vis-a-vis the so-called radical regimes^^ caused Prince Faysal to give greater emphasis to 
the government. 
At first, the functions of the Council were defined broadly: "To examine, decide, 
and recommend on almost any matter in Saudi government administration" (Huyette, 
Towards the second half of the 1950s countries like Egypt, Syria and Iraq had secular regimes 
stemming from a military coups d'etat. In contrast Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco were considered 
conservative, due to the difference in forms of legitimation and the alliance with extra-regional powers. 
See Kelidar, Abbas 1967. "The Struggle for Arab Unity" in World Today 23, (7): 293-294. 
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1980: 66).^^ However, there was latent competition between the Royal Diwan of Saud 
and the Council that made difficulties for the administration of the state. In fiscal 
policies the King established in 1955 the nullification of income tax on the grounds that 
it was incompatible with Islam; meanwhile. Prince Faysal in the same year issued a law 
declaring the continuation of taxes (Chaudhry, 1997: 78). 
The way in which Saud exercised his authority was mainly through the 
reinforcement of religion domestically as a means of protection against the spread of 
foreign ideas and values (such as Arab nationalism, communism and socialism). The 
strikes in ARAMCO (the Arab American Oil Company) in 1953 and 1956^^ 
exacerbated the possibilities of a threat. He introduced the prize for the memorisation of 
the Qur'an in 1954. Meanwhile the ulama issued a fatwa banning students from going 
abroad (Abul Rahman bin Qasim 1978: 217). King Saud also gave more power and 
funding to the Committees of Public Morality (Vassiliev, 1999: 340). On the other 
hand, he continued with Abdul Aziz's practices in his approach toward nomadic 
population. 
During the reigns of Faysal and Saud, society underwent major changes as a 
consequence of the demarcation of the state and the appearance of the oil wealth. 
Thanks to the oil revenues, the state became the main supplier of work in the central 
administration through the creation of different ministries and departments. Education 
was given much greater emphasis, especially when Faysal was King. The latter 
The Council was composed mainly of princes, and only three ministries (finance, conmierce and 
health) were occupied by commoners. 
The 1953 strike stemmed from the working conditions of local workers in Dhahran. The living 
standards of the senior workers were high, living in their own compounds and enjoying luxuries denied to 
the locals. The complaint of the workers was against the company policy of discrimination, since there 
were no locals in the intermediate and upper echelons of the company. They went on strike again in 1956 
because their situation has not been improved, and they also protested against the renewal of permission 
to the United States to use Dhahran Air base. This happened as mentioned, within a context of regional 
changes that produced fear in the authorities about the consequences of these activities for the security 
and integrity of the royal family and the country. See Lackner, Helen (1978). The House Built on Sand: A 
Political Economy of Saudi Arabia. (London: Ithaca Press), pp. 95-98; Salame, Ghassan (1993). 
"Political Power and the Saudi State" in Hourani, A. Philip S. Khoury and Mary C . Wilson (eds.). The 
Modern Middle East: A Reader. London: I. B. Tauris; 579-600; Buchan, James (1982). "Secular and 
Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia" in Niblock, Tim (ed.). State, Society' and Political Economy in 
Saudi Arabia. (London: Croom Helm), pp. 111-114. 
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development involved heavy reliance on the need to meet the demands for skilled and 
semi-skilled personnel; but at the same time was a source of suspicion and threat since 
such people brought with them "new ideas" to the local people. Gradually society 
became differentiated not only on traditional terms of tribal and settled peoples, but also 
the generation of jobs and economic activity caused the emergence of another way to 
situate socio-economically persons in Saudi society. 
The external and internal situations were difficult for the country. The royal 
family was in a difficult position because of its internal rivalry'^" and the external arena 
looked uncertain. However, the family reached a consensus through a senior member, 
Prince Saud ibn Abdul Rahman, who gathered together all the factions from inside the 
royal family, along with tribal and religious leaders, in order to give Faysal ful l powers 
in 1958, leaving only the ceremonial duties of King to Saud (Ibid. 64). 
With Faysal as Prime Minister, and President of the Council of Ministers, the 
Council acquired more power, enabling it to ratify the internal and external policies. A 
Royal Decree issued in 1958 gave the Council responsibility for regulatory, executive 
and administrative functions. From that date, the Council was the final authority for 
financial affairs, treaties and international agreements (Huyette, 1980: 69). On the other 
See the study of Saudi society by Rugh, William (1973)."The Emergence of a New Middle Class in 
Saudi Arabia" in The Middle East Journal 27, (1). 7-21 and Heller, Mark and Nadav Safran (1985). The 
New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia. Harvard Middle East Paper. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). 
At this time a division inside the Royal family emerged as a consequence of the publication of a 
memorandum addressed to the king criticising his internal and foreign policy by a group of princes, 
Abdallah, Talal, Badr, Fawwaz, Nawwaf, Abd al-Muhsin and Majid. Mordechai, Abir, (1988). Saudi 
Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites, Conflict and Collaboration. (London: Croom Helm), p. 67; 
Yizraeli, Sarah (1997). The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: the Struggle between King Sa'ud and Crown 
Prince Faysal 1953-62. (Telaviv: Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies), pp 55. 
This faction mainly consisted of the younger princes, the last three representing the al-Sudairy branch of 
the royal family. Talal and Fawwaz full brothers of an Armenian concubine and Abdallah, who was the 
eldest prince in the group, had tribal links (Shammar tribe). The appearance of this faction and the 
publication of the memorandum appeared after certain measures taken by King Saud regarding the 
nomination of some posts contravened the balance between different elements in the royal family. In 
general, the dismissal of Talal was regarded as an indication to younger princes that they would not have 
any impact in policy-making. Furthermore, the appointment of commoners loyal to Saud and the 
appointment of his son as Minister of Defence, created the feeling that Saud was preparing his son to 
become his successor Bligh, (1984) Op. Cit. p. 60 
127 
hand, the Presidency of the institution saw an increase in its role since, according to the 
Royal Decree, it was to direct the general policy of the state. The President of the 
Council had to coordinate the activities of the various ministries and to supervise them 
(Ibid.). 
Immediately after assuming his functions as Prime Minister and President of the 
Council of Ministers, Prince Faysal started to try to improve the economic situation. He 
established an austerity plan with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. The repercussions of this on the day-to-day politics in the 
Kingdom once more exacerbated the rivalries. One of the major steps taken by Prince 
Faysal was to separate the family budget from the state budget, and to reduce the 
stipend of the royal family. This, as Lackner points out, caused resentment among some 
members of the royal family (Lackner, 1978: 62). 
In spite of the success of Prince Faysal's economic programme and its positive 
effect on the economy of the kingdom, Saud reclaimed his full powers. Taking 
advantage of the discontent with Faysal, especially among the younger princes he 
regained his power in 1960. Prince Talal was appointed as Minister of Finance and 
Prince Abdul al-Mohsin was nominated as Interior Minister. However after the first 
year the alliance between Saud and these princes ended with the exile of the princes."" 
They were pushing for more progressive policies, but Saud refused to implement these 
policies because of the antagonism they could provoke among conservative groups in 
the country. 
As a result of these events, the conservative elements (especially the ulama) 
shifted their alliance to Prince Faysal. They were concerned about the progressive 
elements associated with King Saud, and the repercussions which their ideas would 
This faction of princes composed by Talal ibn Abdul Aziz, Abdul Mohsen ibn Abdul Aziz, Badri ibn 
Abdul Aziz, Nawaf ibn Abdul Aziz and Saad ibn Fahd were known as liberal princes by analogy with the 
free officers who established the Nasseriste government in Egypt. They criticised the monarchy and 
pronounced in favour of constitutional reform. They settled in Egypt and enjoyed good relations with 
Nasser. See: Lackner, Helen. Op. Cit. pp. 90-92. 
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have on traditional and religious values. The Mufti, Sheikh Muhamad ibn Ibrahim, and 
Sheikh Hassan al-Sheikh (the Head of the Committee of Public Morality) sent a letter to 
King Saud reminding him of the role of the Mufti in supervising the laws and giving 
rulings in areas related to shari'a (Vassiliev, 1999: 359). One example of the attitude of 
the ulama at this time was the fatwa, by the Mufti banning the importation of books 
containing ideas against Islam. The contents of libraries had to be checked in order to 
guarantee that they would only contain the proper books (Abdul Rahman al Qasim, 
1978: 111-120). 
The ulama, as in the case of the period of Abdul Aziz, were once more 
defending Islam as the main source of values at a time when the unity of Saudi society 
was being threatened from within and from external sources, represented mainly by 
ideologies such as pan-Arabism and socialism. They opted to ally themselves with 
Prince Faysal, who would have a moderate approach towards the introduction of 
changes and would maintain the unity of the country. 
Faysal was reinstated once again in command of the country as nominal King in 
December 1961, when King Saud went abroad to receive medical treatment. Faysal took 
advantage to consolidate his position vis-a-vis King Saud. He changed the composition 
of the Council of Ministers, bringing in more commoners, and giving the post of 
Minister of Education to one of the religious scholars. Sheikh Hassan ibn Abdallah Al 
al-Sheikh. The bestowing of this particular position on the ulama formalised a role 
which the ulama had in fact been performing for a long time. 
At the external level, Prince Faysal opted to face the threat of pan-Arabism by 
invoking Islam and by reasserting the role of Saudi Arabia as a guardian of the Muslim 
Holy places, in an attempt also to gain internal legitimacy before the ulama and other 
moderate or conservative elements. In 1962, he supported the creation of a non-
governmental organisation of religious scholars named the Muslim World League, in 
129 
which the Mufti of Saudi Arabia was to play an important role. The organisation was 
aimed at the promulgation of Islam as an antidote against pan-Arabism. Also in 1969, 
he supported the establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, an inter-
governmental institution. Another important measure was the welcoming to Saudi 
territory of religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood who had been expelled 
from Syria and Egypt. The brotherhood was to participate in the foundation of an 
Islamic University in Medina in order to challenge the nationalised Egyptian Al Azhar 
University (Mordechai, 1993: 42). The coup d'etat in Yemen in 1962, with the support 
of Egypt, combined with the growing activity of opposition groups,'"^ played in favour 
of the consolidation of Prince Faysal. Saud tried to recover his position, but Faysal 
successfully manoeuvred the different socio-economic groups and the family to close 
ranks with him. 
In the aftermath of his re-installation in power in October 1962, Faysal launched 
the Ten Points Programme. This set out his strategy for creating consensus among the 
different tendencies in Saudi society. For the reformist or progressive groups, he 
proposed three new initiatives: the creation of a fundamental law in accordance to the 
shari'a and Qur'an; the independence of the judicial power through the creation of a 
ministry; and the revision of the Public Morality Committee. For the conservative 
groups, the programme was framed in terms of respect for Islam. For the ulama. 
'"^  The main oppositionist groups were mainly secularist and were influenced by communist and socialist 
ideas. Among those groups were: the so-called "free officers", the free princes, the Communist party, the 
Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula, the Socialist Front for the Liberation of the Peninsula. The 
"free officers" were Saudi pilots who had flown to Egypt seeking exile, immediately after the outbreak of 
hostilities in Yemen. The free princes were associated with the Arab National Liberation Front (a result 
from the division of the Saudi communist party) which started to launch public attacks on the Saudi 
regime, they were in favour of a constitutional regime and a referendum to decide whether to have a 
monarchical or republican regime. Its programme sought a revision of the oil policy and the abstention of 
any alignment with any extra-regional power. Nasser supported this organisation. The Communist party 
'was in favour of close relation with the Soviet Union, the nationalisation of the oil companies, the 
formation of labour unions, parties, equality of citizens and the establishment of a republican regime. This 
organisation was against the royal family and any form of capitalism or economical liberalisation. The 
Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula was close to socialism and in favour of the end of the 
monarchy. The Socialist Front for the Liberation of the Peninsula was advocating the autonomy of the 
Hijaz region. All these groups started to appear after the strikes in A R A M C O and they were active 
especially in the 1960s. See Salame, Op.Cit. pp. 596-598. 
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specifically, the fourth point highlighted their role as the group that would provide 
solutions to the new problems, based on the shari'a. The proposal involved the 
formation of a High Council of Ulama and jurists to deal with new problems. For 
society, in general, Faysal wanted to improve living standards, providing the population 
with free medical services and education, and giving subsidies to the poor. For the 
commercial groups he proposed reforms to encourage the recovery of the economy. 
Within the royal family the arbiter of the dispute was the senior prince, 
Muhammad ibn Abdul al-Aziz, and in 1964 the intermediary between King Saud and 
the family was the Mufti Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim. This was an old practice 
established from the first Saudi state by which the ulama had exercised an important 
role on the process of legitimating the transmission of powers. The fatwa issued on 
March 1964 acknowledged that differences between the princes existed and that they 
had attempted to overcome them. However, taking into consideration that civil strife 
and chaos threatened to emerge as a result of the differences endangering the country, 
the ulama decided that King Saud could continue as the King in ceremonial terms, but 
Prince Faysal would carry all responsibilities for internal and external affairs. The fatwa 
ended with an exhortation to God to grant success to the legal guardians of the nation — 
a reference to Prince Faysal who had become the legal guardian of the BCingdom.'"'' 
The ulama, who endorsed this fatwa, were twelve. Four of them were from the 
Al al-Sheikh family: the Mufti, Abdul al-Latif ibn Ibrahim director of the Bureau of 
Institutes and Colleges; Abd al Malik ibn Ibrahim, Head of the Public Morality 
Committee; Umar ibn Hassan, head of the Public Morality Committee in Najd, Eastern 
and Northern frontiers area; and Abdul al Latif ibn Ibrahim, Director of the Bureau of 
Institutes and Colleges. The others were distinguished qudat from Mecca, Medina 
(Mohammed ibn Ali al Harakan who later became the first Minister of Justice) and 
i03 See the programme of reforms in Vassiliev, A. Op. Cit. pp. 364-365. 
See Middle East Journal, (1964) 18 (5). pp. 352-353. 
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Riyadh. Ibn Baz also signed this fatwa as vice-president of the University of Medina. 
Eventually in November, after pressure from members of the royal family, King Saud 
resigned and Prince Faysal became King. 
The ulama's involvement consisted of giving Faysal the oath of allegiance and 
pronouncing their fatwa in his favour. In this particular situation, they were only 
sanctioners of a decision already reached inside the royal family. At the same time, their 
stance in favour of King Faysal accorded with the previous practices of the ulama faced 
with a threat to the unity of the umma. 
After this family crisis, the steps introduced by Faysal were designed to reduce 
the possibility of another crisis. He appointed Prince Khaled as a Crown Prince, after 
Prince Muhammad (next in kin) renounced the post. He appointed Prince Fahd as the 
second vice-president of the Council. Later King Khaled designated Prince Fahd as his 
successor and first vice-president of the council and Prince Abdullah as a second vice-
president. As it is appreciated nowadays, this formula has been repeated in the 
transference of powers after the death of Khaled and in the appointments of King Fahd. 
The organisation of authority was also reflected in the inclusion in government 
administration of areas that traditionally had been the prerogative of the religious 
sphere. For some scholars this institutionalisation produced a differentiation between 
religion and politics, contributing to the bureaucratisation of the ulama (Al Yassini, 
Ayman, 1985: 79), and the evaporation of the ulama's political power (Bligh, 1981: 49). 
The creation of the Ministry of Justice, the Board of Senior Ulama, and the reforms of 
the Committee of Public Morality are regarded as causes of the decline of ulama 
autonomy vis-a-vis the government, and the reduction of their power. 
Abdul Aziz al-Thatri, Abdullah ibn Humayd (former chied Qadi, Court of Appeals, Mecca), Abdul-
Aziz ibn Salih (Chief Qadi, Medina), Sulayman ibn Ubayd (former Head of the Sharia Court in the 
Eastern province), Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid (Chief Qadi, Sharia Court of Appeals, Riyadh), and Abdul 
Rahman ibn Faris (Deputy Chief Qadi, Riyadh). Ibid. p. 353. 
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The above-mentioned analysis is derived from the idea that prior to the 
institutionalisation, all the main functions identified with the ulama were under the 
control of the ulama through the office of the Mufti , especially those related to judicial 
matters. The creation of the Ministry of Justice, in 1971, by Royal Decree, removed the 
prerogatives concentrated in the Mufti's office. Although formally the Minister is 
responsible to the King, neither this new authority nor the creation of non-shari'a 
regulations, damaged the autonomy of the judicial system. Regulations issued between 
1962 and 1975 were aimed at supporting the autonomy of the judicial domain. 
According to Vogel, they are formal guarantees of judicial independence: firstly the 
interference of a minister in a shari'a court matters is regarded as a crime, and secondly 
it is aimed at preventing interference by the provincial governors. The Board of 
Grievances is prohibited from hearing any matter that has to be handed to Shari'a 
Courts and according to the judiciary regulations of 1975, the Supreme Judicial Council 
has the task of monitoring the behaviour of the qudat and deciding their fate. (Vogel, 
1993: 776-770). 
Another misconception about the judicial system is related to the existence of 
specialist courts which do not base themselves on regulations themselves on the shari'a 
(Layish, 1984:33). The fields that are outside the ulama's competence are in fact few, 
and deal with matters such as commercial disputes and government administration. 
Also, it should be borne in mind that even these regulations are supervised by the 
religious authorities since the King can not enforce them without the final approval of 
the ulama — i f not formally, at least informally (Vogel, 1993: 568). 
The Board of Senior Ulama (Hay'at Kibar al-Ulama) was established in 1971 
by Royal Decree. Its role is to give opinions on all matters referred to it by the King, on 
the basis of the shari'a, and to give religious guidance to wall al amr (authority) in the 
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creation of rules. According to the Royal Decree 23742, the Council is presided over 
by a Secretary General who is supervised by the Council of Ministers. The second 
person of authority within the Council's hierarchy is the President of the meetings, a 
position that is rotated among the five eldest members of the Council. It meets once 
every six months or at other times of emergency. Each member received five thousand 
riyals for each session attended. 
The Board of Senior Ulama is supported by the Institute for the Issue of 
Religious Opinions and the Supervision of Religious Affairs (Dar al Ifta wa al -Ishraf 
ala al-Shuun al Diniya). Membership of this institution is also appointed by Royal 
Decree and some of its members (if not most of them) also belong to the Board. In 
general, both organisations deal with the issuing offatawa, both related to Islamic rites 
and to sensitive and public political and religious issues. The president of this Institute 
is generally the General Secretary of the Council of Ulama, having the prerogative to 
designate the members of the Permanent Council of the Ulama, according to article 9. 
This will be discussed in the following chapters. 
The presidency of the Committee for Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil 
was set up in 1976, with Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al al-Sheikh 
as its General Director. Faysal had promised in his ten-point programme that the 
Committee would be reformed. Lackner points out that this reform was expected to 
restrict the Committee's actions (Lackner, 1978: 66). This did not happen in the 1960s, 
'"^  According to Royal Decree 23742, one important aspect contained in this decree is that membership is 
not restricted only to the Saudi highest specialists on Shari'a. Membership can be granted to a non- Saudi 
religious scholar. At this time 17 ulama were appointed: Sheikh Abd al Aziz ibn Baz, Sheikh Abdallah 
bin Humaid, Sheikh Muhammad Al Amin al Shanqati, Sheikh Sulaiman bin Abid, Sheikh Abdullah Halt, 
Sheikh Saleh al Luhaydan, Sheikh Abd al Raziq, Sheikh Saleh bin Gazun, Sheikh Muhthar Aqil, Sheikh 
Muhammad al-Harakan, Sheikh Abdul al Aziz bin Saleh, Sheikh Muhammad al Jubair, Sheikh Abdallah 
bin Gadian, Sheikh Abdullah bin Manea, Sheikh Rashed bin Hanin, Sheikh Abd al Majid bin Hassan and 
Sheikh Ibrahim ibn Muhammad ibn Ibrahim. In 1976 two members were added Sheikh bin Qaud and 
Sheikh Muhammad al Uthaimin by Royal Ordinance. See Al-Sanidi, Abdullah (1995). Marahil tataur 
tanzimu al-'idara al-hukumiyya fi al-mamlaka al-Arbiyya al-Saudiyya wa lamahat min 'injazatiha 
[Stages of the Progress of the Organisation of Government Administration in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and its Achievements]. Riyadh, p. 239. 
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a period characterised by the activities of some opposition groups.'"^ As a result, the 
mutawa'a did not reduce its activities in this period since Faysal's strategy was to 
maintain social and religious values enforced by them. The reformation of the 
committee activities occurred inl979."'^ 
During King Faysal's period, then, the administration and infrastructure of the 
state were shaped and systematised. The administration, as has been mentioned above, 
underwent transformations associated with the formalisation of practices into 
institutions and the creation of new institutions in order to cope with the growing needs 
and requirements of the country. The role of the Council of Ministers was consolidated 
as the main agency for managing the public affairs, as an advisory body to the King and 
as an institution whose aim was to implement all the policies derived from it (Huyette, 
1980: 77). Although the Minister of Education was the ulama's, formal representative on 
the Council, the role and importance of the ulama did not in fact decrease during this 
period. 
The fundamental role of the ulama, particularly in the consolidation of the Saudi 
state, was based on cooperation, since they played an important part in keeping society 
together in times of internal and external crisis, for example during the succession crisis 
and when threats arose from radical movements during the 1960s. The formalisation of 
the structures of authority reflected both past and new practices in order to cope with the 
requirements of modern times. The incorporation of the ulama into the government 
apparatus did not by any means, signify their loss of role and power. 
Especially in 1969, there were several coup d'etat attempts. See Lackner, Helen. Op. Cit. 
'"^  "According to the Royal Decree 37/m 1979 and Council of Ministers resolution 171 are: "to protect 
Islamic duties, rites and guidance of people and enforcing the religious duties that are laid down in the 
shah'a and to encourage the performance of those duties, to prohibit evil by preventing banned traditions 
and unaccepted innovations, to apprehend those who are practice or are accused of practising these 
traditions or innovations or are lax in performing the duty of shari'a; to question such persons in the 
presence of a representative of the governor of the region in the case of important issues". Sani, Op.Cit. p. 
239. 
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Chapter Four 
Creating and Recreating the Norms 
A main component in the ongoing process of legitimacy is its maintenance. The 
creation and recreation of the norms contribute to maintaining the legitimacy of the 
political system. Conformity to the norms (legal, social and religious) entails the 
continuous practice of those norms by the agents whose acts produce and reproduce 
them. The practice of the norms by the agents underlies the social character of the 
legitimacy, while the importance of the practices maintains the legitimacy of a political 
system. In the case of Saudi Arabia, religion has played and still plays an important role 
in providing a framework for those norms and values. Far from being rigid these norms, 
with the passing of time and facing the challenges emanating both from outside and 
inside, have been able through their practice to adapt to the challenges. 
Crucial for the understanding of how legitimacy is maintained is the role played 
by the shari'a and by its interpreters: the ulama and the government. In spite of the 
emergence of government regulations and committees to develop these regulations, the 
shari'a has not lost its predominance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
In this way, it is possible to conceive the shari 'a as a metanorm by the term used 
by Salvatore. According to the latter, the shari'a is a metanorm, in the sense that it is 
the norm that regulates other norms, keeping its discourse homogenous and sustaining 
its symbolism (Salvatore, 1998b: 296). The shari'a has undergone periods of 
redefinition and transformation in every Islamic society, as Salvatore's analysis of 
Egyptian society shows. He acknowledges that the appearance of national legal 
tribunals, far from diminishing the importance of the shari'a, strengthens it by setting 
the tribunals within the context of the shari'a. Or, as Carre has contended in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, in spite of the duality of the legal system and despite the fact that for 
every norm there is another way, the shari'a is always the point of reference (Carre, 
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1982: 244). But this has to be accompanied as well by the appearance of a public space, 
where different actors can also contribute towards the establishment of the pubHc 
character of Islam, by conforming their vocabulary to the metonym. This denotes the 
activity of social agents, creating and recreating the normativity of the shari'a. The 
normative character of the shari'a, stressed by Salvatore, is to a great extent due to the 
character/modality of the shari'a to be able to categorise what is right and what is 
wrong (Ibid. 297). This abiUty underscores the role of the ulama in contributing to the 
maintenance of the role of the shari'a over other sources of regulations. 
The interpretation of the values and norms derived from the shari'a makes the 
role of the ulama particularly important. After all, they are the social agents who, on the 
one hand, state the public virtues of the believer and the citizen (Salvatore, 1998a: 89-
119), and on the other, who categorise those who are conforming to these values and 
norms and those who do not. As Asad contends, what the ulama are doing is to attempt 
to reorder knowledge that governs the "correct" form of Islamic practices (Asad, 1993: 
210). He adds that in order for the ulama to exercise authority in a time of constant 
change, their discourse, and therefore its interpretation, has to be anchored in a 
dominant narrative of the present anchored in a positive evaluation of the past (Ibid.). 
The government as portrayed in the works of Ibn Taymiyya is the enforcer of 
religion and the guardian of the Muslim community. Therefore the government 
becomes accountable in terms of its commitment to religion. Government acts come to 
be determined by reference to the shari'a and to past practices. The transformation of 
authority in Saudi Arabia, especially in the political arena has to a great extent been 
managed so as to keep the system anchored to its religious commitment. 
The object of this chapter is to analyse how in a period of constant 
transformation, and facing challenges from outside, the Saudi political system has 
managed to keep its legitimacy and to retain the two types of authority: the government 
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and the official ulama. The aspects of legitimacy that are the focus of this chapter are 
the legal system of Saudi Arabia (in order to understand what is the role of the shari'a), 
the ulama and the government as responsible for the formulation and implementation of 
policies validated by the shari'a. However, the legitimacy is not only based on a 
compliance with legal norms, but also on the maintenance of the agreement between 
society and government on the norms and values that sustain their relationship. Here an 
analysis is presented of how society and the role of its members are defined by the 
ulama, and how the resulting conceptions are enforced by the government; especially as 
regards family and women's issues. These sections are followed by a study on how the 
ulama participate in the formulation and practice of government regulations dealing 
with the public domain, stressing the conflict and cooperation in this domain. 
Furthermore, the question of the definition of Saudi Arabia as the leader and/or 
guardian of the international Muslim community is examined. This role necessitates a 
foreign policy anchored on Muslim beliefs, thus reinforcing the government's own 
legitimacy internally at the same time. 
4.1. The Articulation of Legality in the Legal system 
The configuration of the legal system of Saudi Arabia has been the result, to a 
great extent, of the relationship between the ulama and the government and of the 
increasing challenges that the Saudi Arabian Kingdom has faced. The development of 
this legal system will be elucidated stating how the ulama and the government have 
shared a quota of control, some times based on co-operation and at other times on 
conflict with one another. The main objective of this section is to analyse at a structural 
level the articulation of legality, examining the areas where the ulama have the upper 
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hand and the areas under the control of the governmental institutions, and how both 
interact in the production and reproduction of the legitimacy. 
The application of justice in Islam is divided into two spheres: issues dealing 
with the court and issues dealing with ifta' (giving a religious opinion). According to 
Vogel, the first domain represents the administration of justice by a court, where the 
compliancy to the resolution of the cases is very important. This sphere involves issues 
of adversial cases, rules of evidence, binding judgements and state enforcement of the 
resolutions adopted by the court. In contrast ifta' and the religious opinions given by the 
Mufti dealt mainly with issues of religious rituals, and those opinions are non-binding 
judgements, since their implementation is left to the individual's commitment to God 
principles (Vogel, 1993: 218). 
In general terms, it is possible to state that the ulama still have a considerable 
role to play, since the shari'a courts are the prevalent institution for applying the law in 
the Kingdom, even in cases that may be considered outside their jurisdiction. The 
government is allowed to produce new regulations concerning affairs related to 
commerce, labour and other "secular" areas, but is not completely independent, since 
the ulama participate, in informal and formal terms, in order to ensure the fulfilment of 
the shari'a, and their role in the legal system. 
The development of the Saudi legal system can be traced through three periods. 
The first period began in 1926, after the conquest of the Hijaz with the proclamation of 
"the fundamental instructions" enacted to govern the newly annexed province of the 
Hijaz. Later, with the socio-economic and political challenges emanating from the oil 
revenues, the legal system underwent change from the 1950s to the 1970s. Lastly, with 
the creation of a Saudi basic law in 1992, further changes to the legal system were 
introduced. 
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A. First phase 1920-1950 
The bases of today's judicial system are to be found in the system employed in 
the Hijaz in the late 1920s, within the framework of "The Basic Instructions of the 
Hijaz" in 1926. The establishment of a Consultative Council formally introduced the 
idea of an institution in charge of studying the laws proposed by the King, and in the 
case where a proposal of law was created by the Council it had to be submitted for the 
approval of the King. Later the legal system of the Hijaz would serve as model for the 
unification of the legal system in the Kingdom. 
The legal system under the Instructions established three types of trial courts, 
modelled more on the Ottoman courts than on the ones existing under the Hashemites, 
and followed mainly the Hanbali School.These courts were the Expeditious Courts 
(also known as Summary Courts), the Grand Shari'a Court and the Commission of the 
Judiciary. The Expeditious courts were themselves composed of three different types. 
The first dealt mainly with criminal cases and some civil cases. The second level was 
the one that dealt with bedouin affairs and also disputes raised with urban dwellers, and 
finally a third court dealt with cases that fell outside the jurisdiction of the first two 
courts. The cases presented in these courts were put before a qadi. In the towns and 
cities of the other provinces in the Kingdom, it was the third type of court which was 
present (Al-Rasheed, 1973: 53). In the Grand Shari'a Court, the cases heard were 
mainly civil and involved severe cases of crime. This court was composed of three 
qadis. 
The highest judicial authority was the Presidency of the Judiciary. At the 
beginning with the promulgation of law, a commission attached to this office had the 
faculty to review the cases of appellation, as well as having the power to give legal 
The substantive law has been Hanbah since 1928, but in cases that can cause hardship or 
contravention, it is possible to refer to the other schools. Al-Rasheed, Muhammad S. (1973). Criminal 
Procedure in Saudi Judicial Institutions. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Durham), p. 28. 
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opinions on matters not included in the jurisdiction of shari'a courts (Solaiman, 1975: 
94). But after 1931, another institution was created, the Committee of Revision, 
composed of five members. The president of the committee was the major qadi of the 
province and an intermediary between the King and this institution (Nallino, 1939: 37). 
However, the President of the Judiciary became after this committee the authority to 
hear appellation cases, but in those cases that involved the major penalties the veredict 
required confirmation by the King. However King's intervention was more in 
theoretical terms than in practice. The King always had to avoid interfering, leaving the 
cases to the ulama or referring correspondent authorities; only in cases where there was 
a clear miscarriage of justice procedure would he intervene (Vogel, 1993: 760-761). 
At the same time, other types of courts were established to deal with commercial 
affairs, since the Hijaz economy was mainly based on trading activities. A Council of 
Commerce located in Jeddah was created in 1927. It was originally composed of one 
president, six members, all with experience in the commercial affairs, and one qadi. The 
members of this tribunal were appointed by the King. In 1931 a commercial code 
composed of 630 articles was promulgated, following the lines of the Ottoman 
commercial codes (Al-Hamad, 1973: 164). 
By contrast in the other provinces, especially in Najd, the judicial system was 
relatively simple; the cases were heard by a qadi, who was nominated by the King from 
among the senior ulama in each town and city. The qudat were appointed according to 
their credentials as learned men and did not receive money for carrying out 
justice.'"^This system of law was still competing with the customary law, especially in 
the non-urban areas (Gouldrup, 1971: 276). 
See third chapter. 
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B. Second phase 1950-1970 
The next phase was marked by the unification of the judicial system formulated 
by King Saud in 1952, although this was not implemented until 1960.'"The unification 
brought the judicial system under the control of the Presidency of the Judiciary (at the 
head of this institution was the Chief Judge) based in Riyadh. The presidency enjoyed a 
great control over the legal system, as the most important functions were concentrated 
in this office. At the beginning, the presidency was occupied by Abdullah ibn Abdul al-
Latif al-Al Sheikh, who also had other roles including being the King's adviser for 
religious issues on such activities, as the appointment of ulama; he also was acting as 
Mufti and was acting before the unification of the legal system as the maximum source 
of appellation. During the sixties, Mohammed ibn Ibrahim ibn Abdul Latif became his 
successor as adviser, mufti, president of the high judicial authority and as the chief 
judge. According to the regulations introduced by King Saud, the office of chief 
judge carried complete control over all matters related to the shari'a courts and 
religious affairs, including the issues of hiring, suspension and dismissal of judges and 
other employees in this area. Under the Presidency of the Judiciary's jurisdiction were 
all the employees of religious organisations and the committees of public morality, 
imams and preachers (although they were dependent on the Directorate of Awqaf for 
their salaries), as well as all the teachers in the mosques. 
The Council of Ministers through its legal committee, and in general the mler 
(or head of state) or his representatives enjoyed the facility (still applicable today) to 
create new regulations, but this had to be done following the principle of the public 
interest (maslaha), and had to comply with the shari'a. However, even in these cases, 
the ulama participated in two ways. The formal way was through the Presidency of the 
''' "Regulations for Determining Responsibilities in the Sharia Court System" approved by Royal decree 
109 (1952-53). (Mecca: Government Press). Articles 82-85. 
^^^Ibid. article 3. 
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Judiciary, since in the formulation of a new regulation a representative of the judiciary 
had to be present, and the law also had to have the approval of the Presidency (Al-
Rasheed, 1973: 30). The informal way that remains up to the present time is the weekly 
meeting that ulama that is held between the senior ulama and the King, where issues 
like the elaboration of new regulations can be discussed. 
The high judicial authority discouraged the formulation of new judicial codes, 
perhaps motivated by the desire to keep control of all the aspects of the judiciary, but in 
issues related to areas not specified by the shari'a, they did occasionally permit the 
existence of semi-tribunals, council and committees to deal with such cases. What was 
behind their attitude, as was suggested in the previous chapter, was their "natural" 
reaction to keep their own fields for themselves and to rationalise the changes in the 
terms known to them. Al-Rasheed makes some remarks explaining the ulama's 
reaction. Firstly, the ulama considered that the creation of codes would contravene the 
shari'a, and also would prevent the judges from exercising ijtihad, since the codes 
would be a substitute for the Qur'an and shari'a. Secondly, the ulama were afraid of 
loosing control of the judicial system, since the creation of new codes would motivate 
an adoption of foreign legal systems to the detriment of shari'a. And thirdly, the idea 
was held by a number of ulama, that these new regulations could only be initiated by a 
mujtahid (a religious scholar who can develop an un-precedented legal reasoning), the 
number of whom is limited (Ibid. 32-33). 
At this stage of the development, great control over the shari'a court was 
exercised by the ulama in general, including those areas that were strictly religious but 
connected in formal and informal ways by the legal system. Even in the cases of 
commercial law, which will be examined in more detail later, they continue to have a 
role. 
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In 1954, the Board of Grievances (Diwan al Mazalim) was established in order 
to deal with all the complaints of citizens about governmental ministries and 
departments, disputes between the ministries, and the disputes of the contractors with 
the government. The creation of the Board represented the effort of the government to 
f i l l the gap between the shari'a and the necessities of a modern state (Wilson, 1991: 
126), following Islamic and Saudi traditions. In the beginning, the Board was attached 
to the Council of Ministers, but became independent by royal decree in 1955, although 
it still reports to the president of the Council of Ministers. 
The introduction of a new code of commerce in 1965 complemented the 
previous one. This new code focused on establishing the role of national corporations, 
their administration and legal rights, the rights and duties of the persons involved and 
their dealings with the government (Al-Hamad, 1973: 132). As a result a special 
Committee was set up to deal with disputes among the commercial corporations, 
covering also foreign companies established in the Kingdom, composed of shari'a-
trained judges or former judges (Al-Rasheed, 1973: 66). Although the shari'a is 
considered to set the criteria on the issue of contracts, it was the government that created 
regulations concerning the registration process of the companies (Al-Hamad, 1973: 170-
171). 
Next to these two institutions was the Committee for Securities in charge of 
hearing the cases of frauds in securities, cases violating the law of commercial agencies 
and the law of weights and measures. The appellations cases of this committee went 
directly to the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Another important set of bodies 
established in 1961 was the Committees of Commercial Fraud Control aimed at 
regulating all commercial goods. All these commercial committees came under the 
jurisdiction of the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Other new codes established 
around 1970s were the Social Security and Labour regulations. 
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The major re-organisation of the judicial system occurred amid the period of 
King Faysal under his reform programme, which included the creation of a Ministry of 
Justice."'' Basically the re-organisation resulted in the decentralisation of the main 
functions of the high judicial administration into separate structures. The office of mufti 
and his functions were transferred to the Grand Council of Ulama supported by the 
administration of the institution called Religious Research, Ifta, Propaganda and 
Guidance (created in 1953) and whose role is going to be analysed in the next section. 
The control over the employees of the mosques passed completely to the Minister of 
Pilgrimage and Awqaf, and the control over the religious police become an autonomous 
agency attached to the Minister of Interior. Meanwhile, the administrative power of the 
judicial system was located in the President of the Judiciary, who would became later 
the Minister of Justice. The Appellate Commission had ceased to exist in 1954, but 
recommenced activity under the judicial commission reorganised in 1971 under the 
name of the Supreme Judicial Council that was also in charge of the supervision of the 
legal system (Al-Rasheed, 1973: 64). 
Under this major reorganisation, the Supreme Judicial Council was given the 
task of the supervision, nomination and discipline of the judges, and it continued to 
remain as the authority to hear appellations cases related to maximum penalties and 
matters referred by the King, the Minister of Justice, as well as shari'a related matters. 
The other cases entered into the jurisdiction of Board of Reviews, an institution that is 
attached to the Council. The Supreme Judicial Council is composed of eleven members 
from which five are full time and are appointed by the King, the other six members are 
the President of the Council who is also appointed by the King, the President of the 
Board of Reviews, the Deputy Minister of Justice and three senior judges from the 
principal courts in the main cities (Vogel, 1993: 298). 
See third chapter. 
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The Board of Grievances was also restructured under the new regulations of 
1982; the board acquired new functions such as the execution of foreign judgements and 
the tribunals dealing with the employee disciplinary regulations."'* The Board has 
become, since the decade the 1980s, the most important judicial organ dealing with 
matters not related to shari'a, although it composed of shari'a training members, these 
are helped by experts on technical and legal issues. It refuses to try any case that would 
overlap the jurisdiction of shari'a courts.""'' Among all the committees and tribunals, 
the board has remained the most stable and has been able to broaden its jurisdiction to 
include all commercial issues, except those related to banks. The Grievances Board is 
crucially important for the implementation of new regulations and at the same time 
constitutes a link between the tribunals and committees and the shari'a courts (Vogel, 
1993: 562). 
In spite of the changes mentioned above, the shari'a courts have been the prime 
source for the application of law. Even in those cases where jurisdiction is not clear, the 
shari'a had gained prominence. If a dispute is presented to the Board of Grievances and 
to the shari'a court, the latter one will try the case. The notion behind the shari'a courts 
hearing cases that do not fall within their jurisdiction follows the principle that every 
case brought under the shari'a court has to be heard, although the case may not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the court (Al-Rasheed, 1973: 34). 
C. Third phase (1990's) 
During the last decade, internal and external events prompted the formulation of 
the Basic Regulations System and other major changes in the institutions mentioned 
above. The economic deficits that followed the fall in the price of oil increased social 
and political tensions between the state and society. These tensions become more acute 
Article 9 "The Regulations of the Grievance Board" in Contemporary Jurisprudence Research Journal 
10, (3): 80. 
article 9. 
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due to the external events related to the invasion of Kuwait and the so-called 'Desert 
Storm' operation (this will be the object of study in the following sections). 
In spite of the fact that the Basic Regulations are man made,"^ they emphasise 
adherence to the sources of Islamic law, which regulate daily life in the Kingdom. The 
principal novelty was the establishment of a Consultative Council in 1993. Among the 
functions attached to the latter was its participation in the formulation and suggestions 
of amendments to regulations, referred to the president of the Council and submitted to 
the King."^ 
On the issues related to the administration of justice, the law promulgated issues 
that were currently in operation as in article 46:"The judiciary is an independent 
authority. There is no control over judges in the dispensation of their judgements except 
in the case of the Islamic shari'a". 
The sensitive issue regarding the boundary of the tribunals and shari'a courts is 
reflected in article 48: 
"The courts will apply the rules of Islamic shari'a in the cases 
that are brought before them, in accordance with what is 
indicated in the Book and sunna, and statutes decreed by the 
ruler which do not contradict the Book and the sunna". 
As pointed out by Vogel, this article can satisfy the advocates in favour of the 
application of regulations in the court and those ulama whose opinion is that the above 
article makes reference to the ability of the judge to decide either to apply shari'a 
mlings or the King's regulations. Additionally this article can be regarded also as 
underlying the responsibility of the qadi to decide when a regulation is contradictory or 
not to the shari'a (Vogel, 1993: 589-590). 
It is important to point out that the in the committee in charge of the formulation of the basic law, two 
out of 11 members were religious scholars. Muhammad ibn Jubayair, at that time Minister of Justice and 
currently the president of the Majlis Shura (Consultative Council) and Rashed Khnain a prominent 
religious leader. Aba-Namay, Rashed (1993). "Constitutional Reform: A Systematization of Saudi 
Politics" Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies 16, (3). 53. 
Article 23 of the regulations of the Consultative Council B B C S W B ME/1319/A/4 (3 March 1992). 
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The role of the ulama through this general study of the evolution of the legal 
system has shown to be predominant, especially during the 1950s and 1960s when the 
main religious and judicial functions were located in the role of mufti. However the 
changes introduced by the government in terms of the creation of new institutions and 
regulations was done more or less with the approval of the ulama. Some times the 
government overlooked the opinion of the ulama on the implementation of laws (Ibid. 
568), but this related to laws dealing with worldly affairs and not with religious issues. 
The ulama still kept the monopoly over the interpretation and application of shari'a 
law, and furthermore the shari'a remained the base for the other tribunals or all of 
which contained the experts in shari'a. Also in the practice of trials the jurisdiction of 
shari'a court remains the prevalent form at the present. "It is a matter of time before the 
new areas are going to be assimilated under the dominion of specialised shari'a courts", 
according to interviewee E. 
Some have argued that what was happening was that the ulama were being 
passed over by the formulation of new government regulations. But in fact the ulama 
were consulted and expressed their opinion in the formulation of government 
regulations and their implementation. Moreover, these regulations were not in 
contradiction with the shari 'a, and their jurisdiction was rather limited in contrast with 
the application of the shari 'a. This demonstrates, then, how important the religion factor 
was and how significant the role of the ulama has remained for the articulation of 
legality. 
Nowadays the challenges to the legal system, according to interviewee E, are 
two. Firstly, the challenge emanating from the integration of the Saudi judicial system 
(based on the Islamic framework) into the new international order, entails the need to 
prevent any conflict with Islam. The second is the problem arising from a select group 
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of individuals benefiting from the judicial system, which is in direct contravention to 
the egalitarian tents of Islam. 
4.2. The Roles of the Ulama and the Government in 
Society 
The earlier sections have explained the importance of shari'a for the legal 
system, along with the role of the ulama and the government in its application. The 
construction of the structure of the legal framework is also the result of the practices and 
beliefs that have been held by Saudi society. Therefore this section's main objective is 
to analyse the role of ulama as the main agents that create and recreate the norms of 
Saudi society, as well as the role of the government in recreating and enforcing those 
norms. This analysis is accompanied, firstly, by a number of considerations on the 
nature and the development of the practice of issuing religious opinions (ifta) 
institutionalised by the state, in order to understand the repercussions on the dynamics 
of Saudi society. Then a study of how society recreates and maintains its beliefs and 
social practices through the analysis of a number of fatawa is presented, focusing on 
how they recreate the roles of each member of the society. 
The main activity associated with the role of the ulama is ifta. However, as the 
state started to formalise the role of the ulama, ifta also became institutionalised. 
Through this institution the official ulama issued fatawa, either in the form of 
regulations and answers to the challenges faced in daily life or as opinions dealing with 
some governmental policies and collective social issues. The fatawa are not binding 
since their compliance depends on the commitment of individuals to the religious tenets. 
The opinion expressed by the mufti is directed toward a questioner {mustafti) whether in 
connection with litigation or not. This is in contrast to the resolutions of the court 
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including adversarial cases, where rules of evidence are enforced by state authorities on 
religious grounds (Masud, Messik and Powers, 1996: 3). 
As has been mentioned in the first chapter, from the time of Muhammad's death, 
his companions were deemed responsible for expressing opinions on the correct 
practices of the Islamic religion and on problems arising from daily life. Later, in the 
time of the Umayyads, this activity become formalised and associated with the state. 
However, the expression of religious opinions was circumscribed not only to those 
persons chosen by the authorities, but also to private individuals. Ibn Khaldun decribes 
ifta as the second function after prayer. He also recognises the difference between 
muftis chosen by the authorities, holding positions in the main mosques and those in 
mosques of lesser importance or who advise people from their houses (Khadduri and 
Liebesny, 1955: 250). The historical importance of the muftis lies in their contribution 
for the development of fiqh through their fatawa (MacDonald, 1937: 1047-1048). 
In spite of the formal role given to ulama nowadays, the appropriateness of 
ulama issuing afatwa depends on the public's appreciation of the individual. In the case 
of Ibn Baz, he was appreciated as a true Muslim by the majority of the population,"^ in 
addition to his role as the Mufti of Saudi Arabia. In the same way a person who is 
known for his knowledge and devotion towards Islam can give advice on private 
grounds. People seek advice from others knowledgeable in religion. Also from the 
opinions given to the researcher, people tended to hold in high esteem those ulama who 
follow a modest way of life and who are independent in their opinions from any source 
of de facto power. 
Nowadays in order to be qualified to issue afatwa, the scholar has to graduate 
from University and afterwards to attend a da'wa centre (learning how to call people to 
Islam) to practice for a period. After this period of practice the Ministry of Religion will 
This expression of 'true Muslim' denotes legitimacy (in the consideration of the persons interviewed) 
given to Ibn Baz. The author gathered impressions from different persons, not only from religious 
scholars, but common people, especially after Ibn Baz's death in May 1999. 
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issue a permit certifying that he can issue afatwa. Although, an alim can still give his 
opinion in private, only those ulama who have the government permission can publish 
their fatawa. The introduction of formal education and the creation of the instances of 
practice constitute a difference from previous practices, where religious knowledge was 
transmitted by the traditional religious circle (halq). 
The creation of structures of administration in Saudi Arabia has incorporated 
past practices regarding the appointment and positions of ulama. Saudi ulama have not 
been the exception to the historical development of ulama in general as, already 
examined in the first chapter. From the beginning the majority of ulama were dependent 
on the state. During the two historical states, the majority of the important posts were 
occupied by members of the Al al-Sheikh family. Simultaneously, the Al al-Sheikh high 
ranking ulama were the mentors of the ulama through the traditional religious studies, 
and also selected the candidates for the different posts. In spite of the introduction of 
formal education and the increasing number of students, the importance of the religious 
teachers as mentors continues to play a significant role."^ 
The issuing of religious opinions or Ifta also has been associated with the de 
facto power during the Wahhabi movement until the organisation of state structure 
under King Faysal was established. A specific office to carry out this activity was 
formally set up in 1971, under the direction of the Mufti and also as part of other 
functions, namely the research department and the spread of Islam call. The twenty-one 
members of the Board of Senior Ulama, including the Mufti , are employees of the state, 
since they receive their salaries according to the categories of any public servant. In the 
1980s the Ifta department acquired a strong presence at the regional level, opening 
subsidiary offices at this level. People can write or telephone these offices in order to 
As an example, from the current composition of the ulama, Ibn Baz apart from having his own 
religious qualification, he had been an student of the previous Mufti Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Abdul 
Latif Al-al Sheikh. 
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ask for an advice. The King or any other authority can request the ulama's opinion on 
particular issues. 
Ifta is an important source for the definition of norms, and especially i f it is 
supported by the state it becomes the main source. By stating not only how to perform 
the religious rituals and duties in daily life, but also by stating, in terms of Salvatore, the 
virtues of a good Muslim and good citizen (Salvatore, 1998a: 87-119), the ulama's role 
then is paramount to the legitimacy of the government. The government depends on the 
ulama to elaborate and reinforce public policies, such as women driving, issues related 
to zakat, and banking as is going to be examined later. 
Regarding the ulama's role in creating and recreating the norms and social 
practices attention is given to some of the fatawa from the Mufti Ibn Baz, as they 
became an important source of those norms and practices. Importance has to be given to 
how these fatawas are elaborated, since their content also represents a recreation of the 
fundamentals of religion and historical practices. The enforcement of these opinions by 
the government and the social practices is examined here in order to show how society 
conforms to the content of the religious opinions. 
In an address to students in Umm al Qura University, entitled "the Duty of 
Muslims toward their Religion and their World" (Ibn Baz, 1992: 5-13), the mufti 
portrayed a vision of the society according to the Qur'an and sunna, where the 
principles of the society and the roles performed by members of the family are spelled 
out. The core of this fatwa was to stress the importance of being knowledgeable about 
God and His religion, and exhorting or inviting each Muslim to practice Islam. The 
fatwa began by stating the obligation of carrying out the practices prescribed by God 
through his Prophet and by the Qur'an and sunna. These practices had to follow the 
basic tenets of Islam. The importance of tawhid, the fundamental tenet of the Wahhabi 
movement, was stressed in this fatwa. Devotion and submission to God had to be done 
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according to tawhid, stating the command of sincere devotion, and the importance of the 
worship of God alone. 
Ibn Baz emphasised the need of the individual to show his devotion to God by 
doing good deeds. The believer must abstain from the practices forbidden by God like 
"polytheism, adultery, theft, consumption of intoxicants, disobedience, ingratitude to 
parents, disconnection of family ties, and devouring the wealth of the orphans and 
others" (Ibid. 1992: 8). 
A good society, then is described in terms of the roles assigned to each member 
believing and practising Islam. The symbolism used here in order to denote the 
commanding and enforcement of religion is the figure of a guardian, preserving the 
religious precepts. The ruler is a guardian of his subjects, the man is a guardian of the 
family and the woman is a guardian in the house of her husband and she is responsible 
in her house. The means to carry on the practice of the religion is based on co-operation 
among Muslims, especially in acquiring knowledge on Islam. For that reason, it is 
important for all Muslim to concentrate on the study of the Qur'an and tafseer (for all 
Muslims and especially for students, boys and girls). They must listen to preaching and 
public lectures; those who do not do so are considered unbelievers. 
The sense of duty in each Muslim and member of the Islamic Saudi society is 
stressed by Ibn Baz: everyone in society must try to teach each other in a good way, in 
order to prevent them from doing any wrong. In particular, he makes reference to the 
important role of the "caller", who does so "with wisdom and with good preaching 
arguing with them in the ways that are best and most gracious" (Ibn Baz, 1992: 11),'^° 
by accepting the truth and putting it into effect. The parents are responsible for raising a 
family with a knowledge of God, since bringing up a good family is a prerequisite for a 
good society. 
See also Ibn Baz, Abdul Aziz (1982). "Prerequisites of Muslim Preachers" in Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Conference of World Assembly of Muslim Youth on 'Islamic Dawa'. (Nairobi, Kenya, April 
1982), pp. 97-113, 
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"The young must be ordered to perform the prescribed prayer at seven 
years of age, and at ten they must observe the rites of Islam. They must be 
warned against the things that are forbidden, such as neglecting the duty of 
prayer, the consumption of intoxicants and drugs, smoking, shaving beards, 
wearing long dresses, listening to singing..." (Ibid. 13). 
In another fatwa about the duty of the Muslim youth (Ibn Baz, 1989a: 5-9) Ibn 
Baz stresses tawhid by stating that any individual who worships any other God but 
Allah is a blasphemer and unbeliever. The same applies to those who do not perform the 
five pillars of Islam, or when they practice homosexuality, the consumption of alcohol 
or being disobedient to their parents. The advice given in this fatwa is accompanied by 
expressing the necessity to learn religion, and stressing that the most important thing 
after the profession of faith is the performance of the five daily prayers (Ibid. 9). 
These/atowa are very illustrative about the world portrayed by the Mufti and the 
official ulama. There is a strong sense that community mobilisation is needed for the 
learning of Islam and the practice of its teachings in daily life, supported by the roles 
associated with each individual, whether they be rulers, parents or children. This 
approach was also emphasised by interviewee C, who said that the main duties of the 
family centre around religion, keeping the truth faith, learning religion and holding 
good values and customs (which includes the segregation of men and women and 
obedience to one's parents). 
From the world portrayed by the mufti in his fatawa, the way that society 
recreates that vision is important to consider, since this indicates on one hand, the 
acceptance of the ulama's authority and, on the other, how society and government 
conform to religious and traditional principles. One of the main principles stressed in 
those fatawa, the importance of acquiring religious knowledge, is carried out in two 
ways: the formal educational system and the traditional or informal system. The 
informal studies such as the circles Qialaq) of study in the mosque, are very important 
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121 for children and for adults. The children are encouraged to memorise the Qur'an 
through the existence of national competitions sponsored by the government. Women 
also have their informal studies through gatherings with the so-called sheikhas. '^ ^ 
The state, together with the ulama, has enforced the learning of Islam, but not 
always in cooperation, as the time spent on religious subjects at school has been 
decreasing. Towards the end of Abdul Aziz's reign twenty-two hours out of twenty-
eight per week at primary level were spent on religious subjects. By the early 1980s to 
the present the amount of time spent on religious subjects has changed substantially. At 
the elementary stage (for children between six and twelve years old), twelve hours per 
week out of a total of thirty-two hours were dedicated to religious subjects like Qur'an, 
Qur'anic intonation. Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic traditions. At the intermediate 
level eight hours out of thirty-six weekly hours were spent on religious education. The 
secondary school programme covered thirty-six weekly hours, where 4 hours were 
spent on religious studies, and finally at the university level the students spent 3 
sessions per week on religious studies (Al-Zaid, 1981: 75-81). The absolute number of 
both women and men studying religion has increased in recent years. In 1980, the 
number of students enrolled in religious studies was 5264, by 1990-1991 the number 
had increased to 13,928 and had increased still further to 22,184 students by the year 
1994-95. However, in comparison to the total number of students enrolled each year, 
the percentage intake of students pursuing religious studies has decreased from 15.32% 
in 1980, to 11.70% in 1990-1991 and to 11.16% in 1994-1995.'^^ The importance of 
Islam, as was stressed by some academics blurred the line between those studies which 
deal with religious subjects and the ones which are considered as "secular". The 
While conducting one of the interviews with a rehgious scholar, the researcher noticed the importance 
of the number of followers (formal and informal students). She was told that this scholar has 
approximately around "seven hundred students" attending his formal and informal study groups. 
''^ 'Sheikhas' is the name given to the women who are known for their knowledge in religion and their 
activity in teaching. 
'"^  Ministry of Higher Education. Statistics for Higher Education. Riyadh. (Several volumes). 
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attainment of knowledge is regarded as an important religious duty, as related to the 
benefits that an educated person could bring to the community, according to 
interviewees a and b. 
The television and radio also play an important role in the religious education of 
society. In the case of national television, programmes are shown about the life of the 
Prophet. The ulama take part in question and answer programmes where the public can 
telephone and ask for advice. Recitations of the Qur'an mark the opening and closure of 
broadcasts. In general, the media policy followed by the State is set within the frame of 
religion, historical and cultural values of the Kingdom, aimed to enforce the obedience 
according to the religious precepts to God and the Ruler. This policy has as an objective 
the protection of religion, traditions and enhancing the Islamic values according to the 
principles established by royal decree.'^ '* 
Nowadays with the influence of satellite, television, the internet and mobile 
phones, new sources of discourse are reaching Saudi society, especially the young 
generation. Interviewees H and O considered that the younger generation were not as 
interested in religion as earlier generations. ' Problems have arisen as a result of 
competition between the "traditional" and local sources of discourses and the new ones. 
During the Faysal period, there was a demonstration by some ulama and conservative 
people against the use of television broadcasting. After negotiations, the ulama accepted 
the use of television as a method for spreading Islamic beliefs. 
The issue of the use of satellite dishes caused a "conflict" between government 
and ulama. During the Gulf War satellites were introduced but it was not until 1994 that 
the ulama opposed their use. ''^ ^ The government banned them in March and again in 
'''' See Article X I X (1991). "Silent Kingdom: Freedom of Expression in Saudi Arabia". (London, 
International Centre Against Censorship, Article X I X ) . pp. 9-12. 
'^ "^  For an analysis of younger generation attitudes to modernisation see: Yamani, Mai (2000). Changed 
Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia. (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs), pp. 15-22. 
Arab Press Service (25 June 1994); Arab Press Service (2 July 1994). 
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July. The Ministry of Interior announced that only programmes from the satellite 
channels that were in agreement with religious and social values could be broadcast.'^ ^ 
However it was not rare to see how people have contravened those regulations and have 
installed satellites dishes. 
The researcher observed that some teenagers, mainly from the middle class and 
upper middle class, appear torn between exposure to the West and the local notions of 
identity. The adoption of western fashion and music was clearly very popular among the 
younger generation. On the other hand, their curiosity about the West was not 
synonymous with a lack of religion, since some of them were very religious. Although 
the opinion of the researcher can not be generalised, it is important to be aware that not 
all young people in Saudi Arabia are exposed to modern technology, satellite and 
Internet. Regarding the latter, in 1998 unofficial estimates suggested that in Saudi 
Arabia there were around 30,000 users and it was expected by 1999 that the figure 
would increase by 100, 000 users with the introduction of local companies providing 
internet services. 
The ulama are trapped in the middle of different types of discourses. Their way 
of life stands in contrast to other styles and ways of life, with the increasing use of 
modern technology. Some of the ulama refuse to use these modem means to gain more 
influence, and thereby lose ground vis-a-vis "alien ideas". Of the religious scholars 
interviewed, E, I , J, N and R agreed on the importance of adapting to new technology. E 
stressed the permanency of the tenets of Islam and the openness of the ulama to 
adapting to modernisation. According to I : "we (Saudis) should have anything that it is 
useful from the Western world and there is a saying from the Prophet: wisdom is the 
target, if there is wisdom and good you can take it from anywhere. Our religion teaches 
us to take anything good from any culture, we must not refuse ". N states that the ulama 
Council of Ministers Decree No. 169, Saudi Gazette, (13 August 1983). p. 3 
Al -Sharq al-Awsat (3 October 1998), FBIS-NES-302. 
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were not opposed to the use of satellite television, but they were concerned about the 
content of the programmes and their effects on Saudi society. According to a, Islam 
provides the means to avoid the negative side effects on the society importing 
technology. Furthermore N and R pointed out the benefit of the use of modern 
technology for the spread of Islam, by allowing a message to reach a broader audience, 
while b stressed that the technology in fact enhanced the status of Saudi Arabia as a 
religious country. 
As has been demonstrated, the role of the ulama is paramount in influencing the 
creation and recreation of norms. The main institution associated to this role is Ifta, 
which has been part of the ruling structure since the beginning of the Wahhabi 
movement, becoming institutionalised during the period of Faysal. The government in 
tandem with the ulama, has institutionalised this practice, as it became indispensable to 
nurture the legitimacy of the regime. However, the scope of the fatawa is not only 
necessary for the regime, but also for society, in the creation and maintenance of an 
organised society along the lines of religion and tradition. In the following subsection 
the role of the ulama and society recreating the norms associated with women will be 
examined. 
4.2.1. Regulations for women 
One of the areas that has remained under the ulama and at the same time has 
been of governmental concern is that of the role of women in Saudi society. As in any 
patriarchal society, the behaviour of women is closely linked to the notion of family 
honour. In the case of Saudi Arabia women are seen as indispensable so as to maintain 
the system of familialism, since they constitute the stable basis on which social relations 
are built on (Fandy, 1999: 49). In Saudi Arabia, the segregation of women and the 
enforcement of religious regulation are generally supported most of the time by the 
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state, since it helps to reinforce the legitimacy of the state. By enforcing religious 
regulations and protecting women, the monarchy honours its commitment to Islamic 
values, as well as acting in tandem with the patriarchal tribal family values that the 
monarchy represents. "Women, veiled and separated, provide a unifying symbol of 
Islamic piety. When co-opted by the monarchy, ideal Islamic women become a symbol 
of national identity"(Doumato, 1992: 45). 
The ulama have the upper hand in the formulation of regulations concerning 
women. The government, following Doumato's arguments, enforces the policies of 
segregation and a dress code and thereby reinforces its own legitimacy. The latter 
development reflects the fact that women's regulations represent a very important part 
in and for the production and reproduction of social and religious values. Because this is 
a "traditional" domain for the ulama, where they can exercise their authority with the 
consent of the government, and may be especially important at times when the 
government's own Islamic credentials are questioned. 
In a society where religious beliefs are very well engrained and patriarchal 
values invoked constantly, the women's field is used as a bargaining point between the 
government and the ulama. The government agree to the ulama's control and 
enforcement over women's regulations in exchange for having a free hand in other 
domains. For example, when "secular" education was introduced by the government, 
the ulama kept the supervision of women's education. However, in times of risk to the 
security of the Kingdom, the ulama and the government will act in tandem, especially 
on women's issues, since the role of women constitutes the main sources of continuity 
in the reproduction of those rules and values important to the stability of the Kingdom. 
Here an analysis on how the ulama and the government regulate women's role 
in Saudi society is presented. This analysis will focus during the 1980s, when the 
government was the target of criticism from Iran over its religious credentials. The 
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regulations enforced encompassed at that time the social and cultural practices of Saudi 
society, and ranged from the regulation of women's dress code to questions of proper 
behaviour, stressing the role of women as mother and wives. 
In a fatwa about the place of women in life, the Mufti ibn Baz emphasised the 
importance of the role of woman in creating a good society. Women, he said, are a 
pivotal part of the society, since it is from them that a society develops. They are 
considered as "the first teachers in the construction of a sound society".'^^ From the 
roles traditionally attached to women, as mother, wife, sister and daughter, Ibn Baz 
highlighted women's role as mother and wife. From the first it is pointed out that 
showing kindness to, and appreciation of, one's mother is well regarded by God. Indeed 
a mother is three times more appreciated than the man according to a saying of the 
Prophet. Woman as wives are the providers of calmness to the spirit, and men should 
show affection and compassion because they are the mothers of their c h i l d r e n . I b n 
Baz stressed his views using the figure of Khadija, the first wife of the Prophet, as an 
example, in so far as she a provided calm and guidance to the Prophet. In addition, he 
referred to an historical Saudi figure, the wife of Muhammad ibn Saud, whose role was 
influential in reaching the agreement between her husband and Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab to spread the call of Islam. 
This fatwa shows clearly how the primary roles for women are those of mother 
and wife. These two roles give women's space the constitution of a private domain due 
the nature of the task associated with their role. In the words of Soraya Altorki, 
women's inclusion in the sphere of public life is relegated to the question of honour 
where seclusion is the practice enforced in order to reinforce that virtue. The 
participation of women in public life is regarded by the Mufti as a cause for the 
Ibn ai-Tiar, Abdullah ibn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad (ed.) (1996). Majmu 'at al-fatawi li samaht al-sheikh 
Abdul Aziz, ibn Baz [Collection of Fatawi from his Eminence Sheikh Abd Al-Aziz ibn Baz]. Riyadh: Dar 
al Walani. p. 348 
™ Ibid. 389, 
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destruction of society. Men are considered to be the strong, the protector and the 
provider, while women are weak, unprotected and dependent (Altorki, 1987: 67). 
Therefore the inequality of female and male becomes socially constructed and 
embodied in the religious regulations and traditional practices. The code of honour (ird) 
is a very strong social value in Saudi society. The honour of the family depends on 
women, therefore avoiding exposure to men other than their own kin is paramount to 
their honour, as well as the observance of the dress code. 
The dress code involves the use of hijab (veil) and the use of the abaya (black 
cloak) to cover their figure.'"" Respect of this dress code is considerably emphasised in 
the fatawa given by the official ulama. For example there are some fatawa regarding the 
necessity of women covering their face in front of the family's chauffeur, and women 
are encouraged to keep the hijab even outside the Kingdom. In both cases the necessity 
for enforcing these practices is stressed (Al Musnad, 1996: 260-61), such that they must 
keep their face, the source of beauty and temptation, covered. 
Women's dress is regulated through a significant number of fatawa condemning 
the use certain cloths and high heels by Ibn Baz, Sheikh Uthaimin and Sheikh Ibn 
Jibrin. '^ ^ The use of high heels is generally disliked. The reasons given by Ibn Baz are 
that it makes the women to appear taller than she really is; secondly it can be dangerous 
in case she falls; and thirdly there are negative health consequences in their use, 
according to medical evidence. Sheikh Uthaimin dismisses the use of high heels on the 
grounds that it allows women to expose their beauty (Ibid. 375). 
The use of the veil in Saudi Arabia has become the symbol of religious and 
traditional norms. As is pointed out by al-Munajjed, the issue of the veil shows different 
attitudes. For most illiterate and uneducated women do not consider not wearing veil as 
haram (taboo) and ayb (shameful). For others the use of veil is a decision to keep their 
Not all women cover their face, but all the women wear hijab. There is a strong religious and social 
pressure to use both of them, but some women disagree with the use o\ niqab and they do not wear it. 
'^ ^ See al Musnad Op. Cit., pp. 275, 283-284, 374-375. 
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identity against the intrusion of Western influences. The veil in this sense works as a 
protection against men, keeping women outside their attention (Al Munajjed, 1997: 47-
57). 
The segregation of sexes is also a religious and social norm implemented in both 
public and private domains. In the private domain, a family will enforce the segregation 
of men and women following the religious norms. Men will have their gatherings with 
male guests in a specific room of the house, and women will gather in separated rooms. 
In some cases,women and men will have a different entrance to a house. Women veil 
themselves in front of male in-law relatives. There are, however, differences in attitude 
according to generation, and socio-economic status. 
The enforcement of policies of segregation between men and women is at the 
very core of Saudi traditional customs and is justified in religious terms. According to 
Ibn Baz it is obligatory to avoid the mixing of sexes, since it "leads to evil and lewdness 
and the destruction of societies" (Al-Musnad, 1996: 316). He contends that women have 
natural roles which God gave to their bodies and mind, that women should work in 
those places related to their nature as teachers and housewives, therefore there is no 
necessity for women to work in places with men (Ibid. 317). "The participation of 
women in public is supposed to challenge her nature, and is a crime against their 
morality, as work destroys their character" (Ibid. 375). These consequences are contrary 
to the family unity, therefore women are relegated to and maintained in the private 
space, otherwise it would lead to the destruction of society. 
In the public domain this segregation is enforced with the help of the 
government and the religious police. Starting with the educational system, women and 
men are separated. In public spaces such as restaurants women will be confined to 
family sections, if accompanied by a male relative, while men have their own space in 
Most of the family houses visited by the researcher observed these rules. The socio-economic level of 
most of them belonged to middle class and upper middle class, some of the members were professionals, 
with experience living abroad. 
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these places. Some libraries have a day for women, while some have special women's 
only sections, otherwise women have to request material through fax or telephone. The 
banks also have special branches for ladies. In the cases of hospitals, the dining and 
waiting areas also enforce the politics of segregation. 
During the early 1980s, the government enforced several policies with the aim 
of restricting the role of the women and reinforcing religious and traditional values. 
This was a response to the internal turmoil that surfaced with the take-over of the Great 
Mosque, the unrest in the Eastern Province and the challenges which stenmied from the 
Iranian revolution. The rapid socio-economic changes introduced during the decades of 
the 1960s and 1970s, as the result of the rise in oil revenues, altered the pace of the 
dynamics of Saudi Arabia. In the case of the take-over of the mosque, this showed the 
tensions that existed between one sector of society and the government. The 
fundamental issue raised by the group of rebels in Mecca concerned the legitimacy of 
the religious credentials of the ruling family and of the ulama. In general terms, the 
movement expressed their disagreement with the erosion of religious and traditional 
values. 
The challenge which stemmed from the Iranian revolution took the form of 
ideological counteiproposals, rhetorical attacks and diverse actions against the 
legitimacy of the governments of the Arab Gulf in general.'^ "* To face those challenges 
both the government and the ulama reinforced women's role, as being responsible for 
the upbringing children and the family. The target of the policies aimed to decrease the 
influences and repercussion of the events mentioned above. 
In the ideological clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran, women's issues became 
included. In 1981, articles started to appear in the local newspapers discussing the 
''''' The threat from the Iranian revolution is analysed in the last section of this chapter. 
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possibility of women working and driving cars.'^ ^ Ibn Baz's response to this issue was 
that allowing women to drive would be a cause of depravation, since women would 
have to drive unveiled, and being alone with strangers could cause numerous sins 
(Golderberg, 1982: 782). As a way to challenge the religious authority of the Saudi 
ulama, Khomeini counterattacked by issuing a fatwa in Iran stating the lack of religious 
evidence forbidding women to drive a car (Ibid.). According to a Saudi religious 
scholar, N , Islam does not forbid women to drive, but the ulama decided that the effects 
of such a practice on a society would be serious and used their discretionary power to 
forbid it. 
According to the. fatwa from Ibn Baz, women are also forbidden to travel alone 
with the chauffeur. This opinion is sustained on the grounds of two hadiths: "a man 
cannot be alone with a woman unless there is with her one of her male relatives", and "a 
man is never alone with a woman, Satan is the third". In the public domain the use of 
hijab and the verification of whether or not man accompanying the women is the 
mahram (custodian or guardian) or not is one of the duties of the religious police. 
According to interviewee q the mutawwa'a have to check that everybody is complying 
with the duties of Islam. Although he recognised that in the past there were some 
abuses, he emphasised that this institution is undergoing a major reorganisation. 
Basically he regards as positive the recruitment of professional individuals rather than 
relying mainly on voluntaries. 
The government and ulama enforced strictly the religious and traditional rules 
relating to the seclusion of women from the public sphere, such as the prohibition on 
women studying abroad even if they were with a male companion. A new regulation on 
the latter matter was introduced by the Crown Prince King Fahd.'^^ The religious police 
For a description of the public debate on women employment at the beginning of 1980s see: Bahry, 
Louay (1982). "The New Saudi Woman: Modernizing in an Islamic Framework" in Middle East Journal 
36, (4): 502-515. 
'^'^ Saudi Gazette, 5 May 1980. p. 3 
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in the Western province closed women's hairdresser salons.''^ ^ Ibn Baz pronounced a 
fatwa opposing government policy in the Eastern province where women were to work 
as secretaries or translators in 1980. In his opinion, women should stay in the house, as 
the idea of women going out of their home clashed with the shari'a, and would lead to 
the collapse of society. I f there was a shortage of workers, the answer was not women 
working but giving incentives to the youth to join government works (Ibn Baz, 1993: 
381). The standing of the ulama and the activities of the religious police provoked in 
part the promulgation of a royal decree, ordering the state sector and the private 
companies not to allow women to work in a mixed environment with men (whether 
Saudi or not) since this practice was against the shari'a and customs of the country.'^^ 
The religious police became more active in supervising the enforcement of religious 
regulations, including the proper dress code and use of hijab, as well as the strict 
observance of the segregation rules. All this underlies the government's efforts to 
maintain the stability of the country and to convey a pious image of the religious 
precepts, nurtured by the ulama. 
Most of the religious scholars in high positions interviewed stressed the fact that 
due to the characteristics of Saudi society, they considered the segregated educational 
system as one of the main features of Saudi society; and three of them, G N and O, 
described it as an integral part of Saudi identity. However, there were differences in 
opinion over how rigidly to enforce the segregation of women at work. Some of the 
religious scholars stressed that women's first priority should be to raise their children. 
As long as women's activities did not contravene this or the role of their husbands as 
main providers for the household, then there should be no conflict. 
One of the interviewees, F, expressed the view that, with technology and other 
innovations, women were not as religious as before. Women in his opinion should dress 
Saudi Gazette, 9 September 1980. p. 3 
Saudi Gazette, 10 March 1983. p. 3 
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and behave with modesty, and keep wearing the hijab, in order to protect themselves 
and their families. They must study Islam well, basing themselves on the Qur'an and 
sunna. They should refrain from dealings with men and keep away from the forbidden. 
Another interviewee, O, expressed the opinion that women could work outside the 
domain of their houses as long as there was no conflict between their occupation and 
their role as mothers. 
It is important to highlight that, in contrast to the opinion of Ibn Baz, the 
majority of the interviewees were in agreement to the idea of women working. However 
the younger religious scholars pointed out the hindrance to the development of Saudi 
society caused by the prevention of women from being incorporated into public life. 
Some went even further pointing out the religion is not the cause of women seclusion 
but social practices. Regarding the interviews with non-religious scholars, they 
manifested their approval of giving women more space in the society but without 
reaching the "extreme freedom" of western women, a view expressed also by some of 
the religious scholars. 
The 1980s, in practice, saw an expansion of women's spaces, in spite of the 
reinforcement of religious policies. As was mentioned before, women's bank branches 
were first opened during this period and became common. Women during the early 
years of the eighties started to be allowed to work as doctors and nurses, under an 
Islamic framework.'^^ Women's education grew considerably. The official figures 
showed a considerable increase of women's enrolment in university studies (including 
bachelor degree and postgraduate studies). In the academic year 1977/1978 female 
attending university at bachelor level numbered 5,658 students, representing 18% of the 
total enrolment (Minister of Higher Education, 1980). In the year 1989/1990, female 
See el-Sanabary, Nagat (1996). "Women and the Nursing Profession in Saudi Arabia" in Sabbagh, 
Suha (ed.). Between Defiance and Restraint. (New York: Clive Brenen Press), pp. 71-83. 
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enrolment increased notably to 53,030, representing 47.49% of the total number of 
students at bachelor level (Minister of Higher Education, 1991: 8). 
Women's education brought changes to the percentage of women participating 
in economic life. According to the Civil Service Bureau, in 1986 the total of women 
working amounted to 55,630 (18% of the total working force), a radical increase on the 
figure of 14,000 in 1978. The jobs occupied by women were mainly in education, 
followed by administrative positions (Saudi Economic Survey, 1987: 6). The rate of 
women participating in the working force since 1986 has remained the same according 
to a recent United Nations report (UN, 2000: 36). 
Control over the role of women is important for the reinforcement of traditional 
and religious values. The ulama nurture the traditional image of women as segregated 
and veiled, especially senior ulama supported by the government and at the same time 
by the social practices of Saudi society. The advance of women into public life has been 
through the creation of jobs in traditional women's 'domain' (teachers, nurses, doctors, 
etc.) working within the social and religious norms created and recreated by Saudi 
society. The perception is that the 'goodness' of a sound Muslim religious society is 
measured by the role of women. 
4.3. The Ulama and the Cfovemment Policies 
The ability of the government, and specifically of the ruler, to create regulations 
is discretionary, but nonetheless it has to be done within the rules of Islam. In fact, the 
so-called traditional elements of society are sometimes the facilitators of the 
introduction of changes and, according to these the changes are invoked in the lines of 
obedience to the Qur'an and to God (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996: 25-26). According 
to a religious scholar, L, the ulama issue opinions when they are not found directly in 
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the verses of the Qui 'an. If the domain is wide then ijtihad is applied. In latter cases the 
interest of the umma takes precedence following Islam, taking into consideration time, 
place, persons and possible solutions. The imam (ruler) has to check that the opinion 
given is not contradictory to Islam. This opinion is supported by other religious 
scholars, like J, who pointed out that ijithad is not an individual task but as a collective 
function, in the sense that in order to give the correct answer a discussion must take 
place. 
As has been shown in the first section of this chapter, the role of the ulama in 
shaping the judicial system has been influential, even though the reforms were legalised 
by the government. Areas such as education and especially women's education are 
controlled by the role of the ulama. In this section the participation of ulama in the 
implementation of public policies is examined, studying how they participate, and their 
impact on the government. Basically, it is contended here that government policies aim 
to work within the framework of Islam, therefore these policies become accountable to 
religion, and the ulama express an opinion when they believe there is a contradiction 
with the religious precepts. The ulama have a bigger margin of manoeuvre when the 
government lacks legitimacy, but when this is not the case, the ulama see a decrease in 
their leverage to influence government policies. 
The governmental policies outlined in the different economic plans have 
emphasised the need for continuous economic growth, through the development of the 
Kingdom's resources, reducing the dependence on oil as the main source of national 
income. This economic growth is necessary to improve social conditions and maintain 
the religious values of Islam, its defence and application and the maintenance of the 
internal security of the Kingdom (Third Development Plan, 1981: 3). In the third plan 
the government stressed the importance of expanding and enforcing the role of the 
religious organisations, including the public moral committees (the Committee for 
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Forbidding Evil and Commanding Good). This policy, according to the plan was due to 
the context of accelerated economic development that brought about the presence of a 
considerable number of foreigners in the Kingdom. Therefore it was important to 
support the religious and judicial organisations, as a way to preserve the character of 
Saudi society (Ibid. 386). In this regard the government committed itself to supporting 
and expanding religious activities, especially in the cases of the moral committees; 
setting up offices for them at the regional level. The increase and maintenance attained, 
during the Third Development Plan, was 26,357 mosques in the Kingdom in tandem 
with the expansion of enforcement of the public morality committees (Fourth 
Development Plan, 1986: 361). In the Fourth Development plan, the policies of 
expanding religious and judicial services continued, receiving an allocation of 18,501 
millions of riyals for these areas (Ibid. 366-367). 
The decade of the eighties saw a number of economic problems emerging as a 
result of the oscillation of the price of oil and the continuous appearance of budget 
deficits. One of the key areas in the formulation of the economic plans had been the 
issue of the work force. The existence of unemployment among the Saudi population 
led the government to launch a 'Saudisation' programme in March 1981. A royal order 
expressed the need to incorporate Saudis in national and international firms established 
in the Kingdom, and the Ministry of Social Affairs through the recruitment labour 
offices and vocational training was instructed to pave the way to incorporate more 
Saudis into the workforce. The concern of the government was formulated in the 
third plan, which stated the detrimental effects of importing foreign labour could spread 
negative ideas among Saudi society. 
The official ulama supported the government's concern and issued a fatwa 
reinforcing the government's policies. As an illustration of the support of the official 
' Saudi Gazette, 16 March 1981. p. 2. 
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ulama, Ibn Baz expressed an opinion regarding the employment of foreign chauffeurs 
for women; he stipulated that the use of foreign workers for this purpose was against 
Islam (al-Musnad, 1993: 341). Also the Board of Senior Ulama promulgated a 
resolution which stated that bringing in foreign labour was against government policy 
aimed at increasing the number of Saudis in the workforce.''*' 
In spite of the rise in educational enrolment and the emergence of vocational 
centres, the policy of tackling the 'Saudisation' of the workforce has been a recurrent 
target in the subsequent economic plans. For example, in the fourth plan, the 
development of human resources to ensure a constant supply of manpower and the 
improvement of its efficiency was one of the objectives outlined. As has been 
mentioned previously, women made up a substantial part of the increment to the Saudi 
workforce, since for the first time an economic plan encouraged them to participate in 
particular areas in accordance with Islam and the shari'a. 
One particular area where the ulama have expressed their discontent is the issue 
of riba (interest), associated with banking institutions. In 1981, the ulama managed to 
stop the practice of mortgage-backed lending, because such practice involved the 
payment of interest (Odone, 1987: 142), in a context where both the ulama and the 
government were questioned about their religious commitment by the regime of Iran 
and by the internal opposition that emerged with the take-over of the Great Mosque. 
The issue of the banks' practices has become a public debate since then. On one side are 
those in favour of Westernised banks, and on the other are the religious leaders in 
favour of banks which do not change any interest. As Wilson notes, the debate was 
heated by the contraction of credit by the regular banks and the growing activities of 
Islamic banks, in a society where there was mistrust towards regular banks. The author 
contends that Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the government launched an 
Resolution 103, 1403/1982 in (1992) Majalat al Buhuth al hlamiyya [Magazine of Islamic Research] 
34: 341. 
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ideological battle in order to promote the acceptance of regular banks (Wilson, 1991: 
184-185). The position of the government shows how important the religious values are 
given that it was difficult for the government to promote the introduction of normal 
banks, in the light of the stance of the ulama against the issue of interest. 
In February 1984, an article appeared in the newspaper "Al-Sharq-Al Awsat" 
which criticised the operation of Islamic banks on the grounds that, although they 
followed the prescriptions of Islam, in fact, these banks charged riba and falsely 
claimed that they were the objects of discrimination by the regular banks (Ibid.). Later a 
paper by Ibrahim ibn Abdullah al Nasir from SAMA raised the concern of the religious 
scholars. The main argument centred around the definition of riba}'^^ According to him, 
riba as referred to in the Qur'an is the practice that involved the duplication or 
triplication of a sum paid to the lender, when the sum is not paid in a predetermined 
time (Ibid. 186). The argument in favour of regular banks was outlined as follows: "It is 
impossible to have Islamic power without economic power, it is impossible to have 
economic power without banks and banks without interest" (Ibn Baz, 1988: 49). 
The religious scholars, through Sheikh Ibn Baz, counterattacked this argument, 
establishing that riba was forbidden. Ibn Baz attacked Al-Nasir's argument on the basis 
of two principles. First, Ibn Baz established that in the first Islamic century there were 
no banks and no notions of interest. The second principle was that interest causes 
division among Muslims, creating unemployment and a shortage of business. Support 
for the prohibition of riba is found in the hadith that detailed the practice of riba, while 
Al Nasir in his study had only been talking about one type of riba (Ibid. 51). 
Ibn Baz went further, reminding the King of his promise at the time of his 
accession to establish an Islamic financial agency, which came into existence in 1987. 
The Al Rajhi Monetary Exchange group finally obtained the full license of a bank but 
For a discussion of tiie term, see Vogel, Frank E . and Samuel L . Hayes (1998). Islamic Law and 
Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return. (London: Kluwer Law International), pp. 72-83. 
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was forbidden to trade as an Islamic Bank; the Supervisory boards tried to maintain 
Islamic credentials by appointing two of the sons of Ibn Baz and the governor of Mecca 
and Jeddah to this board (Wilson, 1991: 184). In this respect, the inclusion of ulama in 
the Supervisory Board of the Islamic banks in the Gulf area has placed them in an area 
outside their traditional dominion. For the first time. Islamic banking is a source of a 
well-paid income in the private sector for the ulama who are broadening their skills to 
comply with modern requirements in international banking (Vogel, 1998: 286). 
Wilson argued that the religious scholars continued to protest on these issues but 
were silenced after a while by the governmental threat to reduce both their salaries and 
the allocation of money for religious activities. This position was shown by the lack of 
comment or protest when the Public Investment Fund (PDF) borrowed 600 millions 
dollars from 11 banks in 1988 (Wilson, 1991:188). 
In fatawa from the Permanent Committee of Ulama, it was established that riba 
was forbidden, that people should not put money in a bank that pays a certain 
percentage as interest, deal with banks that charge an amount for the transference of 
money except in cases of necessity, or deal with banks that give loans and that charge 
an interest. The ulama forbade dealings with banks except with the ones which are 
Islamic, stating that those were Al Rahji, Sobya. They also forbade people from 
working in un-Islamic banks (Al-Misned, 1988: 261-289). 
The fact that the ulama adopted such a stance did not crystallise in a complete 
change of banking operations. However, the strategy of the banks and government was 
to offer, as well, services according to Islamic practices and, as was established earlier, 
by incoiporating distinguished ulama to the boards of the banks they expected to attract 
more clients to their banks. The strength of the ulama pronouncements then is left to 
individual commitment, and the success of al Rahji bank towards the end of the 1980s 
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(Cunningham, 1989: 80) in comparison to the others banks can be taken as a proof of 
the ulama's strength. 
Disputes raised by banking transactions are another area of conflict for both 
government and the ulama, due to the duality of the legal system, which provokes an 
overlapping of both authorities. The governmental agency, SAMA, has tried to avoid 
the involvement of shari'a courts in banking disputes, establishing specialised 
committees to resolve these disputes. In practice, the individuals in conflict referred 
their cases to the shari'a courts, since the latter "have taken an hostile attitude to the 
banks suing debtors for non-payment of interest" (Ibid. 72). In general terms, SAMA 
has been cautious in the dealings of the banks establishing practices following the 
religious principles. For example, article number two established that this agency "shall 
not pay nor receive interest but shall only charge certain fees on services rendered to the 
public and government" (Ibid. 71). 
The government and the ulama have reached some agreement in the dealings of 
banking practices, as the government is limited by economic circumstances or by 
commercial interest. The policy of the government in 1988 to issue bonds in order to 
counter the projected budget deficit met the opposition of the ulama. Once more the 
ulama's concern was that this practice would involve riba. The government had to 
reformulate this policy according to the Islamic practices to placate the opposition, 
stipulating that the earning of these bonds would be deposited in projects of 
development.''*'' According to one interviewee. A, the government only masked the 
operations of the banks by establishing the payment of fees rather than interest. Also he 
stressed the duality of the banking system operating in the Kingdom is a sign of the 
ulama failure to force the government to follow the Islamic practices. 
' Saudi Press Agency (4-11 June 1988). 
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The policies carried out by the government regarding the economic plans, have 
been formulated within the framework of Islam, and therefore within the framework 
where social practices evolve. The commitment of the ruler to the society to guard and 
provide welfare to it has been one of the main objectives cited in the formulation of the 
economic plans. Although there was no direct participation of the ulama in the 
elaboration of the plans or in the delineation of policies and their implementation, the 
ulama participated through the reinforcement of government policies or by opposing 
those policies they deem contradictory to Islam. In these cases, such as the one 
presented on the issue of banking activities, the government has had to reach an 
agreement with the ulama. 
4.3.1. Recreation of the principles of Saudi foreign policy 
The role played by religion in framing the practices of both society and 
government is also observed in Saudi Arabian foreign policy. Indeed, the role of 
religion in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy has been paramount 
for the government of Saudi Arabia since the beginning of third Saudi state, especially 
once the Hijaz was annexed. Custody over the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, conferred 
a particular status to Saudi Arabia in the international Muslim community. The fact, as 
Baghat Korany once stated, that millions of people all over the world turn to Mecca five 
times a day (Korany, 1970: 801-802) gives one an idea of the importance at least for the 
Muslim world of Saudi Arabia. Islam has been the ideological dimension in the 
formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of the Kingdom, even before the 
appearance of the material wealth acquired through the commercial exploitation of oil. 
However, this ideological dimension is accompanied by strategic, economic and 
pragmatic considerations as well, that are more important than Islam under certain 
issues and circumstances (Piscatori, 1983: 51). 
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In general terms the importance of Islam in the foreign policy can be identified 
in four ways, according to Dawisha. The first is when it helps to create consensus over 
the objectives of the foreign policy. The second is when it provides the rationale, or 
country's identity. A third way exists whereby Islam helps to mobilise external 
resources in support of the state. And a final way is when Islam can become a constraint 
on the real interest of the country (Dawisha, 1983: 4). The Islamic dimension of Saudi 
Arabian foreign policy can be regarded in the four ways proposed by Dawisha: stressing 
the Islamic dimension related to the definition of Saudi Arabia as religious country and 
its the leadership of the Muslim countries causes the mobilisation of external support for 
the state, and at the same time causes the challenge of other Muslim countries to her 
religious leadership. 
In contrast to others areas examined, the participation of the ulama in the 
formulation or implementation of Saudi foreign policy is limited. The ulama act as a 
pressure group according to the issues in question, and they also act as the main 
propagators of Saudi Arabia's religious commitment abroad, contributing to enforcing 
the role of Saudi state as guardian of the holy cities and stressing the religious identity 
of the Kingdom. The examination presented is on how and when the Saudi Arabian 
government has invoked its religious credentials either defending or bolstering its 
legitimacy. The three cases of Iran, Libya and the Arab-Israel conflict, as relevant 
factors in the regional dynamics are presented, where the religious factor has played an 
important part. 
The bases of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia were formulated during the 
period of King Faysal, as has been analysed in the previous chapter. The definition of 
Saudi Arabia's status at the international level was both a product of their role as the 
guardian of the holy places and at the same time a response to the threats posed by Arab 
nationalism and Nasserisra during the late 1950s and during the 1960s. The response to 
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these threats reinforced the religious factor in the formulation and practice of Saudi 
foreign policy in dealings with some issues and regional processes. The Tslamisation' 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1960s is a manifestation of the amalgamation of 
the Islamic dimension with strategic considerations. Saudi Arabia, as a way to counter 
attack from the radical regimes, in the context of the Arab defeat in the Arab-Israeli war 
of 1967, took the opportunity to attract to its sphere of influence Egypt and Jordan, 
through the use of economic assistance. In addition, Saudi Arabia committed itself to 
the recapture of Jerusalem as the third holy city, after Medina and Mecca, based on its 
role as guardian of the holy places. 
During the 1980s, in the context of the Cold War, the definition of the relations 
of Saudi Arabia with the world were shaped by religious considerations, as well as 
strategic considerations. The conception laid out during the Faysal period, was still in 
place through the 1980s. According to Korany, at the centre of this conception was the 
religious notion of a territorial division between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, the 
territory of peace and the territory of war respectively. In practice, the Soviet Union and 
her allies the Eastern block, belonged to Dar al-Harb as followers of the atheistic 
doctrines of communism and socialism. Israel was placed in the same category as the 
Soviet Union because its secular Zionist doctrine challenged Saudi Arabia and the 
Muslim community through the Arab-Israeli conflict, (although Judaism is considered a 
religion related to Islam, and Jews are ahl al-kitab (people of the book) (Korany, 1991: 
247-251) 
By contrast, the United States of America was considered belonging to Dar al-
Islam as a Christian country (also people of the book) and in conflict with the regimes 
of the Soviet Union or Eastern Block, in spite of the fact that the USA assisted Israel 
financially and militarily. The Muslim and Arab countries that embraced ideologies or 
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policies different from Islam were defined as enemies since they posed a challenge to 
the integrity of the territory of Islam (Ibid). 
The economic organisations created and the economic aid provided by Saudi 
Arabia were along the line of this interpretation of relations towards the international 
community. These economic tools became an important channel where economic aid 
contributed to the reinforcement Saudi Arabian foreign policy objectives, and to the 
projection of the religious identity of the Islamic government for both internal and 
external audiences. 
The 1980s were particularly difficult for Saudi Arabia in terms of the region's 
dynamics both with regard to the Gulf area and the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the one 
hand, in its immediate zone the threat of the Iranian revolution emphasised Saudi 
Arabia's vulnerability over its religious legitimacy, contested during the Mecca uprising 
and the Shi'a protests in 1979. At the strategic level, what was involved was a threat to 
the regional balance of power. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were all seeking hegemony 
over the Gulf balance of power. Saudi Arabia and Iran had been "partners" in the 
security of the Gulf, but the triumph of the Islamic revolution changed the local 
dynamics. The war between Iran and Iraq was, on the Iraqi side, aimed to contain the 
revolution and its consequences for the rest of the Gulf countries. The stance of Saudi 
Arabia, deterring Iran and supporting Iraq, was a fundamental factor in Saudi foreign 
policy at this time. 
The Saudi fear of destabilisation in the area was based on three strategic 
considerations. Firstly, the Iranian revolution had to be countered, leading to support for 
Iraq in its conflict against Iran on the one hand, and on the other, the formation of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981, in order to lead the efforts of these countries 
(Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) to protect themselves 
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from Iran.''*'' Secondly, the invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan was perceived 
by Saudi Arabia as spreading the Soviet threat, backed by Soviet influence and links in 
South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Thirdly, the dilemmas of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
continued, such that Saudi Arabia had to avoid any change in the dynamics of the 
dispute which would jeopardise its policies and the situation of the Gulf.'''^ The 
interdependence of these two conflicts, the Arab-Israeli and Iran-Iraq conflicts, is 
demonstrated by the alignment in the latter war. The Steadfast Front (composed of 
Libya, Syria, Algeria and South Yemen) in the Arab-Israeli hostilities also aligned itself 
in favour of Iran in the conflict against Iraq. 
In general terms, the policy adopted by Saudi Arabia was to protect the 
Kingdom from the Iranian threat and to guarantee the stability of the Kingdom after the 
events of the late 1970s. Due to the religious nature of the Iranian challenge, the 
national project based on a Shi'a interpretation and the export of the revolution, Saudi 
Arabia pursued policies aimed at reinforcing its image as guardian of the two holy cities 
and spreading its own Islamic line. The policies involved the establishment of Islamic 
cultural centres and mosques, creating new publications and supporting Muslim groups. 
In all these steps, the ulama participated alongside the government, again showing that 
whenever there is an external threat to the Saudi Kingdom security, the ulama and the 
government will support each other. 
After the invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia requested a meeting of the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries as the first step in order to obtain an international 
condemnation. This event was described in terms of the invasion of a Muslim country 
by an 'unbeliever' country, therefore the support of the whole Muslim community was 
See Long, David, E . (1988). "Saudi Arabia and its Neighbours: Preoccupied Paternalism" in Sidebar, 
Richard and J. E . Peterson (eds.). Crosscurrents in the Gulf: Arab Regional and Global Interest. (London: 
Routlledge). pp. 181-197. 
'•^ Initiatives like the Fahd plan in 1981, which attempted to pacify the situation in the Arab-Israeli 
ontlict in order to diffuse tension and gain support for Saudi Arabia to manoeuvre in the region. See 
Fakash, Mahmud A (1987). "Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Crisis: Foreign Policy and Security Dilemma" in 
Middle East Review 19, (4): 50. 
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requested. Saudi Arabia's policy towards Afghanistan involved economic and 
humanitarian assistance to resist and to halt the Soviet invasion. By invoking the 
religious dimensions of the invasion of Afghanistan, the ulama's religious 
pronouncements (in accordance with Islamic traditions) stressed the importance of 
jihad, and help for the Afghan mujahidin (religious fighter) was described as a good 
deed because they were the worthiest beneficiaries of zakat. The ulama emphasised how 
"these fighters were patient by continuing to struggle in the path of God", and 
encouraged the people to help them, "purifying their countries from the invasion of the 
unbeliever and the tales of Communists" (Ibn Baz, 1989b: 324-328). 
In the case of the Iranian revolution and the creation of the government of 
Velayat-e-Faqih (religious jurists), based on a particular (Shi'a) interpretation of Islam a 
source of continuous challenge to Saudi Arabia was created. The conception of the 
government delineated by Ayatollah Khomeini represented a counterproposal to the 
Islamic sunni interpretation of Saudi Arabia. The rise to power of the religious jurists 
and their participation in the decision-making of the government was a source of threat 
for the Saudi regime. 
The challenges to Saudi Arabia can be understood from the character of Iranian 
foreign policy. This was supported by two main pillars: the first was based on a non-
alignment, "neither West or East"; and the second involved the export of the revolution 
to other regions. Hunter provides a general overview of Khomeini's worldview 
stressing the ideological foundation of the new Iranian foreign policy. Khomeini 
divided the world primarily between those countries with power that oppressed others, 
and the ones who were oppressed. This division coincided with the ideological division 
of "neither West nor East", since the dominators were identified as the leading 
'superpower' countries of each block, namely the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union. The oppressed states were mainly the Muslim countries and Third World 
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countries in general. Another principle that underlay the ideological justification of the 
export of the revolution was the division between those countries that followed the right 
path (the right Islam), and those who did not. Iran, according to Khomeini's conception, 
was the only state which was on the right path, and therefore had a duty to help other 
Muslim countries to take the right path (Hunter, 1990: 37). 
In Khomeini's worldview, Saudi Arabia was subject to criticism for its close 
links with United States and its support for the Iraqi regime against Iran. Saudi Arabia, 
concerned by the impact this was having on its shi'a minority and the unrest in 1979, 
became sensitive toward any Iranian attempt to mobilise or support opposition 
groupings either in the Kingdom or in neighbouring Gulf countries. Seeking to 
neutralise these challenges, it supported Islamic groups favourable to its own point of 
viewpoints around the Arab world, activating the different organisations dedicated to 
development and foreign aid in Muslim countries. The founding of Islamic centres 
around the world, the provision of scholarships for Muslims to study in the Kingdom, 
and the donation of money to schools and universities were among the activities used to 
subvert the Iranian threat and at the same time to enhance Saudi Arabia's religious 
image. The amount spent on these efforts during the period 1973-1990 is estimated at 
over a billion dollars (Al-Sugair, 1993: 111-116). 
Iran through the rhetoric of Khomeini and the hajj (pilgrimage to the holy 
places) launched serious attacks on the Saudi regime. The hajj became the avenue of 
expressing criticism towards of those countries allied to the West and those considered 
as tyrants of oppressed societies. During the pilgrimages of 1979 and 1980, the Lanians 
distributed propaganda and carried photographs of Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1981, the 
government of Saudi Arabia took some measures to ban the carrying of books and 
photographs. Also, prior to the pilgrimage, the Saudi authorities and Iranian authorities 
carried out talks in order to set an agreement over these issues. However, the Iranian 
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pilgrims caused concern to the Saudi authorities during that hajj, as they chanted praises 
for Khomeini in the Mosque of the Prophet at Medina and in the Great Mosque at 
Mecca, and confronted Saudi forces (Golderberg, 1983: 286-287). 
After the hajj of 1981, the conflict in religious terms continued and this time 
focused against the Saudi religious authorities directly. Ibn Baz's ruling of November 
1981 prohibiting the widespread celebration of the Prophet's birthday, was taken by 
Iranian authorities as a cause of belligerence, contesting the Saudi religious 
interpretation. Iran organised, at the national level, to hold the celebration of the 
Prophet's birthday and invited other Muslim countries to join this celebration, as a way 
of opposing Saudi religious leadership. This policy was stressed when Khomeini 
criticised the stance of Sheikh Ibn Baz and the content of his fatwa, discrediting the 
ulama of Saudi Arabia. 146 
The pilgrimage of 1982 saw continued Iranian activities, which indeed were 
more pronounced than in previous years, regarding their challenges to Saudi Arabia's 
legitimacy, not only touching on the religious dimensions but also on economic and 
strategic considerations as well. Although, previous to the hajj, Saudi and Iranian 
authorities had talked over this issue, it was clear that Iran was persisting in using hajj 
as a way of showing its commitment to the Muslim causes, such as condemning Israel 
and its policies towards Palestine and Lebanon, the Soviet Union's invasion of 
Afghanistan and United States role in world affairs.''*^ This strategy was aimed at 
promoting Iran's revolutionary aims, and as part of the strategy of their opposition to 
the Saudi Arabian political system. One of the documents distributed during the 
pilgrimage of 1982 questioned the legitimacy of the Saudi regime. This document 
appears to have been written by an organisation based in Saudi Arabia under the name 
of Organisation for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula. 
' Ibid. 290. 
B B C SWB/ME/7123/A/6 (6 September 1982). 
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Is the system followed by the regime (Saudi)-absolute 
hereditary monarchy, an acceptable government for Islam? Is 
the oppression, the absence of people participation in the 
government acceptable to Islam? Is it allowed in the Islamic law 
to neglect the political, intellectual and social freedom? Can the 
new king call himself guardian and defender of the Mosques, 
meanwhile its name appears associated to corruption, decadence 
and shame?".'"^ 
In addition, the document criticises Saudi foreign policy, especially the 
agreement which allowed U.S. AW ACS to be stationed and over fly Saudi territory.'''^ 
The document in addition criticised Saudi policy over the production of oil.'^° These 
two issues were of particular strategic concern to Iran, because the implications of the 
Iran-Iraq war and the rivalry which existed between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the 
production of oil, were both part of Iranian propaganda. Hence is not surprising that this 
document appeared in one of the Iranian newspapers. 
Iranians pilgrims rallied in Medina, launching attacks on the Soviet Union, Israel 
and the United States. The Saudi authorities intervened, arresting some Iranians and 
taking away the banners and portraits that the participants were carrying. The Saudi 
authorities protested against the Iranian actions, which they considered were against the 
objectives of hajj. However both the representatives of the Iranians pilgrims and 
AyatoUah Khomeini himself stressed to the Saudi Arabian authorities the legitimacy of 
their actions and the importance of using the hajj to unite Muslims against the USA, 
Soviet Union and Israel 151 
This was an extract of the appeals to the pilgrims published by the Iranian Martyr's foundation 
Newspaper. B B C SWB/Part 4/ME/128/A/11 (11 September 1982). 
See Safran, Nadav (1985). Saudi Arabia: the Ceaseless Quest for Security. (Cambridge, 
MassachuseUs: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 362. 
'™ Since 1982, the O P E C countries had adopted the system of production of oil by country quotas. Iran 
and Libya did not follow this agreement and produced more than the stipulated amount causing a 
reduction in the prices of oil. Behind these policies was the attempt by Iran and Libya to curtail Saudi 
leadership in the O P E C and in this way to cause economic problems that would affect its support to Iraq. 
See Seymour, Ian. (1985). " O P E C and the World Market: Present Problems and Future Prospects" in 
American-Arab Affairs (13). pp. 87-89. 
See B B C SWB/ME/7129/Ay2 (13 September 1982), B B C SWB/ME/7129/A/1 (13 September 1982), 
B B C S W B / M E /7137/A/l (22 September 1982). 
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Further foreign problems stemmed from the deteriorating relationship with 
Libya as a result of the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The position of Saudi 
Arabia through the Fahd Peace Plan, was rejected by Libya and the Stead Fast front at 
the summit of the Arab League in November of 1981,'" leading to religious and 
political attacks between the two countries. Libyan president Mu'ammar Khadaffi used 
a similar line of attack to that of Iran, questioning the religious credentials of the Saudi 
leaders and the ulama of the Kingdom, and taking advantage of the vulnerability 
showed by Saudi Arabia in her dealings with Iran. 
The response of the government and particularly of the ulama was to declare 
Khadaffi an unbeliever, disqualifying his voice and his religious credentials. The ulama 
refuted the claims of the Libyan leader through the issue of a fatwa, stating that the role 
of religion of the Kingdom was based on the shari'a, and the role of the ulama was to 
uphold justice and maintain the correct practices. They emphasised the achievements of 
the Kingdom and the efforts of the government to spread the Islamic call.'^"' 
The Libyan leader created the Organisation of the Islamic Call to counterattack 
the influence of Saudi Arabia in spreading the religious call. In September 1982, the 
Libyan organisation was given international status, with an international council to 
direct the organisation. Through this organisation Khadaffi was seeking to spread a 
view of Islam consistent with his particular ideas about Arab socialism. Africanism and 
Arabism (Kostiner, 1983: 245-246). In fact, this organisation was competing with the 
' " Saudi Arabia in an attempt to deter the possibilities of a further escalation in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and to overcome the impasse reached in the resolution of the conflict (the departure of Egypt from the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict due to Camp David agreement), launched a proposal for peace known as the Fahd 
plan in 1981 by Crown Prince Fahd. The evacuation of the territories occupied by Israel from 1967, the 
evacuation from the settlements established on those territories and the establishment of a Palestinian 
state were among the 8 points established in this peace plan. See Long, David (1986). "Saudi Foreign 
Policy and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Fahd (Arab) Peace Plan " in Belling, Willard (ed.) (1986). 
Middle East Peace Plans. (London: Croom Helm), pp. 54-66. 
153 B B C SWB/Part 4/ME/6984/A/5 (22 March 1982). 
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Saudi-based Muslim World League. However, in 1983, the relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Libya improved, as a result of developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict.'"^'* 
In the second half of the 1980s, Iran retaliated against Iraq and its supporters, 
invading the Iiaqi Faw peninsula and orchestrating bomb explosions in Kuwait and in 
the United Arab Emirates during 1986. King Fahd, the target of Iranian criticism, 
stressed his religious stance by adopting the title as the Servant of the Holy Cities. This 
strategy was an attempt to show his commitment to religion and to de-escalate the 
questioning of his legitimacy on managing the affairs of the holy cities, as well as to 
strengthen his image abroad and internally. The dynamics of the Gulf War and the 
attacks by Iran on Saudi tankers in the Gulf provoked a firm attitude over the issue of 
the pilgrimage. 
During the pilgrimage of 1987, Saudi forces opened fire on Iranian 
demonstrators when they were demonstrating in Mecca, causing the death of over 200 
Iranian pilgrims. The Iranian authorities headed by the AyatoUah Khomeini condemned 
the use of force, the lack of respect for the holy cities, and especially the lack of 
commitment on the part of Al Saud family to its historical obligations of protecting and 
enforcing religion. The Al Saud family was described by the Iranian authorities as the 
agents of America. Following the lines of criticism of Khomeni, Rafsanjani, the Iranian 
Parliament speaker, stated that what was needed was to uproot the Al Saud family from 
the custody of the holy cities.'^^ 
These events were followed by a demonstration in Tehran during which the 
Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies were sacked and the Saudi Ambassador was killed. Saudi 
Arabia launched an active media campaign to discredit Iran and the un-Islamic character 
of the demonstrations, questioning the Islamic credentials of Khomeini (Goldberg, 
1988: 602). Once more, the posture of the Saudi government was supported by the 
They had a common interest in supporting the faction al-Fatah, headed by Yasser Arafat, at a time 
when Arafat was under pressure from the radicals factions supported by Syria to rehnquish his mandate. 
B B C SWB/Part 4//ME/8637/A/5 (4 August 1987). 
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Saudi ulama. The Board of Senior Ulama issued afatwa stating the purpose of the hajj 
as an act close to God, where no bad acts should be carried out. "For the hajj are months 
well known. If anyone undertakes that duty therein, let there be no obscenity, nor 
wickedness, nor argument, in the hajj"P^ They accused the Iranian government of not 
respecting the religion and praised the Saudi rulers for their intervention whose aim was 
to protect the pilgrims. "May God reward the rulers of this country for their good deeds 
and give them more good and support the right path taking by them".'" 
The explosion of two bombs in Mecca during the pilgrimage of 1989 increased 
the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The period before the beginning of the hajj 
was tense due to the death of Khomeini, and the introduction of a quota system by Saudi 
Arabia for the management of the pilgrimage. According to this system, the quota for 
Iran was 45,000 pilgrims. Al l these issues caused additional strain between the two 
countries. The explosion of two bombs in Mecca during the pilgrimage carried by 
sixteen Kuwaitis and ten Iranians was part of a plan devised by Iran. A group called 
the Generation of the Arab Anger claimed responsibility for the explosions, saying that 
the bombings were a warning to the Saudi raling family.'"^^ 
During 1989, with the arrival of a new president, the death of Khomeini and the 
peace agreement between Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic 
relations and entered a new phase marked by attempts at reconciliation. 
In the domain of foreign policy, the identity of Saudi Arabia as guardian of the 
holy places and leader of the Muslim community results in a double-edged sword. The 
perceived threats to the security of the Kingdom posed by the invasion of Afghanistan 
by the Soviet Union and the Iranian revolution were defended and contested within the 
Islamic dimension. Due to the role of Islam, as has been analysed in the domestic 
B B C SWB/Part4/ME/8639/A/3 (6 August 1987). 
'''Ibid. 
B B C SWB/Part4/ME/0507/l (12 July 1989). 
'''Ibid. 
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legitimacy, Saudi Arabia continually has reinforced, internally and externally, the 
regime's religious credentials. The government has enhanced its commitment to spread 
Islam and influence through the different Muslim organisations around the world, and 
has been assisted in this by the official ulama. The ulama were fundamental in 
advancing the objectives of Saudi Arabian foreign policy by mobilising internally the 
resources to create consensus over the nature of the external threats and by mobilising 
popular and economic support to the mujahidin causes (in Afghanistan and Palestine), 
as well as by defending the regime from the challenges discrediting the religious stance 
by the Iranian and Libyan governments. 
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Chapter Five 
Contesting the Legitimacy 
The process of legitimacy also entails its contestation or resistance by different 
groups inside a society. When the contestation is produced using the norms and values 
which the authorities claim to ful f i l , then it becomes necessary to look for the ways that 
groups organised and recreated those norms and values as a medium of contestation, as 
well as their effects on the ongoing process of legitimacy. Although the contestation 
movements presented here indicate specific situations, it does not mean that 
contestation is only produced in those moments, since conforming and resisting are 
activities carried out simultaneously by the social agents. The specific situations studied 
here are more an indication of the margin of manoeuvre of the opponents to break the 
official discourse and to realise activities whose objective is to contest the legitimacy of 
the regime.'^" 
The majority of the opposition in the contemporary period of Saudi Arabia has 
come from a religious background, so it is not a coincidence that the spaces used by the 
opposition have been the mosques, or that some of the leaders, especially after the 
Second Gulf War, have been preachers. The government since 1982 has reinforced 
control over the religious spaces. According to an order by the Minister of Interior, 
nobody can make a public speech in the mosque unless they have an official permit 
(Article XIX, 1991: 35). Later in 1988, the General Secretary of Pilgrimage and 
Endowments requested all the mosques to check the identity of all speakers at the 
mosques (Ibid.). In spite of the government control over the preachers and imams of the 
mosques, the opposition activities have been carried out precisely by those actors and in 
those spaces. 
Scott, James (1990). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press), p. 120. 
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This chapter will analyse how official Islam became contested by different 
groups in Saudi society, using Islam as the form and content of their contestation. The 
invocation of Islam as the source and reference, is as Asad points out, an attempt by the 
contestants to establish both an authority over what orthodoxy is and, at the same time, 
a redefinition of the Islamic practices (Asad, 1993: 210-212). The nuances of the use of 
religion indicate the internal divisions inside Saudi society and how the government and 
ulama cope with them. They also reveal the extent to which the ulama constitute the 
moderate voice among the spectrum of religious tendencies inside the Kingdom. 
The first major challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling elite was the seizure of 
the Mosque in 1979. Although the movement was suppressed, it represented an attempt 
to contest the religious and political authority, amid a process of rapid development 
during which Islamic mobilisation was used to neutralise the pan-Arabist mobilisation 
of the seventies. Most importantly, this event showed that, as in the case of the ikhwan 
rebellion, Islam could be interpreted and used by other actors apart from the official 
ulama and the government. 
The decade of the nineties was also the setting for the emergence of other voices 
that claimed authority over the interpretation of the sacred texts, threatening the position 
of ulama vis-a-vis society and the religious commitment of the government. The 
analysis of the major opposition groups in the country, as well as the reaction of the 
government and ulama will be stressed in order to assess the effects on the relationship 
between the ulama and the government. 
5.1. "The Return of the Ikhwan" 
The Mecca seizure by a group of people lead by Juhayman al-'Utaibi, in 
November 1979, shocked the Saudi political system, in general, and particularly the 
relationship between the government and the ulama. The group of rebels related the 
starting of a new century in the Islamic calendar in the sacred month of Ramadan with 
inillenarian beliefs, proclaiming the existence of the mahdi (the rightly guided) and the 
restoration of the role of religion.'^' The context of this event deserves an analysis in 
order to expose the causes and the vindications sought by this group of dissidents. It 
indicates that after a certain time, the religious mobilisation sought by the government 
during the sixties had reverberated in the organisation of a religious dissident group. In 
the first place, it is necessary to refer to the origins of the leading members of the group 
of protesters, since their origins will provide a context which can explain the possible 
causes of the take over of the Mosque. The analysis of the demands and the reactions of 
both government and the ulama will be followed in order to bring out the changing 
balance between the two main actors at the centre of this research. 
In order to analyse the causes of the movement, it is necessary to look first at the 
socio-economic features of the members of the rebellious group. The two main 
characteristics of this group were its family links with sections of tribes (such as the 
Utaiba, Matir and Yamma) associated to the rebellious ikhwan on the one hand, and on 
the other, its connection with the situation of the nomadic population in general after 
government policies to settle this population. The policies pursued by the state in order 
to enhance the sedentarisation of the nomadic population encompassed the creation of 
agricultural projects (Wadhi Sirhan 1958, Harad, Jabrin 1972), as well as land 
distribution, initiated since 1968, aimed to assist the bedouins in their transformation 
into sedentary farmers. 
In spite of governmental support, the agricultural projects failed after periods of 
drought, due to the lack of proper planning and timing. The lack of technical skills on 
the part of the nomadic group also had an impact (Fabietti, 1981: 191), and the 
distribution of land brought about inequality inside the tribal groups. The receivers of 
The figure of Mahdi refers to the arrival of a person who is rightly guided by God, before the end of 
the world, to restore religion and to administer justice. See Macdonald, D. (1987). "al-Mahdi" EI. 
(Leiden: E . J . Brill), pp. 111-115. 
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land were those connected to the emir or to those distributing the land, which introduced 
differences in terms of possession of land, in contrast with the solidarity and sense of 
egalitarianism previously prevalent in tribal groups (Fabbieti, 1981: 196). 
Up to the decade of the seventies, the majority of bedouins had become 
sedentary in great numbers, with 10% of the total population remaining nomadic. The 
programmes of urbanisation and the concentration of activities and work in the cities 
initiated since the fifties attracted bedouins, many of whom composed the poor strata in 
the big cities, while others became involved in the National Guard or in the Army. The 
lack of education and skills to adapt to the new style of life stressed the contrast 
between their traditional ways of life and urban life. That, together with their 
dissatisfaction over the lavish living conditions and westernisation of some parts of the 
society, led to the alienation of some parts of the previously nomadic population 
(Kostiner, 1990: 245). 
In general, the period of the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies was 
characterised by the introduction of reforms and new technology, such as education for 
girls and television, provoking diverse reactions among the Saudi population. Among 
other important reforms were the introduction of changes in the religious sphere, such 
as the re-distribution of functions and offices, including the creation of the Ministry of 
Justice after the death of the grand Mufti Sheikh Ibrahim. These reforms were linked as 
well to changes at the socio-political level. 
The claims sought by Juhaiman's group offered some parallel with the demands 
of the rebellious ikwhan during the late years of the 1920s and beginnings of the 1930s 
(Kechichian, 1990: 8-9; Ayubi; 1991: 101; Ochenswald, 1983: 276). In fact, the leader 
of the group, Juhaiman, was the grandson of Sultan ibn Bijad ibn Humaid, one of the 
leaders in the rebellion against King Abdul Aziz. As with their predecessors who had 
complained about the introduction of telegraph and radio, Juhaiman and his followers 
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complained about photographs and television. Furthermore, just as the rebellious 
ikhwan laid claim to the true Islam and portrayed the ulama as lacking legitimacy 
because they aligned themselves with King Abdul Aziz,'^^ Juhaiman's group also 
claimed the role of Islam and criticised the ulama for their endorsement of the 
corruption of the regime. 
Another important feature of the group was that most of them were students of 
religion, although some such as Juhaiman had dropped out their studies. This feature 
indicated that this group had been students in the early seventies or perhaps late sixties, 
at a time when religious mobilisation was invoked in order to counter-attack the threats 
which emanated from abroad, especially those embodied in the Arab Nationalism 
propagated by Nasser.'^ ^ Also at that time Medina University was under the direction of 
Sheikh Ibn Baz and received many foreign students, especially members of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, that can be considered as an influence on the group. 
According to Buchan, Ibn Baz was a teacher of some of the members of this group, as 
also were other high-ranking ulama (Buchan, 1982: 23). 
According to Holden and Kechichian, it appeared that some of the high-ranking 
ulama, among them Ibn Baz and Muhammad al Luhaydan, knew about the activities of 
this group. But because of their concern over the changes introduced in the religious 
sphere and their fears over a decline of the wZama's position vis-a-vis the political 
power, they let the group continue its activities (Holden, 1981: 517-518; Kechichian, 
1986: 60). Also it is possible that some of these ulama agreed in principle with the 
position in favour of strengthening the role of Islam, but not with the political motives. 
It will later be shown that the ulama in the nineties sympathised with the dissident 
preachers, Safar al-Awali and al-Audah, but not with the political tones or implications 
of their arguments. 
See third chapter . 
See third chapter . 
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The content of Juhaiman's publications'^'' was focused primarily on a critique of 
the legitimacy of the Saudi regime along with the demands for reinstating the 
importance of the tribal community. First, as has been mentioned earlier, this group (as 
in the past did the rebellious ikhwan) claimed to be the true defenders of the faith. 
Secondly, they questioned the legitimacy of the House of Saud. According to them, the 
deviation from Islam started from King Abdul Aziz (who had betrayed the ikhwan), and 
also they stressed that the wealth, which derived from the exploitation of oil contributed 
to the corruption of the regime. The first case represents clearly a claim based on the 
perceptions of King Abdul Aziz's treason against the ikhwan movement. In addition this 
group questioned the legitimacy of the Al Saud family, and their right to be the 
guardians of the community. The second claim reflects the rapid economic change that 
Saudi Arabia experienced and the new style of life, which had brought about a 
contradiction with the principles of simplicity of Hanbalism and Wahhabism. 
In this regard, Buchan shows that the first pamphlet (Rules of Allegiance and 
Obedience: the misconduct of the rulers) established as a main argument the 
characterisation of the al Saudi rulers as corrupt, and stating that rulers who do not 
follow the sacred sources deserve opposition. In addition, the A l Saud rulers were said 
to twist the law according to their own ends and had established relations with 
unbelievers and atheists (Holden, 1981: 518). The official ulama, and in particular Ibn 
Baz, became the object of attack in Juhaiman's pamphlets as being "agents of the 
cormpt regime, using religion to bolster illegitimate rule" (Kechichian, 1990: 12). 
The content of the dissidence was not only the question of legitimacy of both the 
King and the ulama, but also the desire to establish a new form of government, where 
the head of the community would be chosen by the people. "Juhaiman stated that the 
Khalifah, or ruler of the Islamic state, must be a pious Muslim chosen by the people in a 
For a comprehensive list of the pamphlets published atid commented by western scholars see: 
Kechichian, J . (1990). "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al -'Utaibi's letters to 
the Saudi People" in The Muslim World 80, (1): 9-11. 
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general bay'a (oath of allegiance) and must uphold the religion" (Faksh, 1997: 93). 
There was clear opposition to the hereditary form of government, but even so, the group 
did not criticise the government in terms as strong as for example kaflr (unbeliever) 
(Salame, 1987: 313-314). 
The motives behind these contentions stemmed from the desire of the 
individuals concerned to keep their identity in both tribal and religious terms. The group 
sought the restoration of the tribal community in the power structure, since after the 
establishment of the Kingdom the alliance of the ulama and the government had been to 
the detriment of the umara (Kechichian, 1990: 12; Mordechai, 1988: 11). As analysed 
in the third chapter, this was also an issue behind the complaints of the ikhwan in 1927, 
and had been suppressed by King Abdul Aziz reinforcing the ulama-m\e,r relationship. 
The restoration of pure Wahhabi and ikhwan beliefs was at the core of their proposals, 
and with the acclamation of the mahdi they aimed to create an ideal society. 
The government's reaction was to ask for the opinion of the official ulama, 
several days after the incident. Two main documents contained the ulama's rulings 
decisions were published, the fatwa published in local newspapers and another more 
extended/h/wa."^"'' The first fatwa began by acknowledging that King Khaled requested 
their opinion on the events of Mecca. The response by the official ulama was to give 
permission for the use of force in case the armed group would not give up their arms. 
This was based on a verse of the Qur'an: "But fight them not at the Holy Mosque unless 
they first fight you there. But if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those 
who suppress the faith"."'^ The authorities in their public appearances stressed that they 
took action in the mosque after receiving the approval of the ulama. 
The first fatwa was accompanied by a communique published in local newspapers. See B B C 
SWB/ME/6281/A/9 (26 November 1979) and Kechichian, J . (1990) Op. Cit. The second/afvva is 
accompanied of a summary of the main points in Ibn Baz, Muhammad Ahmad al Abdul Aziz (1990). 
Majnm'at al-fatawa wa maqatat mutanaw'at [collection of fatawi and addresses]. (Riyadh: Department of 
Religious Guidance, Advice and Call, National Offset Printing Office), pp. 89-96. 
B B C SWB/ME/6281/A/9 (26 November 1979). 
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In the second fatwa, the ulama started to disqualify the action of the insurgents 
for the violation of the holiness of the Mosque, in the sacred month. The armed group, 
they said, according to the Qur'an and traditions deserved the most grievous 
chastisement (Ibn Baz, 1990: 89). The ulama accused the group of being deviationist 
and separatist, comparing them with the khawarij '^^(Ibid. 91). Then they defended the 
ruler, establishing that this was a rebellion against the legal ruler, to whom a lawful and 
Islamic bay'a has been given (in contrast to the bay'a given to the mahdi at the 
mosque). Also it was emphasised that the state had not done anything to deserve the 
rebellion of its people. For these reasons the members of the group deserved to be 
beheaded or to die as unbelievers, since they were causing division in the community 
(Ibid. 89, 91). The acclamation of the mahdi was disqualified by the ulama, who stated 
that there were clear indications according to the sacred sources of the features of the 
mahdi, not as the group claimed through the dreams of Juhaiman's sister or the wife of 
the declared mahdi (Holden, 1982: 520). 
The take-over of the holy Mosque at Mecca did not attract many followers. 
Juhaiman's group attracted more condemnation than sympathy inside the Kingdom and 
among the international Muslim community. The take-over lasted for two weeks. Some 
of the participants were killed in the mosque and others were executed later. 
The reaction of the government immediately after these events was to reinforce 
the role of religion in the Kingdom. The allocation given to religious activities was 
increased in comparison to the previous economic plan from SR 1,262 millions is 
allocated during the Second Development Plan (1975-1980) (Ministry of Planning, 
1981: 427), the allocations in the Third Development Plan (1985-1990) reached the 
figure of SR 9,043 millions (Ministry of Planning, 1991: 80,390). The policy of 
supporting the construction of mosques was emphasised once more. The appointment of 
' The first separatist group in Islam. This group is considered deviationist, since they refused to arbitrate 
the dispute between Mu'awiyya and Ali according to the judgment of Qu'ran at the battle of Siffin. See 
Delia Vida G. (1987). "Khawaridjites" in EI. (Leiden, E . J . Brill), pp. 904-908. 
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a member of the Al al-Sheikh family to the post of Minister of Justice constituted an 
attempt to restore the traditional pattern of the Al al-Sheikh family being in charge of 
the justice system. 
The ulama, as pointed out by Al-Yassini, emphasised in their sermons after the 
event the legitimacy of the house of Al Saud, as rulers who uphold the Qur'an and 
shari'a . Also, they highlighted their conception of Islam as one of moderation and not 
of radicalism, in opposition to the one embodied in the arguments and actions of the 
rebel group. Oil and wealth, they said, are gifts of God and should be enjoyed with 
moderation. In this regard, it was noticed that prominent ulama appeared in television 
programmes in order to explain the compatibility between Islam and well being (Al-
Yassini, 1985: 128). 
In general, during the decade of the eighties, the government tried to reinforce 
its commitment to religion and the role of the ulama supporting them. Some of the 
people interviewed commented that during the eighties the power of the ulama was at 
its height. The enforcement of women's regulations and the activities of the religious 
police provide evidence to support this opinion. 
5.2. The Opposition in the Nineties 
The Second Gulf War (1990-1991) was the catalyst for the emergence of 
organised voices of dissidence in Saudi society. The events that shaped the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and later Iraq's defeat have been the object of numerous analyses in 
different sources. The invasion provoked fear in Saudi Arabia over an escalation of the 
conflict over Saudi territory, and as a result the assistance of United States was sought 
in order to prevent the fear from becoming a reality. 
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The Second Gulf War exposed the vulnerabilities of Saudi Arabia, as well as of 
the other Gulf countries, in both external and internal aspects. The reliance on the 
United States and Western forces, in general, to defend the Saudi Kingdom became 
subject to criticism, as also was the amount of money spent on defence. The amount of 
money spent by Saudi Arabia on the Desert Storm military operation amounted to 60 
billion dollars, in addition to the 20 billion dollars already spent on helping Iraq in the 
war against Iran. This spending made Saudi Arabia feel the effects of economic 
recession, emphasised by the continuous decline in the price of oil since the 1980s. The 
appearance of deficits in the yearly budgets and the plans to curb them provoked a 
reduction in subsidies and a rise in prices, including fuel (Cause, 2000: 82-84).'^^ At a 
social level, the policy of enforcing Islamic values and the role of the ulama in allowing 
the entrance of foreign troops, was regarded as a paradox. The continuous religious 
mobilisation to support the legitimacy of the regime during the eighties reverberated 
during the nineties in an opposition that used Islam as a mantle for its demands. 
In order to understand how the contestation was produced, it is necessary first to 
look at the reaction of government and ulama to the issues of the defence of the country, 
as this is the context where the opposition groups emerged. Then an analysis of the 
demands of each opposition groups will follow in order to study the nature and scope of 
those groups and the effect on the balance of the relationship between the ulama and the 
government. 
5.2.1. Defending the country 
After the invasion of Kuwait and after knowing that Iraq's troops were 
deploying on the north east frontier (close to the area where the oil reserves are), the 
Also see an analysis on the budget limitations and the economic policies implemented by the 
government in the decade of the nineties see: Krimly, Rayed (1999). "The Political Economy of Adjusted 
Priorities: Declining Oil Revenues and Saudi Fiscal Policies" in Middle East Journal 53, (2): 254-267. 
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King decided to request the support of American forces, as a preventive measure, 
hoping that this would deter Iraq from advancing into the Saudi Kingdom. As happened 
on other occasions, the unity of the royal family and the search for religious legitimacy 
to endorse government policy were of key importance in responding to the challenge. 
At the governmental level. King Fahd in response encouraged the international Muslim 
organisations to pronounce their opinion in favour of his policy, bolstering the regime's 
Islamic legitimacy abroad. At the internal level, the official institutions of ulama made 
declarations supporting the policy pursued by the state. 
The ulama issued afatwa supporting King Fahd's request. The terms employed 
in the fatwa echoed those used by of King Fahd, stressing the measure of prevention of 
such policy. 
"This duty is dictated by necessity in the current circumstances, 
and made inevitable by the painful reality, and its legal basis and 
evidence dictates that the man in charge of the affairs of the 
Muslims should seek the assistance of one who has the ability to 
attain the intended aim. The Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunna 
have indicated the need to be ready and take precautions before 
it is too late...".'^'' 
The Board of Senior Ulama's fatwa was followed by the fatawa from the 
nominal Mufti Ibn Baz, and the Council of Ulama from Medina. The remarks of the 
Mufti were oriented to underscore the illegality of the aggression committed by Iraq 
against Kuwait. According to Ibn Baz, in terms of the links and unity that should exist 
among Muslim countries, this action was against Islamic teachings and international 
law (Ibn Baz, 1991: 22). The Mufti saw it as imperative for all Muslim and Arab 
countries to condemn Iraqi actions, and established that the Iraqi regime according to 
Islam should return the territory and solve the problem by peaceful means (Ibid.). 
Finally the Mufti declared as correct the King's policy regarding the request of 
assistance from non-Muslims, because of the necessity of the situation, with the 
169 B B C S W B ME/0843/A/3 (15 August 1990). 
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objective to defend Islam and the Kingdom (Ibid. 23). 
The reactions, against the policy of allowing non-Muslim troops into the Saudi 
realm, were based on the grounds that this violated the sanctity of the holy places. These 
reactions came immediately from Iraq and others countries,'™ as well as from internal 
circles in Saudi society, as will be shown in the following sections. One of thefatawa 
that was issued in order to placate criticism concerning the violation of the sacred 
territory was the fatwa from the council of ulama from Medina, which stressed that the 
presence of foreign troops was not in the sacred territory. The ulama favoured the 
policy followed by the king and clarified that the holiness of the sacred places was not 
in jeopardy, since the troops of the US and the countries participating in the military 
coalition were in the Eastern province —more the 1,500 kilometres away. They also 
vindicated the role of the Saudi government in the protection of the sacredness of the 
two holy places, and of the Islamic shrines (Ministry of Information, 1992: 48-49). 
In another/afwa Ibn Baz said: "there is no doubt that asking the help of a non-
Muslim to defend and protect the Muslims from the enemies is permissible according to 
the shari'a and is even a duty at time of the necessity", supporting his opinion by the 
traditions of the prophet (Ibn Baz, 1991: 34). 
5.2.2. Defending women's role 
As stated in the previous chapter, the government and the ulama, in an attempt 
to reinforce the regime's legitimacy during the decade of the eighties, focused on 
restricting the role of women. In spite of these restrictions women were able to play 
with the rules in order to cope with the boundaries imposed by social practices. Some, 
'™ It is important to note that the use of Islam and the proclamation offatawa came from both sides of the 
conflict, one from Saudi Arabia and her allies and the other from Iraq and its supporters. Although the 
latter is out of the scope of this study. See Haddad, Ivonnne (1996). "Desert Storm and the War of 
Fatwas" in Masud, Muhammad Khalid, Brinkley Messick and David S. Powers (eds.). Islamic Legal 
Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), pp. 297-
309. 
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taking advantage of the "disadvantages", have been able to excel in their areas of 
occupation.'^' A group of women have been using literature to challenge the system, 
subverting the elements used to justify their subordination in order to contest the 
dominant discourses and policies.'^^ 
In this section the purpose is to focus on how women have been able to 
challenge society's norms, using the Islamic discourse in order to defend their role in 
society. Particular attention will be given to the issue of women's driving rights,'^'' and 
the current discussion of the issues and challenges that women have been facing after 
the second Gulf War. 
One context of the women's position was highlighted by the Gulf crisis and the 
contrast between the restriction on Saudi nationals and the relative openness of the 
regime towards foreigners. Some flexibility in the rules was introduced, in part, by the 
arrival of Kuwaiti families, and, in particular, by the fact that Kuwaiti women were 
driving their cars from their country to Saudi Arabia. The presence of military personnel 
and media during the Second Gulf War further encouraged the flexibility of the rules. 
Moreover, the Saudi government encouraged women to participate as volunteers 
providing medical and nursing assistance.''''* The response of women to the 
governmental policy was positive and was inspired by a sense of patriotism. 
In spite of the limitations that women have to deal with in order to do research, such as having only an 
assigned day to use certain libraries, or having to request material by fax or phone from a number of 
libraries, and only being allowed to specialise in certain areas, women in their different fields have been 
able to caiTy out important research. In addition, women have been able to contribute to their community 
through charity programmes established by women. 
'^ ^ During the 1980s women were able to address issues related not only to them, but also to the whole of 
the society. As Arebi's study about women writings shows, women through literature have been able to 
recreate the role of women both in ideal and real terms, challenging the view of women portrayed by 
religion, tradition and the holders of power. Arebi, Sadekka (1994). Women Words in Saudi Arabia: The 
Politics of Literary Discourse. (New York: Columbia Press), pp. 268-269. In the seventies women were 
discussing issues like polygamy, unrestricted divorce discrimination between boys' and girls' education, 
restricted personal freedom, among other topics according to al Manea, Azeezah a (1984). Historical and 
Contemporary Policies of Women's Education in Saudi Arabia. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Michigan), p. 141. 
An extensive narration and analysis has been elaborated by Doumato, Eleanor (1992). "Gender, 
Monarchy, and National Identity in Saudi Arabia" in British Journal of Middle Easter Studies 19, (1): 31-
44. Also see, Doumato, Eleanor (1995). "The Ambiguity of Shari'a and the Politics of 'Rights' in Saudi 
Arabia" in Afkkhaim, Mahnaz (ed.). Faith and Freedom: Women's Human Rights in the Muslim World. 
(London: L B . Tauris). pp. 147-151. 
See Saudi Gazette (14 September 1990). p. 3; also 17 and 25 September p. 3. 
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The situation of relative openness and the presence of the international media 
were used as an occasion for forty-seven women to demonstrate in favour of their rights 
to drive cars in Saudi Arabia. The group of women drove their own cars for less than 
half an hour in Riyadh and submitted a letter to Prince Salman, governor of Riyadh. As 
Doumato highlighted, the women in their petition to the prince used Islam as the basis 
on which to claim their right to drive: 
..."Our demand is corroborated by religion. The traditions of our 
Prophet Mohammed, may God's blessing be upon him, the Four 
Caliphs and the early believers and their dependence on the 
efforts of women are evidence confirming the greatness and 
comprehensive nature of Islam in acknowledging the rights of 
everyone. The prophet, may God's peace and blessing be upon 
him, said, 'Take half of your religion from this 'red-haired 
women'" (Doumato, 1995: 139). 
Society, in general, reasserted its conservatism through its reaction to the 
demonstration. The reactions of society, in general, were those of condemnation, 
showing that conservatism and traditional values were deeply rooted in society. The 
demonstration, in a time of crisis over the legitimacy of the regime, went against the 
"established" rules of society.'^ '^  The women were eventually set free, after being 
detained for many hours, but their passports, together with the passports of their 
husbands, were confiscated, the women lost their jobs and they were not allowed to 
travel. The reaction of fellow women was that of shame against the demonstrators, 
according to a number of interviewees. Furthermore during Friday sermons they were 
considered "the worst of the society" by both official ulama and by non-conformist 
ulama. 
The ulama, before the non-conformist ulama could take a lead on the issue, 
issued a fatwa declaring women driving as being opposed to Islam. This fatwa 
portrayed women driving as an activity which would lead to depravity, and stressed the 
One of the interviewees expressed his ambivalence towards this issue stating that he agreed with the 
demand of the women demonstrators, but the time conceived by them was wrong, since they delayed the 
public discussion of the matter for more years. Interviewee f. 
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confinement of women to the private sphere: 
..."Women driving leads to many evils and negative 
consequences. Included among these mixing with men 
without her being on her guard. It also leads to the evil 
sins due to which such an action is forbidden...The 
purifying law forbids all of the causes that lead to 
depravity... Women driving cars, however is one of the 
causes that lead to that..." (Ibn Baz, 1996: 310-311). 
The Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif, issued an announcement re-stating the 
official ban on women driving for both Saudi women and foreign residents,'^^ based on 
the fatwa by the Council of the Ulama, adding that there would be a suitable 
punishment for the violators of the ban which "goes a long way in protecting sanctity 
and preventing the causes for the degradation of women".'''' Later in an address by the 
Minister of the Interior to the Literary Club in Riyadh, the Minister stated that the 
government would not tolerate any demonstrations, as long as the doors of the officials 
are open to discuss any matter. He depicted the women demonstrators as women who 
were educated abroad and had received non-Islamic education.''^ 
The government and the ulama acted in tandem, condemning the demonstration 
and banning women from driving. The government exploited the affair, distracting 
public attention on the polemic raised by the presence of foreign troops in the country. 
Prince Nayif in his address to the literary club in Riyadh, reiterated the dangers of 
adopting Western ideas. He stressed the importance of protecting the youth in particular 
from "destructive ideologies and suspicious imported culture"."^ The ulama, by 
standing against the driving demonstration, tried to remove the possibility that the 
women's issue would be contested by the fundamentalist or extremist ulama. 
Once more women were at the centre of polemics. The Gulf crisis and the 
effects on Saudi society made women the scapegoats of the regime, to vindicate its 
'Although the issue of western women from American forces was not discussed, obviously an exception 
was made. Arab Press Service (17 November 1990); B B C S W B ME/0922/A/12, (15 November 1990). 
'^''Saudi Gazette, (14 November 1990). p. 1. 
™Saudi Gazette, (16 November 1990). p. 1. 
"'Ibid. 
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religious credentials and to defend the country from the influences of the Western 
presence. For the ulama, this was particularly important for their stance in the context of 
the conflict, reaffirming their authority and avoiding any interference or challenge to 
their monopoly of interpretation over women's roles. Only recently did the women's 
demonstrators gain compensation for the loss of their jobs, but even nowadays some of 
them continue to face hostility in their social and work activities. 
The economic effects of the Gulf crisis emphasised the need for women to work 
outside the house and, at the same time, emphasised the economic burden that hiring a 
chauffeur or a taxi represented. The appearance of graduate women being unemployed 
and the freezing of public employment had made it difficult for women to face the 
situation."^" According to the official sources, by 1996 women's enrolment in university 
continued to increase to 104,489, representing 47,24% out of the total of students 
(221,177) enrolled. (Ministry of Higher Education, 1997: 21). Although new areas of 
work had been taken by woman, in the media, computing, and business, they still face 
difficulties in finding jobs, due to economic and social circumstances. 
According to interviewee f, the limitations imposed on women have affected the 
development of society. If the government freed women, it would reduce the pressures 
on men, and would reduce the money going abroad as foreign remittances. Another 
interviewee, m, also agreed with the idea that women should be integrated into the 
labour force, and stressed the economic waste represented by the maintenance of big 
buildings for ladies bank branches. According to a religious scholar, J, women should 
have a public life and should have wider options regarding their educational options, but 
without the problems that women face in the Western world. 
From a social point of view, the obstacles that a woman has to face still come 
See Doumato, Eleanor, Abdella (1999). "Women and Work in Saudi Arabia: How Flexible are Islamic 
Margins" in Middle East Journal 53, (4): 568-583. 
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mainly from male attitudes. In a survey done by Arab News,'^' 80% of the interviewees 
agreed with the idea of women working outside their homes, but most stressed that 
women's jobs should be in "an environment with fixed parameters in accordance with 
traditional and religious values". Also of importance was the reference made by some 
males and females to the importance of a women's salary to alleviate the financial 
burden, although this was only openly recognised by 30%. The majority of respondents 
indirectly expressed the importance of having an extra-income, but they tackled the 
issue in traditional and religious terms, emphasising that a woman's income would 
enhance their independence and they would be able to spend the money on their own 
personal effects. 
Behind the stance of the groups of men, it is important to stress how well 
engrained is the notion of traditional and religious values, that set the parameters of 
women's space and behaviour. The role of ulama in re-creating the role of women in 
society, through their fatawa, was seen as natural. 
Women have become more vocal in contesting their role in society publicly, 
addressing social problems. One case of this is Nourah al Khereji, a contributor to the 
newspaper al-Medina, whose articles appear translated in Arab News. She addresses the 
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issues of the power of mutawwa'a, the lack of rights for women regarding the 
problems faced in dealing with the governmental institutions, education and other social 
problems. She wrote three open letters to the Shura Council, invoking Islamic teachings 
and providing examples of women figures from the past. The content of the first letter 
was a plea for a change in the laws, along the shari'a precepts, relative to the laws of 
Qawama or tmsteeship in the cases of divorced w o m e n . T h e second petition was 
This survey was performed on 50 males from allegedly all socio-economic backgrounds by submitting 
to them a written questionnaire. Arab News (23 January 1998). p. 3. 
Al-Khereji, Nourah. "From preventing vice and promoting virtue to tracking women and families: 
mutawwas give themselves a new role" Arab News, (29 January 1999). p. 3. 
Ai-Khereji, Nourah. "Letter to Shoura on Plight of Divorced Women", Arab News (5 March 1999). p. 
3. 
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about the role of the male guardian and the difficulties raised by this requirement.'^ "* She 
exhorted the ulama to reconsider the question of male authorisation, inviting the jurists 
to re-examine this issue in the light of women making pilgrimage without mahrim 
(guardian or custodian). The necessity of having to ask for male authorisation, in order 
that women can travel, is an issue that has been present for the last twenty years. In al 
Khereji's view, attention should be drawn to establishing a certain age where women 
can travel without authorisation. Another situation which Nourah identified was the 
authorisation for medical anaesthesia, where again male authorisation has to be 
provided. Men come to be completely in control of women, and a "woman is not 
recognised as a person responsible for herself and her body". The third letter made 
reference to the problems faced by Saudi women married to non-Saudis.'^^ In this case, 
the writer asked for a revision of some rights that are restricted for this type of family, 
like equality in education, allowing men to exercise the legal authority over his spouse, 
granting the husband a permanent iqama, etc. Also in this third letter, the writer 
exhorted the government to issue women with separate identification cards (ID) with 
photographs since this would enhance women's mobility. 
The Minister of Interior declared in March 2000 that soon women would have a 
separate ID.'^^ The issuing of the ID would be under women's control, in order to 
comply with traditional and religious norms. In his announcement, Prince Nayif 
emphasised the role of the government as women's guardian, saying "Women make up 
half of our society and the government, especially the Interior Minister, has always 
looked after their concerns". 
In May 1999, Crown Prince Abdullah, touring the Eastern region, made some 
remarks that brought back the polemic about women's right to drive. Also a high-
Al-Khereiji, Nourah. "Do Women Always Need a Male Guardian?", Arab News (12 March 1999). p. 
3. 
'"^  Al-Khereiji, Nourah. "The Problems that Woman Faces when Married to a Foreigner", Arab News (19 
March 1999). p. 3. 
Arab News, (22 March 2000). p. 2. 
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ranking prince suggested that the idea of women driving would be the subject of 
discussion in the Shura Council. In addition, another source linked to the government 
said to the researcher that in the near future women would be allowed to drive under 
certain conditions, such as age, and with a restriction to certain areas as a starting point. 
Once more, the reaction of the official ulama was quick. They released 
pamphlets against women driving, also the Board of Senior Ulama issued another/aAva 
about what has been published on women. In this fatwa four points reaffirmed the 
stance of the official ulama towards the women's issue. The first one was about the use 
of hijab (veilj, seen as a duty according to the holy sources. This ran counter to women 
driving, since she has to be covered. The second was specifically about the ban on 
women driving, saying that asking this would lead to women mixing with men and 
cause chaos in society (similar to the previous rulings). The third point stressed that 
women must not mix at work; and the fourth banned the use of photos of women on 
card identities.'^'' 
Recently Prince Nayif, the Minister of the Interior, reiterated the policy of 
prohibition on women from driving a car, addressing a group of students (by closed 
circuit television) at the Girl's Education College. He remarked that "the permission for 
women driving will only be discussed after society accepts the idea".'^^ 
As has been shown, women constituted the symbol of the government and the 
ulama to show their protection of Islam and society, at the same time influencing Saudi 
perceptions of women's role. Women's issues in times of crisis, become a source of 
unity between the government and the ulama which act in tandem to show the 
commitment to religion. On its part, society has recreated the roles of women according 
Bayan al-lajnah al-da'imah lil-buhuth al-'ilmiyya wa al-ifta' hawla ma-nushira fi al-suhuf 'an al 
mar'ah [The Statement of the Permanent Committee of Research, and Guidance and Opinion About What 
has been Published in the Newspapers on Women]. 12 May 1999. Signed by Ibn Baz, Sheikh Abdul Aziz 
bin Abdullah ibn Baz, Mohammed al-Al -Sheikh, Dr. Bakr bin Abdullah Abu Said, Dr. Saleh bin Fawzan 
al-Fawzan, 
Arab News (28 April, 2000). p. 2. 
205 
to religious opinions and government policies, creating and recreating the rules, as the 
attitude of men showed above. Nonetheless, these social practices are not homogeneous, 
since there is a group of women that rebel against the boundaries imposed on them and 
a group of men who want women fully integrated. 
5.3. The Petitions 
The most striking feature of the developments that took place during the Gulf 
crisis was the salient criticism towards the Saudi regime by Islamic opposition and other 
groups. The criticism of the presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil was a starting-point 
for critics, following the events of the Gulf war, to launch a wider critique of the Saudi 
political system. Basically two petitions caused considerable concern among the ruling 
elite: the petition of the "liberals" (so-named by the western media) which appeared in 
December 1990, and the petition of the religious scholars that emerged during February 
and May 1991, to become endorsed in the memorandum of advice in September 1992. 
The use of the mosques and the recording of sermons and lectures with critical 
arguments against the Saudi regime came to represent a challenge to the political and 
religious discourse traditionally held in the hands of the ruling family and the official 
ulama. Nonetheless, the core of the opposition voices came from inside the 
establishment itself: professors from Universities, leading ulama and judges among 
others.'^^ The consensus about the disclosure of the opposition in this context among 
western scholars was explained as the result of the weakness of the state to defend their 
territory and the reliance of the government on the help provided by United States, sided 
"''^  As described by Dekmejian, the 52 signers of the petition and the 109 of the memorandum, were 
mainly from the middle class and from Najd. A significant number of signers had PhD's and were 
dedicated to religious affairs. See Dekmejian, Hrair (1994). "The Rise of Political Islam in Saudi Arabia" 
in Middle East Journal 48, (4): 635-636. 
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with economic problems (Rathmell and Alani, 1996; Fakash, 1998 and Gresh, 1995). 
These problems were perceived by some Saudi people as a threat to their homeland, 
especially Saudi government links with western allies provoked a reaffirmation of 
Wahhabi identity vis-a-vis them (Dekmeijan, 1994: 630). The emergence of religious 
opposition showed once more the attempt to redefine the norms of the society and the 
political system (Asad, 1993: 211). 
As an immediate consequence, the relationship between the government and the 
official ulama was tested. The official ulama tried to mediate between the core of the 
opposition ulama and the government. In this section, an analysis of the petitions 
delivered to the King and the response of the regime to the growing opposition is 
presented. It is important to define the points of discontent and their continuity in the 
appearance of defined oppositionist groups. Emphasis will be given to how the ulama 
became fragmented over the issue of the criticism, and to look at the links which existed 
between the official and non-official ulama with the aim of assessing the impact of the 
latter on the former. 
The so-called "liberal petition", which appeared published in February 1991, 
was presented to the King during the last months of 1990 or early in 1991 by a group of 
professionals and businessmen This group of liberals was composed of technocrats such 
as the ex-Minister of Information Ahmad Abdu Yamani among others. The petition was 
moderate in the requests presented, emphasising the adherence of the petitioners to 
Islamic law, in order to avoid any criticism by the religious groups. The "liberal 
petition" requested the formation of a consultative council at national and regional 
levels, following the Muslim practice of shura, with limited powers and the adoption of 
a system of regulations elaborated by the Board of Senior Ulama and intellectuals. This 
petition also included the demand for opening up of media, a revision of the role of 
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women and a complete reform of the educational system. 
In May 1991, the religious grouping, composed of fifty-one individuals 
presented a petition to the King, endorsed by Sheikh Ibn Baz and Sheikh Uthaimin.'^' It 
is well known this petition brought into debate the issue of the balance in the 
relationship between the government and the ulama. The petitioners wanted a bigger 
role for both religion and the ulama. For this reason, they asked for the supremacy of 
Islamic law in all aspects of the Kingdom, stating the need to eliminate all the non-
religious regulations issued and strengthening the religious institutions. In this regard, 
one of the most important requests was for the homogenisation of all judicial 
institutions along with their independence from the King. Furthermore, they requested 
the accountability of public servants according to the shari'a and the opening up of the 
media. The point of convergence with the "liberal" petition was the creation of a 
consultative council, but the religious grouping wanted this to have a broader scope than 
that delineated by the former. According to the religious grouping this council should 
have the power to intervene in domestic, as well as foreign affairs. 
The reflection of the criticism about the issue of foreign troops in Saudi territory 
and the reliance of Saudi Arabia on Western allies to defend its territory found ground 
in these demands. The religious grouping raised the demand for a foreign policy based 
on the shari'a, avoiding alliances that run counter to it. The army and its role in 
defending the country was emphasised by the request to have some diversification in the 
acquisition of arms, avoiding dependence on Western countries. On the other hand, the 
references made to the economic situation were also important. The criticism 
emphasised the waste of money and the unequal wealth distribution, calling for the 
elimination of taxes and a reduction of fees, as well as the elimination of usury from the 
economy and the introduction of Islamic banking in the Kingdom. 
' " " / l / Bilad43 (15 June 1991). pp. 30-33. See also Article X I X (1991). Op. Cit. pp. 50-51. 
See Mideast Mirror, (24 May 1991). p. 22. Dekmejian, Hrair (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 630-631. 
208 
5.3.1. The response of the government 
The response of the government was the establishment of the much-promised 
Consultative Council'^^ and Provincial Councils,*^'' and the formulation of the Basic 
Regulations System in March 1992. The domestic pressures, within the scope of the 
reformist opposition both in terms of religious or liberal lines, played an important part 
in the reforms introduced by the King. A brief analysis of these reforms will be given 
here, emphasising the strategies pursued by the state in the aftermath of the Second Gulf 
War. The response of the government was within the parameters of Islam and aimed at 
strengthening the regime's legitimacy by opening space for participation through the 
establishment of the Consultative Council. This analysis will be preceded by the 
remarks of King Fahd in his speech introducing the reforms, as a way to of highlighting 
how the government was trying to reaffirm its legitimacy. 
As has been pointed out by Al-Rasheed, the message delivered by the King, 
introducing the reforms, constituted a powerful vehicle aimed at enhancing the King's 
legitimacy. He presented himself as following political and religious duties. On the one 
hand, he was responding to mounting opposition and, on the other, was presenting his 
authority within a framework of continuity anchored by Islamic traditions (Al-Rasheed, 
1996b: 367). As Asad contends, if a voice wanted to become authoritative, his discourse 
has to be formulated in terms of representing the present with a positive evaluation of 
the past and using common symbols and institutions to which the speaker and the 
audience can relate (Asad, 1993: 210). 
King Fahd's speech portrayed the reforms as based on continuity as regards 
respect for Islam and the commitment to defend Islam, its laws and the holy places. This 
continuity was put across as underpinning legitimacy, gained by the commitment to 
The Consultative Council was promised by Faysal in 1962. Later in 1980, during the aftermath of the 
Mecca Uprising, King Khaled also promised the council. And finally King Fahd announced the formation 
of it in 1984 and later in November 1990. 
'''^  B B C S W B ME/1319/6A/7, (5 March 1992). 
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Islam and by the King receiving bay'a (allegiance), according to the religious traditions. 
The legitimacy of King Fahd and his predecessors was seen as sanctioned, not only by 
the ruled, but, even more important, by the ulama and Islam (Ibid. 373). The King 
underscored three features governing the relationship between ruler and ruled: advice, 
co-operation, and obedience. Regarding the first, the idea conveyed was that the 
government should be prompt to react to criticism, and in this conjuncture the King was 
the initiator of the advice. The other two concepts stressed the fact that obedience to the 
King is not only a political issue but also a religious issue, such that the King's rule was 
founded on religious legitimacy (Ibid.). 
The three reforms introduced represent, in fact, the practices prevalent in the 
Kingdom. The Basic System of Regulations, composed of nine chapters, reaffirms 
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic State and the role of the shari'a in it. The division of power, 
in horizontal and vertical terms, is expressed. The horizontal division is represented by 
the different branches of government institutions: executive, judicial and legislative. 
Regarding the executive, a new practice with regard to succession was 
introduced. The traditional practice, exercised since the beginning of the Saudi state, 
had been from father to son. However after the death of Abdul Aziz, the succession has 
been horizontal from brother to brother, respecting the order of seniority among them. 
According to these new regulations, not only would Abdul Aziz's sons be able to 
succeed the king, but also his grand-children (Article 5). The King, according to the 
new regulations, was the only authority who could choose or dismiss the heir apparent. 
King Fahd, by royal decree, reaffirmed Prince Abdullah as Crown Prince. 
Regarding the traditional procedures to acknowledge the King, the failure to 
mention of the Committee of Prominent People {ahl al-hal wa al- 'aqd) meant, as is 
stated by Aba-Ramay,'^'' a movement away from the traditional religio-political 
Aba-Ramay, Rasheed (1993). "Constitutional Reform: A Systematisation of Saudi Politics" in Journal 
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 16, (3): 55-56. 
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partnership, since the ulama have to give their endorsement through the bay'a, as is 
stipulated in Section b of Article 5. These procedures remained along the lines of the 
Islamic traditions. In general terms, the King continues as the main source of authority 
in the Kingdom, holding the positions and privileges already in existence, while adding 
the power to amend or change the system of regulation. 
The vertical division of power according to the new regulations involved the 
creation of provincial councils, allowing the system to open spaces at the regional level 
for debate and for assistance in the co-ordination of national and regional development 
plans. The main aim of the provincial council was to decide priorities on the spending 
and developments plans. The membership of this council is not only inclusionary of the 
official heads of provincial government (such as the amir, who is the chairman of the 
council, his deputy as deputy chairman, the commissioner of the region and the 
governors), but also included ten members selected from the province on the 
nomination of the amir and confirmed by the King and with the approval of the 
Ministry of Interior. In general these councils are linked to the Ministry of Interior, 
which acts as an intermediary between the ministries and the council in cases of 
differences between over policies or projects. 
The most significant change in the legislative power was the creation of the 
Consultative Council, whose aim was to serve as a forum "to discuss and provide 
suggestions on the general policy of economic and social development",'^^ to study 
international law, charters, treaties, etc., to interpret laws, and to discuss annual reports 
submitted by ministers (Article 15).'^ *^  The membership was established at the 
beginning in 1993, with sixty members (in 1997 this was expanded to ninety), appointed 
by the King for a term of four years. According to the regulations, the choice of 
members was based on scholars and men of knowledge and expertise (Article 3). 
B B C S W B ME/1319/A/6-7 (3 March 1992). 
See analysis of the role of the Consultative Council, its scope and functions in Aba-Ramay Op. Cit. pp 
73-76. 
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According to the regulations, the member should meet three conditions: he must be a 
Saudi national residing in the country, he must be good and competent, and he must be 
not less than thirty years old (Article 4). 
The inclusion of Saudi citizens in the political debate can be considered to be a 
policy of co-optation by the regime, having symbolic and representational functions.'^^ 
In terms of co-optation, the membership of the first Consultative Council (1993-1997) 
strongly reflected this trend. In the first Council, priority was given to religious 
scholars, in an attempt to show the importance of the ulama in the Kingdom. The 
symbolic and representative functions were manifested by these religious elements, 
headed by the chairman of the Council under Sheikh Abdul Jubayr (member of the 
Board of Senior Ulama and ex-president of the Board of Complaints). In sum, nine 
members were from the ulama, thereby expressing the symbolic historical alliance. The 
composition of this grouping, however, was such that they represented different 
conditions. 
The policy of co-optation was evident from the inclusion of Abdallah bin 
Humayd (the Imam of the Grand Mosque, who had criticised United States support to 
Israel), Mani al Johany, Ahmad Al-Tuwayjiri and Zayd Abd al-Muhsin al Hussayn 
considered leading activists at King Saud University (all had been jailed in 1993) as 
members of the Consultative Council (Dekmeijan, 1998: 213). 
The establishment of the Consultative Council was aimed at opening up the 
spaces between government and governed, in a policy of inclusion based in 
geographical and social considerations. The geographical distribution showed that the 
main allocation went to Najd and particularly to the area of Qasim, the cradle of 
Wahhabism. Hijaz came second in terms of representation, while the other provinces 
had less representation. The inclusion of Shi'a representation in the Council, one in the 
'"^  Based in the classification of the Majlis roles described by Dekmejian, Hrair 1998. "Saudi Arabia's 
Consultative Council" in Middle East Journal 52, (2): 216-217. 
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first tenure of the Council and another two in the second tenure, indicated a further 
attempt to diversify the representational function and symbolised the rapprochement 
between the government and the Shi'a opposition which occurred in 1993. Additionally 
the tribal element, an important symbol in both Saudi history and present life, was 
represented by over one-third of the members of the Council whose family roots are 
related to the major tribal groups. But the overwhelming majority of the members where 
from the technocratic and bureaucratic sectors, which hitherto had lacked formal or 
informal channels of communication to the central circle of the regime (Dunn, 1995: 
37). 
The other branch of power, which was included in the Basic Regulation System 
was the judicial power. Several established practices were institutionalised under the 
regulations, such as the independence of judges and of judicial decisions (Article 46), 
and the role of the Supreme Judicial Council as the major regulator of the judicial 
affairs. The latter was made responsible for recommending the appointments or 
dismissal of judges to the King (Article 52). Nevertheless, in spite of the duality of the 
judicial system, the shari'a courts remained as the main channel to resolve such judicial 
matters (Aba-Namay, 1994: 68). 
A few weeks after the changes were announced. King Fahd made some remarks 
in his meetings with the ulama, in an attempt to prevent criticism. The King 
admonished the ulama, stating that the scope of religious speech in the sermons should 
be limited to religious matters, instead of worldly issues that were not related to the 
common interest (Gause, 1993: 37). 
The response of the government in general up to this stage was one of 
moderation, introducing reforms delineated in the context of Saudi culture and 
traditions. However it contained a strategy of reaffirmation of the regime's legitimacy, 
sustained by the religious traditions that the regime aimed to continue, with the help of 
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the official ulama, against the non-conformist ulama and other sectors of the society. 
The King's introduction of provincial government and the Consultative Council was 
aimed at broadening the participation of the citizens in political debate, without 
allowing participation in decision-making. The latter remained under the control of the 
first circle of royal princes, and especially the King. 
5.3.2. "The Memorandum of Advice" 
After the implementation of the basic regulations, the Islamist opposition 
presented a Memorandum of Advice'^ ** to the King, where the issues expressed in their 
petition were addressed in depth. This memorandum was organised by Sheikh Abdullah 
al-Jibrin, Sheikh Salman al-Audah, Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Sheikh Abd Allah al-
Jilali. This document represented the core of the demands of the religious opposition in 
the Kingdom. The content was an amalgamation of the criticism expressed already in 
the cassettes and lectures delivered since the Gulf conflict, whose concern was focused 
on the presence of foreign troops and the laxity of the norms. It was difficult for the 
government to counter this line of criticism, since it could be regarded as a moral 
exhortation rather than a political criticism (Asad, 1993: 214). 
The most important issue covered in this Memorandum was the role of religion 
in the Kingdom, in particular the role of the ulama. The writers of the document, when 
referring to the role of ulama, stressed the importance of the duty to call for forbidding 
evil and promoting good, according to the shari'a. Therefore the ulama and "callers" 
must have a high status in a Muslim state: they must be the first to be consulted and 
they must be the ones whom both rulers and ruled should turn to in order to clarify all 
issues related to religion and life (Memorandum of Advice, 1992: 16). The 
^''^ Mudhakirat al-nasiha [Memorandum of Advice] July 1992 (n.p.p.). 
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memorandum contained ten sections, as had the petition: the role of ulama and callers, 
laws and regulations, the judicial system and courts, the rights of the Muslims, public 
administration, economy and finances of the state, social institutions, media, armed 
forces and foreign policy.'"^"^ First, the signatories addressed the problems included in 
each issue, and after that gave advice. 
According to the document, the ulama play a marginal role in areas where they 
should have a greater role, such as legislation, culture, economy and the formulation of 
domestic and foreign affairs. Their marginality is emphasised, according to the writers, 
in the fact that the ulama fatwas are sometimes overruled if they are in contradiction to 
government's regulations. The official ulama are portrayed as lacking autonomy and 
independence, because they are part of the government's institutions. Furthermore, 
sensitivity over the ulama giving advice to the government leads to a restriction of their 
duties. Their constraints are signalled, for example, by the control of the government in 
the recruitment of preachers, and the control exercised over the topics and content of the 
Friday sermon (khutba). 
The memorandum put forward two sets of suggestions in order to remedy the 
situation. The first one referred to the ways the role of the ulama and callers should be 
reinforced. The second concerned the ways in which the state could perform its duty to 
implement da'wa (call to Islam) inside and outside the Kingdom. Regarding the 
reinforcement of the role of ulama and callers, seven suggestions or advices were 
addressed according to the Memorandum:^°° 
1. The idea of lifting all governmental limitations 
imposed on the freedom of religious scholars expression was 
stressed. In order to surpass these limitations they considered 
important the freedom in areas such as, the publication of books, 
fatawa, organisation of lectures, distribution of cassettes. 
Regarding the allegation against the ulama and callers, only the 
courts should deal with this. 
199 A well detailed description and analysis of the memorandum is presented by Fandy, Mamoun (1999). 
Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissident. (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 50-60. 
2(X) Memorandum of Advice Op.Cit. pp. 18-19. 
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2. It was propose the formation of organisations for 
the ulama and callers independent of any governmental 
department. The leadership of these organisations should be 
from the ulama of the community, rather than the ulama from 
the government, and the former ulama should be known for their 
knowledge and piety. 
3. The nomination of ulama to the Board of Senior 
Ulama should be based on their piety and on the grounds of 
their ability to do ijithad (reasoning). The criteria of selection 
should be the acceptance of the community of believers. Their 
dismissal from office should be only for mandatory reasons. 
4. In order to reinforce the role of ulama in 
establishing the shari'a law, a suggestion was formulated in 
terms that all system legislation and treaties must have the 
approval of the Board of Senior Ulama before their signature, in 
order to check their compliance with the shari'a. 
5. The religious endowments should be separated 
from state revenues, so that they would be dedicated to Islamic 
activities and its distribution through a charity society composed 
by ulama and judges. 
6. The activities of the ulama and callers should be 
expanded by enabling them to give and apply their advice in all 
departments and sectors of the government. 
7. Ulama and callers from abroad should be invited to 
hold seminars, encouraging co-operation between Saudi ulama 
from other parts of the Muslim world. 
In the case of the role of the state enforcing and supporting da'wa, the 
Memorandum presented five ways to attain this objective. The most important was the 
fact that the government should ensure that all of its departments followed Islamic law. 
The signatories suggested the formation of a special directorate for religious affairs in 
every department to ensure the fulfilment of Islam. Another important way was to open 
up the media, which is controlled by the government, in order to expand the space 
devoted to religious subjects and the scope of the media towards other countries. In 
general, the measures suggested requested the help of the state towards the spread and 
maintenance of religion, accompanied by the restructuring of the ways that the 
government managed the budget and wealth derived from the oil, according to Islamic 
principles. 
Their opinion concerning the judicial system and the court system was 
formulated in terms of the establishment of a new balance in the relationship between 
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the ulama and the government. Their point of departure was the criticism of the double 
legal system that prevails in Saudi Arabia:^*" the shari'a courts and the committees for 
specific cases created by the government. They exercised the role of the government in 
the application of justice. For example the manner in which the emir or Minister of 
Interior could withdraw cases from the court, and the ban placed on governmental 
bodies dealing with Islamic courts or being the subject of legislation. The memorandum 
stressed the importance of abiding by religious judgement as one of the most important 
duties in a Muslim state (Ibid. 38). 
Although the memorandum admitted that the Basic System of Regulations 
recognises the importance of the judicial system and its independence, the signatories 
aimed to consolidate a complete independence of the judicial system. In order to 
strengthen the autonomy of the judicial system, the memorandum called for a decrease 
in the intervention of the government in general. The signatories sought an independent 
role for the Supreme Judicial Council, which was regarded as important in safeguarding 
the authority of the shari'a. The memorandum stated that the Council should have the 
privilege to either request the governmental institutions to implement legal rules, or to 
ask anyone who causes the non-application of these to be subject to the courts for 
punishment. In addition, the Council should have the power to comment on the 
independence of jurisprudence. The members of the Supreme Judicial Council should 
be dismissed only on religious grounds. In parallel, a special system should be 
established, connected with the Supreme Judicial Council, through the implementation 
of the legal rulings and complaints about the lack of implementation. 
The memorandum clearly supported the unification of the legal system. 
Unification for the signatories would be attained with the cancellation of more than 
thirty committees, and by limiting the Court of Grievances to disciplinary cases only. In 
See chapter four. 
217 
general the revision of the judicial system and the regulations suggested in the 
memorandum had as a main aim the elimination of all the contradictions in the existing 
legal system. 
Regarding the economic sphere,""^ the memorandum criticised the amount of 
money wasted in supporting non-Muslim countries, in paying interest on loans from 
international banks (especially those in the United States) and the policy of keeping the 
price of oil low. The non-separation of zakat from the government budget, according to 
the document, prevented the money from being spent in areas established by the 
shari'a. Again, the idea of establishing an institution to look after the distribution of 
z.akat was brought here. The memorandum identified some areas which had not been 
given sufficient attention by the government such as education, (which areas needed 
schools and equipment), the medical sector (a better service to all the people) and in 
social security. The suggestions were basically an exhortation to the government to stop 
wasting money on other projects (such as the construction of sports halls, palaces, etc.), 
and to stop borrowing money because of the burden that this would represent for the 
future generations. Another important suggestion was that riba must be forbidden, 
stopping government from investing abroad and introducing a programme to establish 
Islamic banks. Regarding the oil policy, it was suggested that the government should 
protect the oil reserves by increasing the price of oil and should use the resultant 
revenues to increase the standard of living. 
The way chosen by the Islamists was, nonetheless, inside the framework of 
"Islamic traditions". The signatories offered advice to the King, but did not oppose 
202 Ibid. pp. 76-84. 
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him, the government or the state. The declared objective was to help the King to restore 
the role of religion in the Kingdom with the aim of strengthening the duty of 
commanding good and forbidding evil. 
The government's reaction to the memorandum was moderate, in an attempt to 
enhance its own credibility and Islamic credentials. As in the case of the women's 
demonstration, the publication of the memorandum was regarded as being against the 
rules of the "political game". Tacitly the government tried not to condemn the content 
of the religious petition, but rather its publication. Otherwise mention of the content 
would trap the government in a debate. The government pursued a policy of discrediting 
the publication of the Memorandum, warning the non-conformist ulama to focus on 
religious matters (Cause, 1993: 158). 
The official ulama followed the same stance as the government, denouncing the 
publication of the memorandum, and the intentions behind this act. The Board of Senior 
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Ulama in its /afwfl stressed several points. " It denounced the falsehoods contained in 
the memorandum, the way it was prepared and its publication. Regarding the 
falsehoods, the Board of Senior Ulama disqualified the signatories, establishing that 
they were "ignoring the good brought by the state". Furthermore, the signatories were 
portrayed by the Council as deviationist, ill-intentioned, ignorant, enemies and 
condemned their ideological links and commitment to foreign groups. The ulama ruled 
that the publication of the memorandum was against the Islamic tradition, since the 
offer of advice should be done in order to command good and forbid evil. According to 
the hadith "God expects from you three things: to worship Him, not to claim partners in 
deity with Him, and to cling to His rope and never divide and to give advice to whom 
Cod had entrusted with your affairs" (Ibid). The ulama through i\\\sfatwa made a call to 
close ranks. 
B B C S W B ME/149/A/15-16, (21 September 1992). 
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The official ulama's stance in this conjuncture was similar to the stance taken 
during the revolt of the ikhwan, where the ulama defended their position as the 
ideologues of the system against the rebellious ikhwan. The reason behind the fatwa 
against the Ikhwan, was the ulama's fear that they would lose their status, in so far as 
the rebellious leaders claimed to be more religious than the official ulama. And the 
same was at risk in this period. However it should be noticed that they did not enter into 
questioning the points raised by the Islamists, in an attempt to avoid being questioned 
about their own role. 
It is important to mention that, out of the eighteen members of the Board of 
Senior Ulama, six members did not sign the fatwa.^^'^ Later, on November 30, the King 
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nominated ten new members, replacing the ones who did not sign. Facing reports of 
the differences between the government and the religious body, the government in an 
official statement rejected those reports, stating: 
"The author forgot to mention that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has since 
his inception established the foundations with the guidance of God's book 
and the teachings of His messenger and that the Islamic faith which the 
government and people is eager to adhere". 
Other measures taken by the government to strengthen its religious commitment 
were to give ulama more space, and to create new institutions dedicated to Islam. The 
declaration of Ibn Baz as Mufti in 1993, sought to underscore the central place of the 
official ulama as the highest authority in religious matters. The official nomination of a 
Muft i had been previously interrupted by the death of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim 
™'* The following ulama were the ones who did not sign the petition: Abdullah Khayyat, Abd al-Aziz Bin 
Salih, Ibrahim Bin Muhammad Al-al-Sheikh, Abd al-Razzaq Afifi, Sulayman bin Ubayd, Abdel al-Majid 
Hassan. 
'""^  According to Royal Decree No. A/138 issued on the 30th of November 1992, the following ulama 
were nominated: Sheikh Nasir ibn Hamad bin Rashid, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Sabil, Sheikh 
Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Badr, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman ibn Hamzah al Marzuqi, Dr. Abdullah ibn 
Abd Al-Mohsin al-Turki, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Zaid al-Sulayman, Dr. Bakr Bin Abdullah al-Sulayman, 
Dr. Salih ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Atram, Dr. Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Sheikh. B B C S W B 
ME/1533/A/6 (2 December 1992). 
B B C S W B ME/1566/A/9 (17 December 1992). 
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Al al-Sheik in 1972, since when no one had been nominated for the post. Another 
important decision was the division of the Ministry of Awqaf into two institutions, the 
Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Mosques. In addition, the creation of the 
Council of Islamic Affairs headed by members of the royal family, represented an 
attempt by the government to create a pious image for two of the most criticised 
members of the royal family. Sultan and Nayif, and also a move to tighten the control 
over money invested in religious activities with the aim to avoid the deviation of funds 
to other activities.^''^ 
From the analysis of the petitions and the reaction of the government, it is clear 
that the religious opposition has constituted the only major organised opposition group: 
it has not needed to relate to, or to make concessions to, any other social groups, 
dominating the public discourse. This situation has constrained the government in the 
formulation of its agenda, since public opinion is mobilised around two poles — the 
government versus the religious opposition (Cause, 1993: 159). This has been reflected 
within the religious establishment, in the division between the official scholars and the 
non-conformist religious leaders. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the events 
indicated the domination of the state power in the definition of the relationship between 
politics and religion (Ibid.), the dominance of the religious discourse as the only mean 
to express and to frame demands is the result of the politics that emanated from the 
relationship between the government and official ulama. The creation of values and 
norms is not imposed, but is created and recreated by society. More than ever, this type 
of consideration stresses the necessity for the government to balance its relationship vis-
a-vis the ulama, in order to reinforce its credibility within society, as the only source 
that can endorse the legitimacy of the regime. In this regard, the formalisation of the 
independence of the judicial system and the predominance given to the shari'a courts in 
When the researcher asked to some of the interviewees about the creation of this office and their 
effects on the role of the ulama, their answer was rather positive, since they agreed with the fact that 
separation of activities is beneficial for the maintenance and spread of Islam. 
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the system of regulations recognised the dependence of the state on the religious 
legitimacy. It was necessary to give the ulama independence in their own realm in 
order, both, for the ulama and the government to keep their legitimacy. This 
dependency exists both in terms of the structure of the operation of the governmental 
system, and in terms of the need to protect the government against criticism. 
5.4. The Opposition View of the Ulama and the 
Government 
The importance of the existence of religious opposition in Saudi Arabia is due to 
the fact that the discourse used by the non-conformist ulama is not identified as a return 
to the Islam of the first Khalifas, but as a means to assess the regime's compliance with 
Islamic principles both in internal and external politics. 
The two main groups of Sunni opposition are the Committee for the Defence of 
Legitimate Rights and the Movement of Reform in Arabia, both currently based in 
London. These two groups are related to the religious movement called Islamic 
Awakening, which was the nucleus for the elaboration of the petition letter and the 
memorandum of advice. Two religious leaders, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Audah, 
were the principal voices of Islamic Awakening movement and are now associated with 
the two main opposition groups as sources of influence and example, since they are 
quoted in the propaganda and publications of these groups, and are regarded as 
examples of truly religious scholars. 
These two non-conformist ulama, who represent the young generation of Islamic 
scholars, are not only experts in religious subjects but are also familiar with secular 
studies, particularly in the case of al-Hawali whose specialisation is on secularism. Both 
preachers became the voices of dissidence against the policy of relying on the United 
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States for the defence of the country. Their speeches, which were reproduced in 
cassettes, showed the feeling of threat represented by the subordinate relations of Saudi 
Arabia to the United States, in particular, and with the western world in general. In the 
case of Hawaii, his idea of an ideal government is not a return to the period of the 
Prophet or the golden period of the Khalifas, but to the period of the first Saudi state 
(Fandy, 1999: 81). His preference is for a government based on co-operation between 
the religious and the political authorities, where the former constitute the senior partner. 
Salman al-Auda also urged the state to return to the original contract which lies at the 
bases of today's Kingdom (Ibid. 95). In general, al-Auda's criticism is not directed to 
individuals but to society in general, identifying the problems of corruption, material 
largesse that has benefited some, the lack of presence of religion in the media, the lack 
of dialogue between the authorities and society and the spread of secularist education 
and influence in the government (Ibid. 96). 
The main feature of the opposition groups is moderation. There is no place for a 
revolution, with the exception of Usama bin Laden and his declaration of jihad against 
the United States.^ "^  All opposition groups criticise the excesses of the ruling family, 
but they concentrate on applying the principles already contained in the Memorandum 
of Advice. It is important to point out that these groups are to a great extent Sunni and 
that the geographical area they represent is mainly Najd. In addition, all of these groups 
now are based outside of Saudi Arabia. Also contrary to the idea of the religious leaders 
as conservative and against any innovation, they used modern technology to spread their 
messages, through cassettes, electronic means and faxes. 
In the following sections, an analysis of the main religious opposition groups 
will be g i v e n . T h e analysis will focus mainly on the formulations of the groups 
regarding the regime and religion. 
uji^g Opposition", Jane's Intelligence Review, (1 December 1996). p. 20. 
For an extensive and detailed analysis of the opposition in Saudi Arabia see: Fandy, M. Op. Cit 
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5.4.1. The Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights 
This opposition group is directly linked to the genesis of the Islamic opposition 
in 1990, since it was the nucleus of the Islamic opposition that developed the petition 
letter and later the Memorandum of Advice. "The Committee for the Defence of 
Legitimate Rights" came into existence on May 7, 1993. The initial members of this 
organisation were very well known scholars, such Sa'ad al-Faqih (academic), Hammed 
al-Suleifeih, Abdullah al-Tuwaijari (academic and religious scholar), Abdullah bin 
Sulaiman al-Masari (well known Saudi religious scholar), Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman 
al-Jibreen (a member of the Ifta).^^^ Soon after its appearance, the ulama declared the 
existence of this group illegal under the premise that the Kingdom implements 
shari'a'^^ The members were stripped of their jobs and were jailed. However, some of 
them like al Faqih and the Muhammad al-Masari (the son of the religious scholar, who 
became the spokesman of the group) sought asylum in London, re-launching the 
organisation in 1994. 
The use of modern technology, fax and internet from London brought 
international attention to this opposition group and widened its local and international 
audiences. Nevertheless, the CDLR kept its roots, since its position and the content of 
its message remained to a large extent that already advanced in the Memorandum of 
Advice. The CDLR may be defined as moderate, since its aim is not to topple the 
regime, opposing the use of force. The organisation's aims are to make Saudi Arabia's 
government accountable, to regain the independence of the judiciary and to make the 
people aware of their rights according to Islamic law.^'^ These three principles are in 
'^^  Although later when established the C D L R in London, Ibn Jibrin issued a /afwa disqualifying the 
religious credentials of Al-Masari, and calling for the non-distribution of Al-Masari's false and 
exaggerated messages. Mideast Mirror, (3 May 1993). p. 190. 
Saudi Press Agency, (13 May 1993). p. 285. 
"Introduction to the C D L R " in http: WWW.demon.co.uk/cdlr/abouteng.html [28 August 1997]. 
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line with the principles advocated in the Memorandum of Advice. 
Through its publications, the CDLR has aimed to keep its audience in Saudi 
Arabia and abroad informed of the events taking place in the kingdom, especially the 
campaign of arrests and the policies implemented by the government. 
The Committee's approach is critical of the government, but it is cautious in its 
comments about Crown Prince Abdullah and Ibn Baz, figures who are respected among 
the majority of Saudi people. In contrast their criticism is directed against particular 
members of the royal family, especially King Fahd, Prince Nayif (Minister of Interior), 
Prince Sultan (Minister of Defence) and Prince Salman (Governor of Riyadh). A key 
point of concern of the organisation is the question of the economic problems, not only 
in terms of the management of the Kingdom's resources but also of its impact on the 
Saudi population. Published material and its spread to the foreign media, particularly to 
the western media, was in fact its main asset, since the government is particularly 
sensitive towards international criticism. 
The CDLR, in a series of articles, discussed the legitimacy of the regime and its 
position with regard to Islam.^ '"^ The way that issues are addressed is through an 
examination of the Saudi government's performance in the fulfilment of aims and 
objectives set in accordance to shari'a. The formulation of the criticism followed the 
position already established in the Memorandum of Advice: the restitution of the place 
of Islam, giving independence to the judiciary system, the accountability of public 
servants and the appointment of officials according to their qualifications. In general, 
the government was expected to direct its internal and external affairs according to 
Islamic law. The verdict reached by the Committee was that the current regime is 
illegitimate since it does not ful f i l the objectives and aims according to the religious 
law.^ '** On these considerations, the organisation established a duty on the part of the 
This analysis is contained of the CDLR Monitor, 1995 issues 49-55. 
CDLR Monitor No. 54. 
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community (umma) not to be passive, but for people to reject in their heart any sinful 
act and to support the scholars who advocate for reform. 
The manner in which they supported their claims is precisely in the way 
expressed by Asad, since it revolves around the historical and traditional religious 
sources in order to explain the present and to advance a kind of moral criticism (Asad, 
1993: 210).^''' Apart from the main religious sources, they rely mostly on the comments 
of Wahhabi sources, such as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Quyama, Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn 
Hassan al Sheikh and the previous Mufti Sheikh Ibrahim. As Al-Rasheed contended, 
they represent a syncretism due to their roots combined with their questioning of the 
established rules of the Saudi political game (Al-Rasheed, 1996a: 20). 
Nowadays, the activities of this group have been reduced, due to the debts of al-
Masari and the split between him and al-Faqih since early 1996."'^ The site of the 
CDLR on the internet (www.demon.co.uk/cdlr) is often used to advance the causes of 
other Muslim organisations based in Britain, like the Mujahirun and the Bangladeshi 
Muslim Literary Circle in Great Britain, in reflection of al-Masari's wish to extend the 
platform of the group. 
5.4.2 The Movement for Islamic Reform 
After the split with al-Masari, Dr. Faqih organised the Movement for Islamic 
Reform (MIRA), in March 1996, in London. Following the original scope and content 
of the CDLR, as well as its means, MIRA became another important source of Islamic 
'^ '^  For an analysis of the study of history and its relevance for the question of legitimacy and identity see 
Al-Rushed, Madawi (1998). "Political Legitimacy and the Production of History: The Case of Saudi 
Arabia" in Martin, Leonore (ed.). New Frontiers in Middle East Security. (London: Macmillan). pp. 25-
46; Nevo, Joseph (1998). "Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia", Middle Eastern Studies 34, 
(3): 34-53. 
Al-Masari in 1997 after his case of deportation, declared a debt over 100, 000 pounds according to The 
Guardian, (11 January 1997). p. 5. The dispute between Dr. Faqih and Al-Masari revolved around issues 
of management and ideological differences. The former was accused of disregarding collective decision 
and establishing links with other Muslim organisations; meanwhile Dr. Faqih was accused of taking funds 
and maintaining secret contacts with Crown Prince Abdullah. The Guardian, (7 March 1996). p. 11. 
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moderate opposition. The aims of MIRA are the quest for reform, particularly 
advocating the freedom of expression and association and the elimination of religious 
police in Saudi Arabia. 
The content of its main publications, Arabia Unveiled,"'^ showed the same 
concerns earlier expressed by the CDLR and under the umbrella of the Memorandum of 
Advice. The demands of the latter, such as the independence of the judiciary, the 
accountability of the government and royal family, the socio-economic problems 
derived from mismanagement, are among the most important in the MIRA agenda. Of 
particular importance is the continuous reference, in its publications, to the economic 
situation and especially to oil policy, accompanied by commentaries on defence policies 
and news about economic developments in the Kingdom. The criticism of the royal 
family is mainly directed towards King Fahd and his sons. Prince Khaled bin Sultan, 
Bandar bin Sultan, and Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, stressing the accrual of the wealth 
of the state by the Al Saud family. When referring to the issue of succession, the 
comments about Prince Abdullah are mild. Regarding the role of the ulama, the MIRA 
support their role as those responsible to keep Islam, but only recognise the non-
conformist ulama such as Safar al-Hawali. In contrast. Sheikh Ibn Baz was considered 
as lacking legitimacy because of his support for government policies. 
5.4.3. The Shi'a opposition 
The Shi'a community, since the unification of the Saudi state has been the object 
of a policy of rejection, being considered infidels and innovators. The opposition 
coming from this community has focused on its demands as a marginalized group in a 
Sunni oriented society. In the decade of the eighties, the main opposition group of Shi'a 
was the Organistion of the Islamic Revolution. Their stance, which focused more on 
complaints concerning economic and social issues, was rather aggressive amid the 
''^ See www.miraserve.com. 
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triumph of revolutionary Iran. Towards the end of 1980s, the Shi'a criticism began to 
focus on issues of human rights abuses in the Kingdom and the lack of popular 
participation, criticising the amount of power held by the King (Morraheded and Fandy, 
1997: 308). 
Since the nineties, the stance of the movement has shifted to "a minority in 
search of cultural authenticity", searching for a space in Saudi Arabia as a minority with 
a long history and traditions of its own, but at the same time as a member of the Saudi 
society (Al-Rasheed, 1998: 122). The name of the movement changed to the Reform 
Movement and its publication until 1993 was the monthly magazine Jazira al-'Arabiya. 
In spite of its firm position in reasserting its Shi'a identity, the movement's elaboration 
of its demands has had parallels with other groups of Saudi society that want greater 
openness of government. The criticism against the establishment stems from the rigid 
line taken by Wahhabism against the Shi'a community (Ibid. 129). 
The new stance of the Shi'a, and the context of the nineties with the emergence 
of the above-mentioned groups, favoured an agreement between the Reform Movement 
and the government. As this movement opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
participated in a general mobilisation against it on one hand, and as the government was 
eager to prevent a possible link between the reform movement with other opposition 
groups, the government shifted its long held discriminatory policy in favour of building 
a bridge. An agreement reached in 1996 involved the release of shiite prisoners, the 
issue of passports to those shiites wanting to return to Saudi Arabia, a review on the ban 
on travel of two thousand shiites and allowing the cultural and religious expression of 
the Shi'a community (such as the importation of books, the removal of negative 
references towards the Shi'a community and the acknowledgement of the Shi'a as one 
of the sects of Islam). 218 
218 Mideast Mirror, (27 August 1996). p. 17. 
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Shortly after the agreement, the events at al-Khobar in the 1996 bombing 
showed once more governmental suspicion about the Shi 'a community, since the arrests 
were concentrated in this community, and the agreement seemed to be far from 
implemented. In 1999, with the commencement of the restoration of diplomatic 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Saudis chose a member of the Shi'a 
community to become ambassador in Tehran. 
5.4.4. Other opposition groups 
Also founded in London was the Committee for Advice and Reform (CAR) 
linked to Osama Bin Laden, the famous mujahid currently "exiled" in Afghanistan. The 
message put accross by this organisation group was to some extent similar to that of the 
CDLR, but was more radical advocating jihad. Initially, the CDLR and this organisation 
issued communiques together, but later they became separated, partly because the 
stance of Bin Laden emerging as a major figure associated with terrorist activities (as 
portrayed by the USA) linked to the bombings in Kenya and perhaps in the 1995 and 
1996 bombings in al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia. 
Another opposition group is the Committee against the Corruption of Saudi 
Arabia (CACSA),^'^ based in the United States. According to its mission statement,^ ^" 
the CACSA aimes to change the status quo in Saudi Arabia. It claims no links with any 
other political or religious organisation and "condemns violence, extremism and 
fundamentalism". CACSA invokes moderation, stating as its second aim the change of 
leadership of the Saudi regime, not the system. It maintained that this could be 
performed without consideration of societal morals and the Islamic roots. This 
organisation aims as well for the establishment of new laws in order to allow freedom of 
expression and the protection of "basic human rights and women's rights as citizens of 
See www. saudhouse.com 
http:/www.saudhouse.com/mission.htm, 27 August 1997. 
229 
Saudi Arabia". 
The publications of the CACSA are focused on the denunciation of the policies 
carried out by the government and of the behaviour of the royal family, lacking any 
further elaboration on its aims. The origins of the group are uncertain, and some persons 
familiar with the opposition Saudi groups have pointed out the possibility that this 
organisation could be operated by Americans. However what is clear is that, due to the 
sensationalist styles, CACSA publications are more oriented to the western audience 
than to analysing and commenting on religious and socio-economic and political 
problems. These last two groups' websites have been removed from the Internet since 
1999. 
5.5. The Mainteiiaiice of the Regime 
The second phase of the regime and opposition confrontation started from 1994, 
with the arrest of the two well-known non-conformist ulama. The situation in terms of 
challenges launched by the opposition became more serious following the bombings in 
1995 and 1996. The escalation of violence showed how the opposition groups were no 
longer merely vocalising their complaints and reformist ideas, but were using violent 
means that threatened the security of the Kingdom. The government, aided by the 
official ulama, continued with its policy of emphasising its Islamic commitment, and at 
the same time enforced a more firm policy against the internal dissidence. The official 
ulama became more assertive in their efforts to defend their position vis-a-vis the 
opposition groups, disqualifying them and defending their own role as the moderates 
within the spectrum of religious groups in the Kingdom. If at the beginning the ulama, 
in particular Ibn Baz and Uthaimin, supported the letter of petitions, later, they retracted 
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their involvement. It did not matter that in principle they agreed with at least some of 
the observations of the petition. However, the official ulama did decide to keep their 
leverage with the religious preachers and at the same time to maintain their position as 
intermediaries between both sides. 
The policy enforced by the government in tandem with the ulama showed its 
religious credentials through the condemnation of the World Population Organisation 
and the International Women's Conference, on the grounds of these conferences being 
aimed against the principles of Islamic law. The condemnation showed their firm stance 
in defending Islam against the liberal and immoral values of the West, as exposed in the 
document of this conference.The ulama made an exhortation to boycott the 
international gathering and forbid attendance.This condemnation was followed by 
support from the government, which declared its support for the stance of the ulama. 
The major crackdown against the religious opposition groups culminated in the 
arrest of the two main popular ulama. Sheikh al-Audah and Sheikh Hawaii, in 
September 1994. The action against these two sheikhs was primarily on religious 
grounds, since the policy of the government was to leave this issue in the hands of the 
official ulama. The government was clearly aware that it lacked legitimacy and could 
not have any legitimacy if the official ulama did not co-operate. The reason behind the 
ulama's co-operation was their interest in reinforcing their position vis-a-vis the 
opposition groups, so as to maintain control of the religious discourse (which the non-
conformist ulama disputed). The previous year, the Board of Senior Ulama had issued a 
fatwa that established their stance against the two sheikhs and addressed the way that 
the authorities should implement their ruling. The Board suggested that the two men 
should stand before a committee formed by the government officials and two religious 
scholars chosen by the Ministry of Religion. This committee summoned the sheikhs and 
(1995). Majalat al buhuth al Islamiyya 45: 331-334. 
Mideast Mirror {\ September 1994 ). pp. 8-10 
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ask them to abstain from their activities and to apologise.However, the two sheikhs 
refused and continued their activities in the Kingdom until finally they were arrested 
together with more than one hundred activists. 
The government, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Interior, emphasised 
that the arrest was due to their violation of the resolution of the Board of Senior Ulama. 
In addition it stressed the role of the government as the guardian of society, protecting it 
from "people's evil", since the two sheikhs were accused of violating what "a Muslim 
committed to the consensus should do".^ '^* Behind these comments, it is clear that the 
government was legitimising its policy by enforcing the resolution of the Board and 
fulfilling its duty as the guardian of the nation. 
Another issue where the ulama and government co-operated, after the arrest of 
A] Hawaii and Al-Audah, was on the issue of foreign policy. The Mufti Ibn Baz issued 
a fatwa declaring the permissibility of making peace with Israel in December 1994,^ ^^ 
on the basis that the agreement would be a temporary one and should be dictated by 
"Islamic necessity". Thisfatwa was criticised by non-conformist ulama and by religious 
scholars from abroad in cassettes and lectures. Since 1991, Saudi Arabia attended the 
Madrid Conference and became associated with meetings as an observer, opening the 
way for a major involvement in the Arab-Israeli issue. This was important in order to 
keep a balance of power in the region. 
The regime had to overcome a difficult period when the opposition orchestrated 
the attacks on US installations in the Kingdom. The bombings of American installations 
in Riyadh in December 1995, where five Americans died, were in reaction to the arrest 
of the opposition activists, as well as against the US military presence in the Kingdom: 
an issue that had been criticised constantly since the early nineties. A group called "the 
Partisans of God Fighting Organisation" claimed to be responsible. They were asking 
--^ Resolution 2/951. Mideast Mirror (27 September), pp. 16-17. 
--"Ibid. p. 16. 
--^ Mideast Mirror {14 Fchrmry 1995). pp. 13-16. 
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for the evacuation of US forces from the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf States. They 
demanded the release of the religious dissidents, the lifting of all curbs on Muslim 
scholars and preachers, and the full implementation of the shari'a}^^ After five months, 
the government claimed to have captured those responsible who, in their confessions, 
admitted links with the CDLR and Bin Laden (both CDLR and Bin Laden rejected their 
involvement) and a Jordanian religious organisation.^" 
Later, in 1996, the bombing in al-Khobar uncovered another group discontented 
with the regime. The attack, targeted towards the American presence, caused the 
concern and involvement of the United States. The first reaction of the Saudi 
government was to arrest people belonging to the Shi'a community, from the eastern 
province. Once more the official pronouncements suggested a foreign link with the 
group, pointing towards Iran. It was clear that the timing of the bombing coincided with 
the execution of the people involved in the bombing of Riyadh. Later, after a period of 
investigation, those responsible for the bombing were revealed to be Arab-Afghans 
(Saudis who had participated in the liberation war of Afghanistan). The latter clearly 
comprised a social grouping dissatisfied with the regime and its relations with the USA. 
The ulama issued a fatwa condemning the events of al-Khobar and exhorting 
people to the right path.^ ^^ The preachers' pronouncements in the mosques stressed the 
importance of closing ranks with the monarch and avoiding any action that would 
endanger the Kingdom. 
In spite of the governmental policies against the Islamist opposition, the 
government allowed some preachers to vent some criticism against the West. The Imam 
of Mecca, Sheikh Saleh ibn Hamed, launched a serious attack on Israel's offensive 
towards Lebanon in that year, blaming the USA as being responsible for these events. 
The precedent lor the signature of the agreement is found according to the Mufti in the truce that 
Mohammad established with the people from Mecca. Mideast Mirror, (14 January 1995). pp. 10-14. 
Mideast Mirror (15 November 1995). 
--^ (1996). Majalat al huhuth a- Islamiyya [Magazine of Islamic Research] 47: 367-370. 
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His sermon appeared on the front pages of Saudi newspapers.Another important 
voice was that of Sheikh Al-Sudeiss, who condemned the influence of the West through 
its satellites and the damaging effects on Saudi values. 
In general, due to the violent nature of the events and the policy against the 
opposition groups analysed above, the government and ulama managed to control the 
situation. The government in the following years, as has been mentioned, supported the 
official ulama and co-opted other groups (such as the Shi'a) or individuals in order to 
neutralise the Islamist oppposition, amid policies aimed at enforcing its legitimacy 
anchored in the religious and social practices of the Kingdom. 
Of the opposition groups abroad, the only one which remains active is MIRA. In 
general, the Islamist opposition inside or abroad has remained fragmented, and without 
any coherent strategy that could sustain or advance its cause. As is contended by 
Kostiner, the threat posed by the Islamists will depend on the ability to draw supporters 
from educated or professional circles and the credibility of their criticism toward the 
goverment (Kechichian, 1997: 7). 
From the opinions given to the researcher about the role of the ulama in the 
kingdom, it is clear that the majority of religious scholars agree on the importance of the 
role of the ulama in general, upholding religious values and as persons who can advise 
the king and the emirs in general on the public interest. Interviewees L and M agreed on 
the flexibility of the ulama to adapt to the changes through ijtihad, and added that the 
main domain of the ulama is the judicial affairs. Only one religious scholar considered 
that the role of the ulama had decreased. He argues that the ulama have gradually been 
limited by the government in terms of the areas where they can exercise their authority. 
Furthermore, although he acknowledged that most of the official ulama were true 
scholars, he considered that their age and lack of contact with other cultures deterred 
French Press Agency FBIS-NES-96-088, 4 may 1996. 
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them from being open towards changes taking place. The younger generation is more 
open since they have travelled and their studies had not been traditional. 
From the interviews with non-religious scholars, interviewees j and k stated that 
the official ulama were important for society in order to control the rhythm of changes. 
Interviewee f, however, did not like the stance of the younger ulama who, he said 
sought political authority. In contrast, interviewee e, regarded the ulama as totally 
dependent on the government, stating that forty years ago, the ulama could talk directly 
to the people, whereas now they have to ask permission of the goverment. 
The death of Ibn Baz in April 1999 showed the high esteem in which he was 
held among most of Saudi society, in spite of the heated debate over his stance as part 
of the regime. Immediately, Sheikh Muhamad al Sheikh, who had previously been the 
deputy of the Mufti , was appointed as the new Mufti. However, some religious scholars 
linked to the system were unhappy at the appointment of the Sheikh as they had 
favoured the appointment of Sheikh Muhammed ibn Saleh bin Uthaimin, considered by 
many as a distinguished and true scholar {huq). The activities of the mutawwa'a became 
more noticeable immediately after the death of Ibn Baz and the appointment of a new 
Mufti . Some Saudis interpreted this as a demonstration of the discontent with the 
appointment of the new Mufti and their preference for Sheikh Uthaimin. 
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Conclusions 
Saudi state and society, as have been portrayed in this study, are crucial 
elements in understanding the internal dynamics that are often disregarded by scholars 
and studies about Saudi Arabia. The dynamics unfolded in this study have shown how 
the link between society and government is paramount in sustaining the legitimacy of a 
regime, and through this how important the roles of the ulama and the government are 
in sustaining that relationship. Going beyond the simplistic approaches commonly 
applied to the case of Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, focusing on 
authoritarian form of government or on rentierist political economy approaches, this 
study has illustrated how complex the threads of the dynamics are that sustain the 
legitimacy of Saudi Arabian political system, and with it the pivotal roles that the ulama 
and government play. 
The point of departure in this study, in contrast to the studies mentioned, is a 
particular notion of power. Rather than power being considered as power over, that is to 
say power conceived as being imposed. This study focused on a notion of power not 
imposed from above but stemming from society itself. In this way authority is perceived 
as an aspect of power relations and, at the same time, as a means of power. Legitimacy 
focuses primarily on the relationship between the authorities and society sustained by 
the agreement between both parties about the rules and values that regulate the society 
in general, including the political system. For these reasons, the authorities in order to 
become authorities and to be regarded as such have to have legitimacy and maintain 
such legitimacy through an ongoing process. 
Following the proposals of Giddens, Sewell and Onuf, it is shown that some 
actors have more resources than others to participate in the creation and recreation of 
the norms. In this sense the ulama, the main interpreters of the sacred sources, have 
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displayed their authority. The government has exercised power through its command of 
authoritative and material resources, and as the guardian and enforcer of the religious 
precepts. However without the compliance, consent and practice of those rules or norms 
by society neither the ulama nor the government would maintain their role as 
authorities. The way the Saudi Arabian people experienced Islam, creating and 
recreating the norms, has been a product of their own development as an organised form 
of state. The importance ascribed to how things are and how they work, or what one 
should do or must do, are the norms that regulate daily life in society. The content of 
those norms has been determined by the practice and tradition of that society. 
In this study a group of hypotheses were established in order to offer a guide to 
understanding the relationship between both the government and the ulama in 
contemporary Saudi Arabia. It has been the main purpose of this study to show the 
existence of interdependency between both types of authority through the phases of 
cooperation and conflict. 
Given that this relationship is interdependent it has been necessary to look at the 
way that both society and government have reproduced an "agreement" that is the basis 
for the maintenance of the relationship between the government and governed, and with 
it the preservation of both authorities and the political system. The preservation and 
enforcing of religion is at the core of the relationship between government and 
governed, where the creation and practice of the notions of authority and legitimacy 
have revolved around religion. The alliance between Muhammad ibn Saud and 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab created a religious movement anchored in spreading 
Islam across the peninsula and formed an organised entity around religious precepts. 
This was the rationale of the famous alliance between the founders of the current Saudi 
Arabian Kingdom. In practice, the movement was supported by the legitimation given 
to Muhammad ibn al-Saud and his descendants by the ulama on one hand, and on the 
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other, on the support of Al Saud family for the expansion of the religious call. 
The religious principles envisaged by the Wahhabi doctrines emphasised the 
active character of the individual towards religion and established the norms and values 
from where the principles and social practices of legitimacy have been derived. The 
notion of tawhid, the raison d'etre of the movement, stressed the active involvement of 
their members, in an attempt to overcome the tribal differences and to attain the 
unification of central Arabia. 
The interdependence between the ulama and the government found justification 
in the principles of Hanbalism and specifically in the notions of authority and 
legitimacy provided by the Hanbali and Wahhabi religious scholars. The emphasis on 
the role of the temporal authority as guardian of the religious precepts constitutes the 
most important value that legitimises the authority. Furthermore, the notion of 
obedience to the temporal authority and its importance in avoiding the disunity of the 
community constitute the main principles in determining who are the authorities and 
what is the relationship between the government and governed. These principles, upon 
which the community and the authorities revolve, were outlined by the Wahhabi 
scholars during the historical periods, contributing to the formation of what al Azmeh 
has termed the "Wahhabi ethos" or an Islamic way of life, which continues to be 
elaborated and recreated through the practices of both state and society. 
The practices of the relationship between ulama and government evolved in 
tandem with the consolidation of a central authority, as well as the extension of the 
movement. At the beginning, then, the relationship between Muhammad ibn Saud and 
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was based on cooperation, and the role of the Al al-
Sheikh family was important in the creation of the first and second Saudi state. With the 
organisation of the third Saudi state, the role of the ulama in participating in decision-
238 
making policy has gradually decreased, but their role as the major enforcers of religious 
principles, administrators of justice and educators has remained. 
From the ulama's side, their dependency on the political authority stemmed 
from the origins of the Saudi state formation. The ulama have been financially 
supported by the central authority. This practice, born from the necessity of 
differentiating them from the Ottoman ulama during the first Saudi state, has continued 
until the present. They have not enjoyed any specific link with any other social group, 
since they were initially the only differentiated one, in which the Al al-Sheikh family 
enjoyed a special status. Their status, as representatives of the central authority and 
simultaneously as the only source for the transmission of knowledge, gave them a role 
as the main actors involved in the constitution of the forms of life and the principles 
underlying the practice not only of religion, but also of politics. The acceptance of 
religion meant at the same time the acceptance of the political authority. 
It is also important to consider the ulama's role as providers of legitimacy for 
the transmission of power. The oath of allegiance, a practice enforced by the Wahhabi 
scholars, was performed first by request of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, 
before the death of Muhammad ibn Saud to his son Abdul Aziz. The latter held both the 
title of Emir and Imam, since when the Al Saud successors have held these two titles. 
Since then all the successions and their respective oaths of allegiance have had the 
ulama first as main guarantors, followed by the rest of the population. In cases of 
dispute among different challengers to the political authority, the ulama have 
maintained their role as the upholders of the unity of the religious community, and also 
have aligned themselves with the de facto power holder, as happened during the second 
Saudi state, and in the third state with the deposition of King Saud and their approval 
for Prince Faysal as successor. 
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The transformation of the central authority into forms of an organised polity 
occurred in tandem with the ulama's transformation, particularly during the formation 
of the third Saudi state. The consolidation of political authority brought in the 
institutionalisation of traditional practices. Initially the unification of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia brought in the enforcement of Wahhabi principles, based on the Hanbali 
school of law and with it the role of Wahhabi Najdi ulama. Later, with the reforms 
introduced by King Faysal, the institutionalisation of different domains of activities also 
brought in the formalisation and institutionalisation of the ulama's role. Even with the 
appearance of progressive government regulations and specialised judicial committees, 
still the role of the ulama and the prevalence of shari'a remain paramount in the 
Kingdom. Moreover, in the articles of the Basic Regulations of 1992, the primacy of 
shari 'a was enunciated. In the same way, the autonomy of the judiciary is formalised by 
these regulations. 
During the contemporary period, the ulama are far from being removed from 
their primary role as interpreters of the religious sources and exercising their influence 
in determining society values and norms. The place of the shari'a continues to remain 
as the source of norms, and, as regarded by Salvatore, as a metanorm. As it was pointed 
out, the basic regulations formalised the role of the shari'a and the importance for the 
articulation of the legality and the practice of daily life in the Kingdom. More 
importantly, the traditional values established since the beginning of the Wahhabi 
movement have been re-elaborated and recreated by Saudi society. The stress on the 
commitment of the individuals towards religion, the importance of religious learning 
and their role as members of the community to recreate those principles continue to the 
present as was exposed in the fourth chapter. 
The religious scholars have continued to exercise their influence through their 
input upon the articulation of the roles of the members of the community. The issue of 
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fatawa has regulated and shaped the practices of individuals, who produce and 
reproduce regulations and therefore has contributed to the maintenance of regime 
legitimacy. The government has helped the ulama in this regard by providing the 
institutionalisation of their offices and enabling them to carry out their activities. After 
all, the generation and maintenance of values and norms have been the most important 
element in maintaining legitimacy over the long term. 
Religion as a source of legitimacy has proven to be a double-edged sword for 
the Kingdom and its stance as a Muslim and conservative country. From the 1950s, the 
country has not been immune to challenges emanating from radical ideologies such as 
pan-Arabism, socialism and communism coming from abroad or from domestic groups 
inside the country. In particular during the decade of the eighties, as a consequence of 
both the Mecca Uprising and the external challenges stemming mainly from 
revolutionary Iran, Wahhabi principles were re-asserted in order to protect the country 
from those challenges. In this context and particularly when a challenge to the ulama's 
legitimacy and the regime exists, the ulama have had to reinforce their independence 
vis-d-vis the government, creating conflict in the relationship. 
As has been analysed, during the decade of the eighties the ulama had a 
considerable impact on the implementation of certain issues. For example, the ulama 
openly opposed the government policy of mortage-backed lending on the grounds that 
this policy contravened Islamic principles, a stance that was supported by sectors of the 
Saudi population. After the ulama's stance, the government withdrew the policy. 
However the legitimacy of the government was not questioned, when, in the economic 
crisis, the government implemented some financial measures such as the issuing of 
bonds in 1987. Nonetheless, because of the ulama's reaction, the government decided to 
spend the money generated from the profits on public works following Islamic 
principles. This issue over the question of banking remained as a "public debate" along 
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the decade of 1980s and raised a conflict of interest, since the arbitration of commercial 
and business problems became trapped in the existence of a double legal system, where 
the shari'a court tended to favour the debtors. 
In contrast, cooperation existed between the ulama and the government for the 
implementation of the programme known as 'Saudisation'. The programme not only has 
an economic objective, but also a social objective delineated in such a way as to protect 
Saudi society from foreign ideas. 
The ulama's role in the recreation and enforcement of the shari'a continued 
during the decade of 1980s and, particularly, with the help of the government, acquired 
a greater margin of manoeuvre enforcing religious regulations on women's role in 
society. Women, being the stable category of the social system, have been more likely 
to uphold the religious norms and social practices attached to them, by the ulama, the 
government and society in general. Enforcing religious practice regarding the role of 
women has reverberated in the sustenance of both the religious credentials of the regime 
and the maintenance of the religious values of the society. The conflict between 
government and ulama was raised when the government invited women to work in 
public offices. However, later the government issued a decree formalising the ban on 
women working in the governmental offices and in private business. 
Another area that has been traditionally part of the ulama's domain has been 
education. In spite of the emergence of universities with a curriculum more oriented 
toward the study of other areas than religion, the ulama still maintain their upper hand 
in general education. The study of religion in formal and informal systems continues to 
the present day but despite the rising numbers of students, the ratio to the total number 
students has been decreasing. However in the future this area, due to the challenges 
imposed by globalisation and the economic needs of the country, could be the cause of 
conflict. 
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In the case of foreign policy the participation of ulama is mainly restricted to the 
spread of Islam abroad, a practice encouraged by the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 
based on her role as guardian of the holy places. Whenever a challenge has been issued, 
such as by the stances of the revolutionary government of Iran and the Libyan 
government, by the Iraqi threat during the Gulf war, or by the emergence of domestic 
opposition, the ulama have defended the King and the country. This stance has been 
consistent with their historical role as defenders of the unity of the community 
Government policies and the role of the ulama have not been exempt from 
contestation emanating from groups and individuals inside the Kingdom. Islam, as the 
main source of legitimacy has also been invoked as a source of contestation. The cases 
of contestation presented highlighted that the ulama and government acted in tandem to 
preserve the stability of the system. However, the ulama's position was not immediately 
"spelled out" in the case of the take-over of the Mosque. The ulama's reaction should 
not be regarded only in the light of their condemnation of the groups or individuals, 
either as defending their position as the sole interpreters of the Islamic sources, or as 
defenders of the unity of the community. Their participation in the contestation lies in 
the fact that the official ulama have also been the educators of those who are 
challenging the system. In the case of the Islamic opposition of the 1990s even senior 
official ulama agreed with the demands of the non-conformist ulama, but not with the 
political implications of their demands. In spite of their condemnation of the emergence 
of the opposition group CDLR and the main leaders of the opposition, neither the ulama 
nor the government entered into the debate concerning the content of the Islamist 
opposition. Once more the government and ulama had cooperated in preserving the 
integrity of the Kingdom. Specifically the ulama had reiterated the role of the 
government in enforcing and upholding religion, as the main values related to the 
legitimacy of the government. On the other hand, the ulama had been able to maintain 
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their leverage with the oppositionist leaders, especially Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-
Audah, as a way to mediate between both the government and the opposition and 
particularly to moderate the stance of the Islamic opposition. 
In spite of the fact that the opposition groups do not currently represent a threat 
to the government or to the political system, since they have neither a clear platform nor 
the support of larger segments of the society, their claims should not be discounted. 
Their reinterpretation broke the homogenisation of the official discourse about the 
representation of the past and the role of religion, premises on which government and 
ulama are sustained. Their call for a model based on the co-operation between 
government and ulama, as was established during the first Saudi state indicated a 
reinterpretation still anchored in the traditions of the society. The criticism over the role 
of religion, government and ulama, proved that a sector from the society was not 
satisfied with the fundamentals of Saudi society. 
In general the influence of the Islamic opposition upon the government and 
religion has tended to polarise the society between two extreme positions, the middle 
way or the moderate position then is scarce. The role of the ulama in this situation 
becomes fundamental for the society and for both parties, in order to keep the unity of 
the community and in this way continue to exercise their mediation between 
government and society. This important role explains why the ulama as an institution, 
will remain over the long term, in spite of the government's attempt to create other 
instances of power, namely the specialised committees, the creation of different 
ministries in charge of the religious affairs and the recently established Council of 
Islamic Affairs. Not giving the ulama enough credibility will continue to affect 
government legitimacy. 
The major challenge for the ulama is not a matter of government control, but 
how much weight their opinion and guidance can prevail over the beliefs and practices 
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of the population. The increasing number of persons accessing satellite TV, the 
adoption of western forms of behaviour, access to internet and the pressures on the 
Kingdom to open up its frontiers to the world market are important sources of 
competition in the ulama's domain. 
Throughout this study voice has given to different groups and individuals and 
their practices, showing through consent and contestation, how Saudi society has 
different tendencies that differ from the liberal and conservative tendencies that are 
often portrayed in studies about the Kingdom. In each issue presented notice has been 
served concerning the different positions at stake. However, Saudi Arabia remains to a 
large extent "terra incognita" for social research. It is in that domain that research needs 
to be done, contributing to a full understanding of how Saudi society evolves. Currently 
an examination of the "new" proposals that the recently freed Islamist opposition 
leaders have launched deserves special attention. 
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